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Abstract 
 
 
This assessment of European Union foreign policy towards the South Caucasus shows that while 
the EU has developed a coherent transport policy since 1992, paradoxically, it has had no 
corresponding coherent conflict resolution policy for this region. The fact that the EU deepened 
transport cooperation without a mediation policy in an area with a multiplicity of protracted 
conflicts is a puzzle. Although the EU eventually added mediation to its policy during the Russia-
Georgia armed conflict in 2008, it was unable to facilitate a political solution. 
 
The research examines what has been the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. 
The dissertation argues that incoherence in conflict resolution policy has been consequent upon two 
causal factors: (i) preferences of the EU member states conditioned by their historical experience 
with Russia, and (ii) institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
By contrast, with functional approach, the three dominant factors that have enabled coherence in 
transport cooperation are (i) legislative alignment, (ii) common transport area, including technical 
assistance for transit development, and (iii) restrictive measures. Examination of these two areas of 
EU foreign policy, shows a discrepancy, demonstrating its inconsistent nature. 
 
The theoretical framework of realism and liberal intergovernmentalism, is applied to empirically 
grounded EU foreign policy analysis. Adopting a case study methodology, this work examines the 
EU’s policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, with special focus on Georgia between 1992-2014. 
The research combines social science methods of literature review, document analysis and expert 
interviews.  
 
 
Keywords: EU, CFSP, ENP, EaP, transport policy, legislative alignment, conflict resolution, 
the South Caucasus, Russia. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
This scholarly assessment of European Union (EU) foreign policy towards the South Caucasus 
demonstrates that while the EU has developed a coherent policy in a sectoral area of transport since 
1992, paradoxically it has had no coherent corresponding conflict resolution policy for this region. 
The fact that the EU deepened cooperation in its transport policy without a conflict resolution 
policy in an area with a multiplicity of protracted conflicts is a puzzle. Although the EU eventually 
added conflict mediation, as a form of conflict resolution dimension to its foreign policy during the 
armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation in 2008, member states of the EU 
found it hard to facilitate a political solution during the Geneva Process, as was the intent of the 
common foreign policy. 
  
1.1. Research Question 
 
This dissertation examines what has been the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South 
Caucasus. It argues that incoherence in conflict resolution policy has been consequent upon two 
causal factors: (i) preferences of the EU member states conditioned by their historical experience 
with Russia, and (ii) institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
This thesis further argues that in contrast to its lack of progress in mediation, the EU has been 
coherent in facilitating a high level of cooperation in transport in the South Caucasus. Examining 
the grounds for a coherent transport policy, the thesis found three dominant factors that have 
allowed for such coherence: (i) legislative alignment in transport, (ii) creating a common transport 
area, including technical assistance for transit development, and (iii) restrictive measures in 
maritime transport policy. The foreign policy instrument of restrictions and rewards that the EU 
used in the transport area encouraged institutional reforms in the neighbourhood countries. 
Transport provides a common ground for interaction between the EU and its neighbours. The main 
task is to show that an analysis of a Common Transport Policy (CTP) conducted externally towards 
the South Caucasus has been largely neglected. Examination of these two areas of EU policy 
demonstrates the inconsistent nature of EU foreign policy. Being the first of its kind of evaluation 
of these two aspects is significant, not just because it is a novel way of conceptualising the EU’s 
external actions, but also because it marks a functional aspect of EU policy implementation. 
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1.2. Discussion and Hypothesis 
 
This thesis is grounded on academic and policy debate about the EU’s eastern neighbourhood 
foreign policy.1 The EU seeks to facilitate stability in its neighbourhood, which visibly translates 
into political, economic, and social cooperation. However, the EU’s increasing involvement does 
not mean corresponding coherence in conflict resolution in this region. The EU has exercised a 
reactive instead of a reflective response to conflict resolution towards this region since 1992. 
Following the conflict between Russia and Georgia, which is regarded as the most significant recent 
crisis in European security on its eastern borders and a defining moment in the EU’s relations with 
the region, the EU was undecided whether, and how, to intervene. Since the launch of the CFSP, 
even though the EU has declared a common policy reflected in its joint actions, EU member states 
have not had concerted positions about their eastern neighbours. As scholars have often pointed out, 
the EU member states are frequently disunited about their external policy, and their shared foreign 
policy competencies are not meant to be common, the problem that lies in the institutional 
framework of CFSP. Literature about coherence of EU’s foreign policy regarding transport towards 
the South Caucasus remains scarce, a gap which this thesis intends to fill. The thesis further 
questions the notion of the common foreign policy, that presupposes the EU as a unitary actor on 
the international stage and sheds clarity on the conventional understanding about this policy. The 
question about EU policy in the South Caucasus is thus embedded in a wider research problem 
about the existence of the EU’s common foreign policy across sectors. 
 
Foreign policy of the EU in the South Caucasus requires a scientific explanation to establish 
knowledge about EU’s common neighbourhood by deriving general principles of the EU’s 
involvement. Observing that no in-depth analysis has to date been conducted on patterns of policy 
consistency in its eastern neighbourhood, this thesis seeks to contribute to the construction of a 
more nuanced understanding of the key determinants of the EU’s policy. This is achieved by tracing 
the EU’s policies in mediation and transport and judging against their output. An assessment of the 
effects of the EU regional transport cooperation in Georgia and more generally in the South 
Caucasus helps to understand what the EU can accomplish in mediation when it is committed to 
policy cooperation along its eastern borders. The research and analysis has particular time relevance 
as the EU advances into its new phase of the common foreign policy with the implementation of the 
                                                          
1 Approach of the EU in the South Caucasus was examined in a preceding work of the author, see: Nino Kereselidze, 
“International Engagement in Georgia: The Abkhazian and South Ossetian Conflicts,” MA Thesis (Budapest: Central 
European University, 2008).  The realist and liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework of explanation, and the 
EUFP concept also builds on the earlier work of the author, see: Nino Kereselidze, “The New Great Game: The 
Engagement of the European Union in the Russian – Georgian War,” MSc Thesis (The Netherlands: Vrije University 
Amsterdam, 2009). 
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Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2009. Comparability identified between these two policies is a useful 
guide for EU policy formation in other policy areas in the South Caucasus. Establishing this 
knowledge has fundamental implications for EU policy implementation in other sectors and can 
also inform other parts of its neighbourhood in the international arena. This thesis engages on a 
theoretical level, but it also has relevance for the policy sphere. 
 
EU policy in the South Caucasus has become an increasingly relevant aspect of both academic and 
policy debate. The crisis in Georgia was indicative of the EU’s inability as an international conflict 
manager to prevent an escalating conflict in its immediate neighbourhood.2 This limitation presents 
itself as an experience for European foreign policy makers to develop a more advanced common 
policy to prevent conflicts that can pose a challenge to Europe’s security. With this experience in 
mind, EU external policy retains importance for political, economic, and social stability in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. This thesis engages with two thematic audiences interested in the topic of the EU: 
those dealing with conflict resolution, and those engaged in external relations in transport. The 
target audience can be regarded as academic communities, policymaking structures, and 
institutional authorities, primarily in, but not limited to, the EU, as well as in Georgia, the Republic 
of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Findings of the thesis can serve as scholarly reference 
material for policy makers in their policy thinking and practice. Robust engagement from the EU in 
sectoral areas is essential for the South Caucasus. This also requires international cooperation 
among the EU, Russia, and the United States of America (US). Being directed to a mixed audience, 
the academic merit of this thesis is to learn from the various aspects of EU policy. 
 
Against an extensive body of literature on EU conflict resolution, the thesis suggests a distinctive 
imprint showing that the EU maintains coherence in its transport policy towards the South 
Caucasus, whilst conflict resolution reveals significant limitations. Observing the progress of EU 
policy from 1992 to 2014 enables key instances of the EU’s involvement to be captured and the 
nature of its policy to be explained. The research adds to existing knowledge of EU policy on 
transport as applied to the South Caucasus by distinguishing between various degrees of 
consistency across policy formation and implementation. EU policy towards this region can be 
divided into three phases: 1) since the EU was founded with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 up until 
2004 when the EU began to take an interest in the strategic economic geographic location and 
transit potential of the South Caucasus but was hesitant about conflict resolution; 2) the period from 
2004 to 2008, which is distinguished by an increasing institutional involvement of the EU in 
                                                          
2 Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, (eds.) The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager (London: Routledge, 
2012). 
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establishing the neighbourhood policy and sending its representation to the South Caucasus; 3) 
between 2008-2014, when the EU emerged as a mediator in conflict and concluded the Association 
Agreement (AA) with Georgia that evidences the EU’s commitment to engage in sectoral areas. 
Hence this research examines EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus from 1992 and ends 
with the signing of the AA in 2014. 
 
1.3. Theoretical Premise 
 
In the absence of a plausible general theory that would explain foreign policy of an entity that is not 
a state, the thesis applies a realist and liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework to an 
empirically grounded EU foreign policy analysis. As an original contribution to the study of 
International Relations (IR), the thesis contends that EU common policy is limited because 
differences among the member states prevails, as is correctly explained by the mainstream theories 
of IR realism and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). From the narrow focus on two aspects of the 
EU’s foreign policy regarding conflict resolution and transport, the thesis is opened up to a 
theoretical debate over the European Union Foreign Policy (EUFP). Thus, the introductory chapter 
of this thesis outlines definitions of the EUFP developed by Christopher Hill, Richard Whitman, 
Lisbeth Aggestam, Roberto Domínguez, Dieter Grimm, Jan Zielonka, Knud Jørgensen, Brian 
White, Holger Stritzel, Roy H. Ginsberg, and Karen E. Smith, which demonstrate the evolution of 
foreign policy.3 This evolution requires an inclusive explanation of the form of power Europe is 
combining, normative, soft, civilian, and military power EU. 
 
After defining the EUFP, the first part of the theoretical chapter examines institutional framework 
of the CFSP drawing on functionalist approach by David Mitrany.4 The same part analyses liberal 
constructivist and normative underpinnings of EU foreign policy advanced by Alexander Wendt, 
Emanuel Adler, Ted Hopf, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, Ian Manners, Florent 
Parmentier, Sonia Lucarelli, Thomas Diez, Stefan Gänzle, and Roberto Aliboni.5 A liberal approach 
suggests that the very existence of the EU’s common policy implies that the EU acts as a unitary 
actor in global politics. Shared norms foster intergovernmental solidarity that is visibly translated 
                                                          
3 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Roy H. Ginsberg, The 
European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire (Lanham: Rowman, 2001). 
4 David Mitrany, “The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional,” Journal of Common Market Studies 4 
(1965): 119-49. 
5 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ian 
Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads,” Journal of European Public Policy 13 
(2006): 182-99; Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3 (1997): 319-63. 
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into the context of the neighbourhood. It also briefly analyses normative, soft, civilian, and military 
power Europe developed by François Duchêne, Hedley Bull, Joseph S. Nye, Mario Telò, Michael 
Merlingen, Michael E. Smith, Wolfgang Wagner, Giovanna Bono, Hazel Smith, and Hanns Maull. 
As a civilian power, the EU adopts the identity of a peacemaker and uses non-military instruments 
to achieve its external goals. By becoming an international actor, the EU can be positioned between 
civilian and military power. While those approaches provide useful ways of categorising the EU, 
they do not explain its function in sectoral areas in its neighbourhood that the next part discusses. 
 
That the EU as an institution conducts common policy is contested by the realist premises 
suggested by Barry Posen, Adrian Hyde-Price, John J. Mearsheimer, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven 
E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and by Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspectives. The realist and liberal intergovernmentalist framework used by this thesis argues, that 
even though the EU has the normative basis, states have differing political and economic interests 
and preferences, following their different perceptions of systemic pressures, that shape EU foreign 
policy.6 Transposing the liberal intergovernmental perspectives into the context of the 
neighbourhood, preferences of the states condition the EU’s coherent conflict resolution policy. 
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
The thesis uses social science theories with philosophical and historical approaches to the discipline 
of IR. In doing so, the research follows ontological, epistemological and methodological 
approaches to find an academic explanation for the EU’s foreign policy. To distinguish between the 
methodology and methods used in this thesis, methodology refers to the procedure of scientific 
enquiry, and methods are techniques of collecting and analysing data.7 Acknowledging that there is 
no philosophical consensus about the definition of social sciences and production of knowledge, the 
thesis complies with the philosophical criteria of testability, falsifiability and refutability to the 
subject of enquiry. Scientific propositions in this thesis can be tested through the falsification 
method suggested by Karl Popper, which proposes that the rule of falsification is inherently built 
                                                          
6 Barry Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15 (2006): 
149-86; Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal of European Public Policy 13 
(2006): 217-34; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); Steven E. 
Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, (eds.) Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive 
Realism Revisited,” International Security 25 (2000): 128-61; Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1993): 473-
524. 
7 Patrick Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), 25. 
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into the social sciences, therefore, an inference cannot be certain.8 Empirical observations are 
constantly verified and a proposition in this thesis holds true unless it is refuted by a new 
observation. To address the limits to the epistemic certainty, following the line of thought of Imre 
Lakatos, the thesis focuses on a series of statements instead of an individual statement.9 As Thomas 
Kuhn asserts, the importance of existing theory is to lay the foundations for defining a puzzle in a 
research problem.10 This thesis explores the puzzle within the dynamics of EU engagement in the 
South Caucasus over historical instance. With an empirical methodological approach the thesis 
aims to understand EU foreign policy in a sectoral area and to this end uses a realist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist theoretical framework of analysis. 
 
The method of enquiry used in this thesis describes and explains the EU’s foreign policy and its 
output based on scientific inference. The research mainly takes an explanatory approach since the 
question deals with contemporary events that have historical connections and so need to be traced 
and explained over time. It is much in line with the Weberian account of science: 
We want to understand … the coherence and cultural significance of individual occurrences in their 
contemporary configuration, and on the other hand, the reasons for those occurrences being historically so 
and not otherwise.11 
 
Social science logic postulates that the truth about a phenomenon is virtually impossible to 
ascertain. However, considering that social facts exist independently of human observation, these 
facts make it possible to establish knowledge of the external world. Certainty of such knowledge is 
unattainable. However, reliability and validity of conclusions can be improved by resorting to the 
rules of scientific inference in methodologically sound qualitative research.12 Once descriptive 
inferences from the observed data are made with a reasonable estimate of uncertainty, description of 
the real world can be attained; and to make valid descriptive and causal inferences, the inherent 
logic underlying the research can be followed self-consciously.13 In addition, perception also opens 
the way for matters that exist independently from the social world.14 In light of this, whilst the 
researcher is aware of the impossibility to establish facts and interpret them objectively, after 
collecting social facts, i.e. empirical practices of the EU such as its directives, statements and other 
                                                          
8 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge, 1963). 
9 Imre Lakatos, “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions,” Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association (1970): 91-136. 
10 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
11 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1922), 542. 
12 Garry King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
13 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 229-30. 
14 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Bristol: Western Printing Services, 1975). 
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factual data, systematic inferences with interactive relationship between description and explanation 
are made.15 Social facts show causal explanations for EU foreign policy.  
 
In the course of the research, three methodological steps are used to determine the quality of the 
research. First, for constructing validity, the need for knowledge about the EU’s foreign policy 
regarding transport is identified.16 Second, evidence is collected and authenticity of data is verified. 
For the research to be methodologically rigorous, three major methods of literature review, 
document analysis and interviews are selected. After the heuristic process of data gathering, 
reliability and replicability of data collection methods are ensured.17 For internal validity, causal 
relationship is established, and for external validity, areas of generalisation are defined. Although 
external validity is difficult to establish in a single-case study, it is achieved by generalisations from 
theoretical relationships.18 Furthermore, the research uses analytics of narrative in which 
descriptions of events are configured in a story line.19 Single events have implications about the 
continued existence of certain developments in a region at large.20 After process tracing and 
investigating a single phenomenon, the research abstracts key features of social reality and lays out 
the ground for implications about EU foreign policy. Predictions about phenomena are made 
examining social facts in real life. The research thus aims to produce self-referential knowledge for 
propositions to bring about change.21 The thesis tries to understand the behaviour of the EU in the 
past to gain knowledge of its prospects. 
 
1.4.1. Methods 
 
The thesis uses qualitative methods of data collection and analysis from the social sciences to assess 
the EU’s foreign policy engagement in its eastern neighbourhood. Such methods are best suited to 
the social enquiry about EU foreign policy because such an approach helps with the understanding 
of the context and the logical structure of this social and political phenomenon. These methods 
predominantly include academic literature review, policy literature review, document analysis, 
expert interviews, as well as some elements from observational evidence. The thesis restricts itself 
to treating the research subject qualitatively in order to gain insights into the substance of the 
process, and the intensity and logic of EU policy making. 
                                                          
15 Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 
(US: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
16 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014). 
17 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 46. 
18 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 
19 John Creswell, Quantitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches (London: Sage, 2007), 
54. 
20 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
21 Patrick Baert, Philosophy of Social Sciences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 169. 
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The research relies on multiple sources of evidence. Secondary sources of social science works 
include voluminous scholarly books, articles and papers. Systemic research in specialist books, 
textbooks, and peer-reviewed periodicals identified a scarcity of literature on EU external policy in 
the sectoral area of transport, let alone it being applied to the South Caucasus. Policy-related 
literature encompasses contemporary policy documents, such as studies, policy papers, and 
handbooks. This also includes a review of the print and digital media, including newspapers and 
records. As primary sources, document analysis draws on the study of primary material of legal and 
working documents, notably: treaties, constitutions, agreements, memoranda of understanding, 
mandates, statements, reports, action plans, and press releases. The thesis studies sources of EU 
law, which is mainly comprised of the primary (treaties) and secondary (regulations, directives, 
decisions, and recommendations) legislation, with the aim to compare EU legislation with policy 
making in practice. Content analysis is used to make inferences from the documents.22 Discourse 
analysis is employed to understand political discourse evolving around EU policy towards the 
South Caucasus. For this purpose, declaratory statements by the EU institutions are analysed to 
show how the policy is achieved on a discursive level. As subchapters 2.1 and 4.1 show, to retain 
the eastern neighbourhood within its realm of control, despite the legislative alignment 
demonstrated in the area of transport, the EU nevertheless keeps boundaries with its “partners.” 
 
An empirical case study of the Russia-Georgia conflict offers the meaning behind generally 
observable patterns in EU policy. For this purpose, primary material for discourse analysis is 
identified in the documents of the EU institutions (European Commission, Council of the European 
Union, European Parliament), and the documents from the executive and legislative offices in some 
EU member states (Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Office 
of the President of the French Republic, Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Parliament of the Italian Republic). Relevant 
documents are also availed at other governmental executive and legislative offices (Administration 
of the President of Georgia, Parliament of Georgia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 
Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, Administration of the President of 
the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MID), United States 
of America Department of State), and intergovernmental offices (United Nations (UN), 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (CoE), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)). 
                                                          
22 Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in Education and Social Science 
(London: Open University Press, 2005). 
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The research mobilises open sources that can be cross-referenced, but given the scarce material 
available on EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus, a third method of semi-structured in-
depth expert interviews is a focal method of data collection. Knowledge of experts directly involved 
in discussions both at the European and at the neighbourhood levels, is a targeted source of 
information related to the topic of EU policy in relation to the South Caucasus. Since research is 
about EU foreign policy, the focus of the interviews is towards the experts from the EU policy 
making community. For comparative expert analysis, similar questions were posed to the experts 
from the policy making circles in the South Caucasus. Findings from the interviews suggest a more 
varied impression than does the present literature on the EU, and include explanations and causal 
inferences about EU policy. The scarcity of academic literature on the EU’s engagement in the 
South Caucasus and restricted access to primary material, such as records of the debates and other 
confidential data, make interviews an even more telling source. 
 
Substantial fieldwork has been undertaken for this dissertation. The primary dimension of this work 
includes 66 out of a total of 75 semi-structured interviews with policy makers, experts and 
stakeholders from over 50 governmental, international and non-governmental institutions, research 
centres, and industries conducted in different locations: Brussels, the Hague, London, 
Belfast/Derry, Budapest, Riga, Baku, Yerevan/Sevan, and Tbilisi/Batumi between 2008 and 2014. 
The research draws heavily on overseas fieldwork in the South Caucasus capitals of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia in 2014. Interviews have been conducted through various means, 
including face-to-face, by telephone, online and from public lectures. The researcher’s positionality 
during data collection also differed. Informants were asked specific questions from the same theme, 
but the semi-structured interview format allowed open answers. Transcribed and decoded data were 
analysed and compared over an extended period of time. Preliminary data gathering raised the need 
for altering the research question and hypothesis, and modifying the theory. 
 
The final means of gaining information, that is not regarded as a method but contains elements of 
data collection, is participatory research in the form of direct observation on the ground during the 
author’s work placements in both EU and South Caucasus countries. This integrates findings from 
the author’s working at a government ministry dealing with the harmonisation of national economic 
policies with the European standards in a South Caucasus country of Georgia; at an 
intergovernmental agency encouraging the national governments to adhere to international and 
European standards; and at the international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) supported by 
the EU working on matters related to the South Caucasus. Observation of daily work in a wide 
range of offices covered empirical events in real time. It is acknowledged that because this 
10 
observation was contextual of a particular policy aspect, reality gained during observation cannot 
constitute the full picture. However, observational evidence to which the researcher was exposed 
shows extra information about the subject of enquiry and helps to gain a fuller understanding of the 
picture. This observation sheds unique light into technical facets of the transport policy making, 
which, due to the nature of government policy making, is not always possible to acquire otherwise. 
 
Research for this thesis was undertaken following ethical standards. Ethics and dilemmas in 
qualitative research were taken into account. In particular, a position within the boundaries of 
academic and professional practice was defined. When engaging with human participants, time, 
objectives, methodology, publication, and other obligations were negotiated. To ensure their 
privacy, respondents were asked for their consent to be recorded and approvals were received.23 
Sources are acknowledged and participants’ contributions are credited, but responses remain 
anonymous and information is treated with confidentiality. Ethics approval was obtained from the 
University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) at the University of St Andrews.24 
 
Research has to limit its remit in terms of authenticity, validity, space and time. The author 
recognises that her thinking was contingent upon the context from which her interest in the topic 
emerged. Choice of the topic, theories, methods, data, and interpretation has been inherently laden 
with the researcher’s values. To establish authenticity and validity of data, and to avoid selective 
reporting and distortion, evidence was scrutinised and cross-referenced by consulting a spectrum of 
primary and secondary material in its original in the English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, 
Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian sources. Extracting information from the 
national parliamentary debates of all member states of the EU on their involvement after the crisis 
posits an additional challenge, as they are published in national languages or are available only 
upon official request. The primary limit to the research remains a lack of access to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia for Georgian nationals, owing to restrictions over the Administrative Boundary Line 
(ABL) with the de facto entities. In particular, the author is restricted to engage with the separatist 
jurisdictions by her position and identity at a government department within the civil service in 
Georgia. Access to data and information in the conflict regions also remains constrained. In 
academic terms, this limitation was overcome by consulting international experts, quoting officials 
and academics from podcasts of public lectures delivered during their visits in European capitals, as 
well as by accessing rarity media, notably digital documentary releases produced in the autonomies. 
As an added dimension, due to diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia being suspended, 
                                                          
23 Marlene De Laine, Fieldwork, Participation and Practice: Ethics and Dilemmas in Qualitative Research (London: 
Sage, 2000). 
24 For the UTREC Ethics Approval Form see Appendix 4. 
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and the lack of communication with policy makers in Russia posits another limitation. Last but not 
least, the requirement to complete the PhD studies within the three-year-postgraduate programme in 
the UK, the returning commitment to the civil service and higher education in Georgia, as well as 
funding for this research project were additional technical circumstances for the thesis. 
 
1.5. Case Study Research Design 
 
The research is based on a single-case study which contains more than one unit of analysis to 
answer the question posed in the thesis. The single-case study is a process of understanding the 
origins and context of a social phenomenon by gathering, verifying, and synthesising evidence to 
establish general facts. The purpose of using the single-case design is to establish findings that may 
defend or refute a hypothesis. Using empirical research design, the in-depth study of a single case 
captures the unique features of the case and makes inferences from the evidence of this case. 
 
Although case study is a common research method used in the social science disciplines to 
understand complex social phenomena, such an approach is also contentious. A common argument 
regarding a case study is that cases generate context-dependent knowledge that is difficult to 
generalise.25 Other scholars think that a case study does not need to be generalisable, rather, it needs 
to feed into processes of “naturalistic generalisation.”26 For many other theorists, the aim of the 
single-case approach is to conduct a generalising and not a particularising analysis, because a 
phenomenon has a unique nature to be a raw material for generalisation and in that form it can 
contribute to scientific development.27 Knowledge of a case in this thesis is generalised to the larger 
segments of the research population. In some instances, the thesis employs a comparative approach 
to compare the EU’s transport policy to the South Caucasus countries with other countries of the 
EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The comparative perspective helps to acquire a certain analytical 
distance and hence allows for a better understanding of the case. Implications derived from this case 
are informative about the EU’s foreign policy in other parts of its neighbourhood. 
 
The primary case of the research examines the EU’s approximation policy for transport with three 
South Caucasus countries between 1992 and 2014. It draws on small samples of EU involvement in 
                                                          
25 Lee Ruddin, “You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study Methodology,” 
Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2006): 797-812. 
26 Robert Stake and Deborah Trumbull, “Naturalistic Generalization,” Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 
7 (1982): 1-12. 
27 Seymour Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International 
Typographical Union (New York: Free Press, 1956). 
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the South Caucasus, and investigates in depth and quality the empirical case of EU policy with 
Georgia. It then reveals patterns of the EU’s inconsistent policy formation. The second level of 
observation is the EU’s approach to protracted conflicts between Georgia and Russia over two 
secessionist territories: the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and Tskhinvali Region (former 
Autonomous Region (Oblast) of South Ossetia (SOAR)). This empirical context is narrowed down 
to conflict in 2008, when the EU emerged as a mediator in the South Caucasus, which brings to 
light the EU mediation capacity by reaching a peace agreement, deploying a civilian mission, and 
commencing the main negotiating format of the Geneva International Discussions (GID). The peace 
accord, which excluded the interests of the conflicting parties, and the Geneva Process have not 
facilitated compliance to four out of six points, speaks for the limitation in EU mediation. 
 
By exploring the EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus, next to the EU’s involvement in 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the research by extension, at some instances, makes 
comparisons to the EU’s approach to the third conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh between other two 
countries of the South Caucasus – Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, due to limitations of the 
research scope and the fact that the EU has not engaged in Nagorno-Karabakh, the thesis does not 
explore this case in depth. Connected to the theme of mediation, another recent conflict in Europe 
where the EU assumed a role as conflict manager was Northern Ireland. The thesis briefly compares 
the EU’s third party assistance to civil society in Northern Ireland with the South Caucasus. Whilst 
the EU engaged in peacebuilding in together with the civil society in Georgia, this did not input into 
conflict resolution policy. The research treats mediation and transport in terms of policy outputs 
encapsulated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)28 concluded between the EU 
and the South Caucasus countries, and the AA agreement with Georgia. 
 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership 
 
The research also uses a comparative approach making comparisons with the EU’s involvement in 
other eastern neighborhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP). Established in 2003, the ENP extends to the EU’s sixteen immediate neighbours. 
                                                          
28 Cf. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One 
Part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the Other Part, Luxembourg, 1996, Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 239 1999, Accessed 1-08-13, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:239:0003:0036:EN:PDF; Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, of the Other Part, Luxembourg, 1996, Official Journal of the European Communities L 246 1999, Accessed 
1-08-13, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:246:0003:0038:EN:PDF; Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of 
the Other Part, Luxembourg, 1996, Official Journal of the European Communities L 205 1999, Accessed 1-08-13, 
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This geographic region encompasses Ukraine and the South Caucasus in the east, Syria to Israel in 
the Middle East, the Balkans in the southeast, and reaches Morocco westwards. The neighbourhood 
includes subregional categories of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) that includes the South Caucasus 
countries, Southern Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries otherwise known as 
Union for Mediterranean (UfM), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), and Middle East 
and Northern Africa (MENA). Policy of the EU is substantially limited in every part of its 
neighbourhood.29 Of the neighbourhood regions, the focus of this thesis is the three countries of the 
South Caucasus from the EaP region. 
  
Since 2009, the EaP has brought together the six post-Soviet eastern neighbouring countries of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, but EU policy has remained 
different with each of these countries.30 Relations between the EU and the EaP countries primarily 
rest on a bilateral format, and at the same time the EU pursues a regional approach by fostering 
cooperation among these states around common issues. The EaP region is affected by several 
protracted conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and Ukraine. The 
South Caucasus is the most representative case because this region entangles a well-defined group 
of states with similar characteristics drawn from a geographic area distinguished by a multiplicity of 
conflicts. It is fragmented with disputes between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, between Georgia and Russia, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as 
Armenia and Turkey. In all three cases of South Ossetia (1991-1992), Abkhazia (1992-1993), as 
well as Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994), ceasefire agreements were reached without final 
settlements, turning the South Caucasus into an area with unresolved conflicts. The South Caucasus 
is, therefore, remarkably more volatile than the rest of the EaP countries and deserves systematic 
attention in the study of EU foreign policy. The thesis has therefore been narrowed down to EU 
policy towards Georgia, and extends its observations to Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
The case of EU involvement in Georgia is exceptional on several grounds. First, in contrast to 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU is confronted in Georgia, which underwent a post-Soviet 
revolution in 2003, with the highest intensity of Russian engagement. Second, Georgia with its 
strategic economic and geographic location is an important transit state for diversification of energy 
                                                          
29 Raymond Hinnebush, “Europe and the Middle East: From Imperialism to Liberal Peace?” Review of European 
Studies 4 (2012): 28; Richard Gillespie, “The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Challenge of the Mediterranean 
Southern Rim,” in The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? Globalization, Europe and 
Multilateralism, ed. Mario Telò (Ashgate: Farnham, 2013), 121; George Christou, The European Union and 
Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus (Basigstoke: MacMillan, 2004); Bat Ye’or, Europe, Globalization, and the Coming 
of Universal Caliphate (Plymouth: Rowman, 2011), 148. 
30 See Figure 1. 
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supplies to Europe. Third, conflict in Georgia can have repercussions for the EU eastern 
neighbourhood. The EU’s involvement in Georgia is the most exemplary of its engagement in the 
EaP because it was during the Russia-Georgia conflict, that the EU assumed a mediator role. The 
case of EU engagement in the South Caucasus shows the significance of protracted conflicts in the 
EU’s post-Soviet neighbourhood. 
 
Why the South Caucasus? 
 
Opinions differ as to whether the South Caucasus can be viewed as a homogenous region.31 Thomas 
de Waal concludes that the South Caucasus, with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with their 
autonomous regions and breakaway entities, has not become a single viable region.32 Tracey 
German, noting that although it constitutes an important transport and communications corridor, the 
South Caucasus lacks, relatively speaking, regional cooperation.33 The European states tend to 
conceptualise their eastern neighbourhood in several ways: such as the South Caucasus, Eastern 
Europe, EaP, and the Black Sea area. This thesis regards the region in line with the EU’s regional 
approach to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, denoting the South Caucasus in its entirety as 
referred to in the EU’s strategy documents. More specifically, while the EU concluded the PCA 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in bilateral formats, since 2003 the EU has maintained the 
European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to the South Caucasus as a whole, which embodies 
the EU’s regional approach. Whilst all three countries locate themselves at the “crossroads between 
Europe and Asia,” they position themselves differently in relation to the EU. Georgia and Armenia 
identify themselves culturally more as part of Europe, whilst Georgia even pursues an explicit 
European policy. Armenia and Azerbaijan favour a balanced policy, taking into consideration 
Armenia’s political and economic dependence on Russia, and Azerbaijan’s trade relations with 
Russia.34 Self-perception of the countries also conditioned how external powers view them. 
 
For a number of reasons, it is worth overviewing some different conceptions of the South Caucasus 
as a cohesive region, which originated fairly recently. Examining contested views on what 
constitutes a region, Rick Fawn indicates that analytical enquiry about a region includes geography, 
                                                          
31 See Figure 2. 
32 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
33 Tracey German, Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus: Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives? (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2012). 
34 Tabib Huseynov, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear,” in The European Union and the South Caucasus: 
Three Perspectives on the Future of the European Project from the Caucasus, eds. Tigran Mkrtchyan et al., Gütersloh: 
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identity, institutionalisation, and the role of actors.35 In geographic terms, the Caucasus is 
determined by the Caucasus Mountains shared in the north by the North Caucasus republics within 
the Russian Federation: the Republic of Adygeya, the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, the 
Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, North Ossetia/Alania, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Chechen 
Republic, and the Republic of Daghestan. The Russian vision of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
as a land over the mountain range where Russia projected its influence, is reflected in the older term 
Transcaucasus (zakavkazie) that first originated when three states formed the Transcaucasian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) in 1922-1936. Three independent states of Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are presently termed the South Caucasus.36 
 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan share both differences and similarities. The three are located 
between the Black and Caspian Seas, Russia, Turkey and Iran, but on several geopolitical 
platforms, with different Christian and Muslim religious affiliations, as well as with different 
linguistic belonging to Indo-European (Kartvelian and Armenian) and Turkic language families. 
Because of the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the three are not economically 
interconnected either. However, all three are the part of the regional transit corridor of the Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) technical assistance programme that the EU 
developed towards the region. With a total population of 16 million, politically the three states also 
share a common Soviet history, a susceptibility to the destabilising power of Russia, as well as the 
use of Russian as a lingua franca. A legacy of conflicts makes both a common feature and causes 
regional divisions. Those scholars from Armenia who contest the notion of the South Caucasus, 
point out that up until the 19th century the concept of the South Caucasus did not exist and it 
remains a mere political construct.37 Some geopolitical analysis refers to the Caucasus, combining 
the South and North parts, which presupposes Russia but also acknowledges security challenges 
emanating from Russia, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran in this “buffer zone.”38 The region 
also tends to be identified by the EU in a wider Neighbourhood and Eastern Partnership context.39 
Another conceptualisation, often put forward by Georgian experts, is a Black Sea region, 
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(2009): 5-17. 
36 See Figure 2. 
37 Aleksander Iskandaryan, “South Caucasus between Isolation and Integration: Genesis and Prospects,” in Caucasus 
Neighbourhood: Turkey and the South Caucasus, ed. Aleksander Iskandaryan (Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, 2008), 7; 
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(Amsterdam: Pallas, 2010), 14. 
39 Synthesis and policy makers’ comments see in Rick Fawn, “Security in the South Caucasus, Conference Report,” WP 
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comprising the littoral states of the Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, the Republic 
of Turkey and Ukraine, which connects Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East.40 
Azerbaijani scholars tend to refer to the region in terms of the Caspian that includes Georgia as a 
transit country for Caspian energy but excludes Armenia.41 As a scholar from Azerbaijan pointed 
out, the South Caucasus is a region with sub-Caucasian identities manifested in mixed culture, 
while the Caspian region is more an artificially imposed identify.42 Although all Caspian countries 
are energy-based economies and share a Soviet historical past, these commonalities have not been 
transformed into their common identity. A political map of Europe is sometimes still conceptualised 
more broadly as Transcaucasia and South Eastern Europe with six unresolved conflicts in Northern 
Cyprus, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo.43 Against the 
backdrop of various conceptualisations, the empirical scope of this thesis is the South Caucasus. 
 
1.5.1. Definition of Terms 
 
Contested definitions of terms in social science, requires a definition of the key terms. This 
subchapter defines EU foreign policy, its coherence, consistency and effectiveness used across the 
thesis. It also provides definitions of war and conflict, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whereas 
conflict resolution and mediation are defined later in subchapter 4.5. The emergence of 
supranational political systems and the diversity of actors in international relations have raised a 
need to rethink the definition of political entities that do not constitute a state.44 Since foreign policy 
is traditionally seen as an attribute of a nation state, defining the EU’s foreign policy entails a 
conceptual complexity. In this context, the thesis uses the inclusive definition of foreign policy 
conducted by the EU, proposing that the EU foreign policy is a strategy of the Union that 
encompasses its positions, relations, and the actions of its member states in world politics. 
 
The combined definition proposed in this thesis draws on the concept of the EUFP advanced by 
Hill, Whitman, Jørgensen, Aggestam, Domínguez, Grimm, Zielonka, Jørgensen, White, Stritzel, 
Ginsberg, and Smith. A prominent definition of the EUFP is that of Hill which asserts that foreign 
policy is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) 
in international relations.”45 According to Whitman, assuming that foreign policy is a function of a 
                                                          
40 Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building 
(New York: Sharpe, 2004). 
41 Elkhan Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union: New Landmarks of Strategic Partnership in the South 
Caucasus–Caspian Basin,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8 (2008): 155; Moshe Gammer, (ed.) The 
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42 Interview 54. 
43 Anton Bebler, (ed.) Frozen Conflicts in Europe (London: Budrich, 2014). 
44 Ben J. J. Crum, “Representative Democracy in the EU,” European Law Journal 11 (2005): 465. 
45 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, 3. 
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state, the EU can only be the subject of enquiry in IR if it is a nation state.46 In contrast to the realist 
notion of a state, which is the unit of analysis in international politics, the EU acts in an 
increasingly interdependent world. Reflecting the transformation of foreign policy in the world, 
Aggestam explains that the EU is a new type of actor in world politics.47 As the EU is not a state, 
Domínguez notes that the EU’s foreign policy is not bound to traditional rules.48 Drawing on an 
agent-structure approach to analyse the EUFP, Domínguez distinguishes three types of agents in the 
EUFP: principal (Council), delegated (Commission and Parliament), and interest groups. 
Interaction between these three constitutes three main structures of the EUFP: organisational 
setting, foreign policy instruments, and practices. As Dieter Grimm observes, institutionally the EU 
does not resemble a state but it has developed its own model marked by supranationality.49 
Zielonka, after comparing the EU borders to a medieval instead of a Westphalian pattern, shows the 
difficulty to establish the difference between a foreign policy and a domestic policy of the EU.50 By 
examining the concept of “foreign” as a division between “inside” and “outside,” Jørgensen saw 
that the end of the Cold War created the need among the states to conduct foreign policy.51 White 
argues that although the EU does not have a state identity, its directives in external relations are 
simulacrum of a foreign policy.52 The central tenet uniting the EU scholars is that the EU is an 
entity that operates at different levels including national, supranational, neighbourhood and 
international. Taking a critical approach to security in Europe, Stritzel even points out the difficulty 
of determining Europe in geographic terms and that Europe is rather “a varied range of historical 
and cultural relations.”53 This thesis determines that, given the changing nature of world politics, 
the EUFP is an external policy conducted by the EU as a new type of entity in world politics. 
 
Using a different approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in order to study the nature of 
common foreign policy making, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman maintain that, although the 
changing nature of the EU has had a different impact on its member states, common features still 
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influence the foreign policies of EU member states.54 Bearing this in mind, Ginsberg defines the 
EUFP as “the universe of concrete civilian actions, policies, positions, relations, commitments, and 
choices of the EC (and EU) in international politics.”55 Going one step further, given its function, 
Smith positions the EU between civilian and military power.56 Drawing on the definition of 
Ginsberg, this thesis defines EU foreign policy as a strategy of the Union that entails its positions, 
relations, and actions in world politics. The thesis avails this definition as a framework for 
examining the EU’s external policy regarding transport. From this definition, EU foreign policy can 
be viewed as a symbiosis of practices and discourses. Throughout the thesis, EU foreign policy 
making is defined as a process of the EU’s long-term engagement with a particular region. 
 
The EU treaties provide an obligation for the EU to formulate a coherent, consistent and effective 
foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon (TL) determined the legal basis for the nature of EU foreign 
policy. According to Article 9, the aim of the EU is to “ensure the consistency, effectiveness and 
continuity of its policies and actions.”57 Consistency in EU external policy output is defined as the 
absence of contradictions among foreign policies. Coherence implies continuity in the foreign 
policy aspect. Similar to the contested definition of EU foreign policy, the benchmark against which 
coherence in conflict resolution policy can be measured is also debated. Whilst it is difficult to 
judge the coherence of EU policy, the thesis determines coherence by examining the results of the 
EU’s conflict resolution commitments against its outputs. It is therefore suggested that conflict 
resolution has been incoherent whereas transport policy, in contrast showed coherence. Following 
on from the adoption of the TL, the EU has aimed to use coherent efforts for conflict resolution in 
its eastern neighbourhood. However, as Smith explains, incoherent outcomes were likely to arise 
because of its fragmented legal-institutional structures.58 Coherent policy in conflict resolution and 
incoherent policy in transport are looked as inconsistent with each other.  
 
One criticism of the study of EU foreign policy is that it tends to focus on the effectiveness of the 
EU as an international actor. According to the European Security Strategy (ESS), the foreign policy 
is considered effective if the EU acts with a coherent foreign policy through a better institutional 
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coordination.59 Using its own criteria, the EU did not manage to uphold this term in the case of 
Georgia, through institutional coordination of its commitments under the mandate of the European 
Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the GID discussions. This thesis, however, 
does not pose whether EU foreign policy was effective. As Christopher Bickerton, by looking into 
the function of foreign policy within the EU concludes, because consensus on foreign affairs 
between member states matters more than the outcomes, EU foreign policy should be studied with a 
focus on functionality rather than effectiveness.60 This thesis suggests that EU foreign policy 
regarding transport area has been coherent in terms of its functionality, whereas the EU’s conflict 
resolution policy lacks this feature, it cannot be regarded coherent. 
 
The terms Abkhazia and South Ossetia also require clarification. Today Abkhazia, South Ossetia, as 
well as Nagorno-Karabakh are de facto states. After Russia recognised the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, they have become partially internationally recognised. They 
regard themselves as the Republic of Abkhazia with its capital Sukhum, and the Republic of South 
Ossetia with its capital Tskhinval, as well as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh with Stepanakert 
[sic].61 This thesis regards Abkhazia situated in the north-western part of Georgia with 
administrative capital Sokhumi, and South Ossetia in the northern-central part with administrative 
centre Tskhinvali as integral parts of Georgia, whilst Nagorno-Karabakh is viewed as integral to 
Azerbaijan located in the south-west. The thesis uses the term Abkhazia with reference to the 
Constitution of Georgia stating that “the status of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia shall be 
determined by the Constitutional Law of Georgia on the Status of the Autonomous Republic of 
Abkhazia.”62 In contrast to Abkhazia, the Constitution does not mention South Ossetia because it 
was already an autonomous region. Official status of South Ossetia is defined elsewhere in the 
Georgian legislation as a SOAR,63 and Tskhinvali Region.64 Instead of using the term South Ossetia 
that implies political bonds with North Ossetia, the Georgian Government refers to South Ossetia as 
part of the Georgian province of Shida Kartli by its historical name Samachablo. Some literature 
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suggests that such reference constitutes an effort to dilute the de facto entities to Georgia.65 In view 
of the controversy of terminology, the thesis chooses to refer to the three jurisdictions as they 
appear in UN documents as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
To distinguish between conflict and war, the thesis relies on the categorisation proposed by Peter 
Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg. In their study of armed conflicts, the authors determine that 
a minor armed conflict is a conflict when the number of battle-related deaths does not exceed 1,000, 
and an intermediate armed conflict is when over 1,000 battle-related deaths are recorded, but the 
number is below 1,000 in a year.66 According to this categorisation, war is when over 1,000 battle-
related deaths occur in any given year.67 With this in mind, developments in South Ossetia (1991-
1992), Abkhazia (1992-1993), Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994), Chechnya (1994-2007), and 
Ukraine (2014-2015) are defined as wars, but in South Ossetia (2008) as an armed conflict. 
 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis contains six chapters. The introductory chapter briefly outlines the research question, 
hypothesis, contribution, social relevance, theoretical premises, justification for the case study, 
definitions, methodology, methods and research design. The next chapter analyses three causal 
factors for incoherence in conflict resolution: preferences of EU member states, following their 
historical experience with Russia, and institutional framework of the EU common foreign policy. 
The chapter identifies a great deal of literature in EU conflict resolution in the South Caucasus and 
insufficient analysis about the sectoral area of transport in the EU’s external policy. This chapter 
also overviews normative convergence and socialisation that the EU uses in its interaction with the 
neighbourhood in four different forms of normative, soft, civilian, and military power. The same 
chapter devises a realist and liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework of explanation that 
is applied to EU foreign policy practice. 
 
Chapter three is narrowed down to focus on the transport policy explaining features of transport 
relations between the EU and the South Caucasus countries. More specifically, the first subsection 
overviews the formation of EU policy in its treaties, and the significance of the PCA and AA 
agreements as well as the EaP mechanism for EU transport policy. The second subchapter analyses 
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the three factors of legislative alignment, common area, and restrictive measures that has enhanced 
the EU’s external policy. A section within this subchapter also investigates the unexplored topic of 
maritime entry in Abkhazia, which, despite its policy coherence in transport, the EU has not 
considered in the prism of “engagement without recognition policy.” The third subchapter examines 
the development of the TRACECA transit corridor for cargo transportation. As the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia is primarily transit corridor for energy, this subchapter also studies the EU’s 
energy diversification through this region, and examines investment by EU countries in the energy 
sector that constitutes three major oil pipelines and seven gas pipelines. The final section of this 
subchapter analyses the EU’s cooperation with the UN specialised agency, International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in maritime transport that proves the coherence of EU’s transport policy 
towards the South Caucasus. 
 
Chapter four examines international involvement in the South Caucasus conflicts between 1992 and 
2014 that inhibited the EU’s conflict resolution. It starts out by examining three phases in Georgia’s 
foreign policy when it sought good relations with Russia (1991-1995), then reoriented towards the 
West (1996-2003), and pursued intense integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions 
after the Rose Revolution (2004-2013). Autonomous status created in the soviet constitutions, 
majority voting, nationalist ideology and elite manipulation prepared the ground for wars in 
Abkhazia (1991-1992) and South Ossetia (1992-1993). Russia’s ambivalent foreign policy with 
Georgia was apparent in acting as an interlocutor by signing peace agreements while offering 
assistance in mediating peace. Russia, following its wars in Chechnya and the subjugation of 
Ukraine is asserting its military presence in the former Soviet space against security changes in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia marked by US and NATO engagement. Subchapter four 
investigates the preconditions and aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, 
including the precedent of Kosovo independence, as well as the deferral of Georgia’s Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) with NATO in Bucharest. In the 1990s, the EU did not have foreign policy 
mechanisms to mediate. Subchapter five lists three major reasons why the EU foreign policy 
regarding conflict resolution has been incoherent: different interests and preferences shown by the 
member states, reliance on the UN and CSCE/OSCE that perpetuated the status quo of the conflicts, 
and an inability to utilise its own assistance to incentivise the conflicting parties. 
 
The same chapter, by putting forward views rarely published before, discovers that the engagement 
without recognition policy applied by both the EU and the Georgian Government vis-à-vis 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not facilitate conflict resolution because they did not take into 
account the internal dynamics within the two entities. Subchapter seven briefly derives implications 
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from the EU civil society assistance in the Northern Irish peace process and applies them to the 
South Caucasus context. As a result of this, the EU also approached conflicts in the South Caucasus 
in cooperation with civil society. That this cooperation could not contribute to conflict mediation 
only adds to the same conclusion of inconsistency of the EU policy. 
 
Once the context of the EU’s involvement in conflict resolution is understood, chapter five offers an 
empirical analysis of two phases in the EU’s mediation in the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, one 
in which the ceasefire was reached, and the second phase of a subsequent political settlement. The 
thesis analyses coherence of EU mediation in both phases by looking whether clauses requested by 
the conflicting parties were incorporated in the peace agreement of 12 August 200868 discussed in 
the first subchapter; and second, by comparing provisions of the agreement against its outcome over 
the Geneva Process discussed in the fourth subchapter. The thesis contends that negotiations 
reflected particular way of the EU’s diplomacy on the grounds that the agreement did not include 
provisions requested by Georgia. During the second phase of the GID, Russia did not respect most 
of the provisions. Although the outcome of deliberation within the EU was to engage, the second 
and the third subchapter analyses divergent opinions about the peacekeeping mission among some 
old and new member states conditioned by their preferences and historical experience with Russia. 
 
The final chapter concludes with the enduring question under which conditions EU foreign policy is 
consistent. As a realist and liberal integovernmentalist approach suggests, EU foreign policy tends 
to be coherent when sectoral cooperation between the EU and the neighbouring states prevails. 
After concluding the above in chapter six, the thesis indicates additional areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
 
There is a growing body of literature about EU foreign policy, however, literature on EU 
neighbourhood policy in sectoral areas, such as transport, is rather limited. Literature that mentions 
transport in the context of governance within the EU does not discuss EU external policy on 
transport, which, however, exists in practice. After a brief overview of how EU policy was formed 
in founding treaties, the first subchapter examines literature on institutional framework of the EU 
foreign policy. The next subchapter analyses liberal constructivist and normative underpinnings of 
the European Union Foreign Policy Making (EUFP). The same part identifies that EU power 
combines normative, soft, civilian, and military power. The third subchapter engages in literature 
on realism and LI, which serves as a theoretical tool for the argument in this thesis. The fourth 
subchapter discusses the state of the art in the literature on the EU’s neighbourhood policy in the 
South Caucasus. Whilst EU foreign policy is studied extensively, literature on the EU’s external 
policy regarding transport hardly exists. This is discussed in the last subchapter. 
 
2.1. Institutional Framework of the EU Foreign Policy 
 
After an overview of development of the EU foreign policy, this subchapter argues that the reason 
for limited coherence in conflict resolution with its neighbourhood lies in the institutional 
framework of CFSP. By contrast, in the sectoral area of transport with functional cooperation, the 
EU policy shows coherence. After presenting functionalist premises in IR, that focuses on common 
interests and needs shared by states, an account will be suggested of the realist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist assumptions. 
 
Integration historiography has been distinguished by deepening and widening of communitarian 
integration since the 1950s. The origins of EU foreign policy are found in four founding Treaties of 
the European Union, and the ESS.69 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
also known as the Treaty of Rome, effective since 1958, created contours of foreign policy denoted 
as “external action” that is defined as “the Union’s action on the international scene” by introducing 
development cooperation and delegations into third countries.70 Devising foreign policy in the post-
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Cold War period was a response to internal and external realities for the EU. As Andrew Williams 
observes, when the East-West divide in terms of the Warsaw pact versus the European Community 
lost its relevance it became difficult to draw the boundaries in Europe.71 After the collapse of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the 
European Community (EC) succeeded in projecting stability to Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE).72 This is considered to be achieved by establishing CFSP with the TEU, also known as the 
Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991.73 The Treaty of Amsterdam amended the TEU in 1997, and 
brought in a common foreign and security policy to promote still greater solidarity among the 
member states.74 Changes in international security, marked by the terrorist acts of 11 September 
2001 in the US and invasion in Iraq in 2003, required multilateral collective action from the EU. 
 
The need to respond more strategically to challenges was proclaimed in the ESS developed under 
the leadership of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) for CFSP Havier Solana. In 
Security Strategy, the EU emphasised the need for a consistent foreign policy with transatlantic 
cooperation to “promote a ring of well governed countries” and, related to its eastern 
neighbourhood, to “take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern 
Caucasus.”75 Five years later, the Council in its Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy assessed that the EU had created a robust framework for relations with countries 
to the east and had acquired a new dimension for the EaP.76 With the Russia-Georgia conflict in 
2008, the Report considered that the EU needed to extend its power with political, military, and 
economic instruments in its neighbourhood, as laid out in the amended Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Ratified in 2009, the TL aimed to introduce consistency in EU foreign policy by dissolving its pillar 
structure, but retaining distinctiveness in supranational and intergovernmental procedures in 
policymaking. Whereas the Treaty retains foreign policy at intergovernmental level, its external 
economic relations and functions are delegated to the Commission and the Parliament.77 This 
Treaty also established the European External Action Service (EEAS) to promote consistency in the 
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EU’s external relations by creating two posts: the Permanent President of the Council, accepted by 
Herman Van Rompuy, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission under Baroness Ashton. According to some 
prevalent views, this reform complicated the institutional framework for foreign policy.78 Prior to 
Lisbon, competencies in EU foreign policy making were dispersed across the Commission, the 
Council, and an HR. As Wolfgan Wagner argues, the CFSP could benefit from a competency 
transfer to the Commission as a supranational structure.79 After adoption of the TL, as some authors 
note, although the EU aimed to achieve coherence in its action, even by including Commission 
delegations in the EU external action, it has still found it difficult to bring coherence in conflict 
resolution policy and consistency in EU’s external relations.80 The fundamental reason for this 
limitation lies in the institutional framework of CFSP. EU member states tend to take different 
positions about foreign and security policy for clearly explicable reasons. Shared foreign policy 
competencies are not meant to be common that is contingent upon institutional conditions. As 
Michael E. Smith argued, states are unable to share competencies with divergent preferences and 
foreign policy priorities.81 This constitutes a complex pattern of EU foreign policy on political 
engagement in its neighbourhood. However, in the sectoral area of transport, the EU policy shows 
coherence, the reason of which rests in functional nature of cooperation with its neighbourhood. 
 
Functionalist vision of international governance, later referred as integration theory, accentuates 
institutionalised cooperation.82 Taking a functional approach to international conflict management, 
David Mitrany argued that international cooperation that rests on functional agencies, working in 
technical and economic sectors, have functional responsibilities in managing those issue areas for 
which there is a consensus to cooperate.83 Security from functional perspective is concerned with 
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economic interaction besides high political affairs. Collective governance and material 
interdependence between states produces internal dynamics.84 As the author concludes, geographic 
association no longer corresponds to the interests of the EU’s neighbours.85 In functionalist critique, 
David Long argued for a functional approach that emphasises intergrative aspects of security. The 
author proposed that openness in trade policies, that as noted above include elements of security, 
with the EU neighbours and technical cooperation would enable functional cooperation across 
Europe.86 By this, it can be distinguished between “low politics,” i.e. functional cooperation, versus 
“high politics,” i.e. political and security cooperation. Following this line of reasoning, security in 
the EU’s neighbourhood is provided through functional cooperation. EU sectoral policy reflects 
functionalist regional integration rather than a geographic strategy towards the neighbourhood. 
  
2.2. The Use of Normative Convergence and Socialisation 
 
Discussion of common foreign policy requires an understanding of the normative convergence and 
socialisation that the EU uses in its interaction with the neighbourhood for foreign policy purposes. 
In these relations, the EU assumes a certain form of power examined across the four forms of 
normative, soft, civilian, and military power Europe within this subchapter. 
  
EUFP analysis implies that the EU as a unitary actor with a common perception on shared norms 
conducts a common policy in global affairs. The following line of thought is that these norms foster 
feelings of intergovernmental solidarity visibly translated into common policy. Normative 
convergence and socialisation are sought with countries as a means of interaction. The EUFP has 
clear liberal constructivist and normative underpinnings put forward by Wendt, Adler, Hopf, 
Finnemore and Sikkink, Manners, Parmentier, Lucarelli, Diez, Gänzle, and Aliboni. According to 
the liberal constructivist account, the EU strives to achieve global peace by exporting its values to 
the international arena. These values of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law as 
laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and encompassed in the 
European law of the acquis communautaire after the Copenhagen meeting in 1993, are to be shared 
among the EU member states.87 Such a perspective is based on a wider theoretical framework of 
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social constructivism. According to this ontological assumption by Wendt, Adler, Hopf, Finnemore 
and Sikkink, subjective positions of the actors are mutually constructed with social interaction 
resulting in the shared ideas and perceptions that act as an intersubjective structure.88 This structure 
constitutes common identity that determines the preferences and interests of the actors. The next 
line of thought focuses on normative convergence between the EU and its neighbours. Following 
Manners, the EU acts with a common set of values and norms, referred to as a normative core, that 
serves as guidance for EU foreign policy.89 According to Permentier and Lucarelli, having created a 
shared understanding by interaction with other actors, instead of coercion the EU conflates norms 
with its international presence in its foreign policy.90 This framework of interaction views 
socialisation as minimising the differences between the actors. The normative model prescribes that 
the “other” needs to be socialised, and the boundaries between “self” and “other” will be removed, 
yet the EU will retain a position of directorship.91 This is achieved on a discursive level by using 
language, such as “friends,” and on a political level by appraisal or shaming.92 Since the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU now borders on Black Sea region where the EU meets two of its 
traditional “others:” Russia, and Turkey.93 The EUFP hence aims to foster cooperation in the South 
Caucasus by infusing norms that incrementally reduce the security threat and achieve stability. 
 
In the South Caucasus, the EU approaches its neighbours with normative convergence using the 
ENP and the EaP instruments. An economic component, entailing the norms of market economy, 
has been a complementary part used by the EU to export its values to the former communist 
countries by extending economic tools to attain stability.94 As an added dimension to exporting 
values, the EUFP sustains economic assets by opening new markets for the EU.  
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2.2.1. Europe as a Normative, Soft, Civilian, and Military Power  
 
Over the last thirty years, literature on the EU has advanced four main concepts that characterise the 
EU in global politics. The EU, being neither an emerging federal state nor a traditional 
intergovernmental entity of sovereign states, is often viewed as a particular postmodern form of 
power.95 Among the most prevalent concepts within this form of power are normative, soft, civilian, 
and military power Europe developed by Duchêne, Bull, Nye, Telò, Merlingen, Smith, Wagner, 
Bono, Smith, and Maull. 
 
Literature in the field of IR has purported that not only is the EU a civilian power, it is also a 
normative power that uses civilian and military instruments to achieve its external goals. First 
introduced by Duchêne, civilian power is defined with reference to the EC as “short on armed 
forces and long on economic power.”96 It is a civilian form of power that enables the EC/EU to 
maintain its influence in international relations. According to Duchêne, having paved the way for a 
civilian power, military power sustained the EU’s military control for international cooperation.97 In 
the 1980s, Bull contested that the notion of a civilian power was only relevant during détente,98 
however, militarising the EC/EU became necessary given the existence of post-Soviet military. 
Introduced in 2002, Manners defined the normative power Europe as “ability to shape conceptions 
of ‘normal’ in international relations.”99 Prior to that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
besides a normative power, Hill proposed the function of the EC/EU as a “mediator of conflicts” in 
the newly independent states.100 The EU can be seen as a particular model of power that uses norm 
diffusion in its external relations with security challenges and economic interests for the EU. 
 
Another categorisation of the EU is as a soft power. Introduced by Nye, the EU has been a 
“tremendous success in terms of soft power” through its ability to influence its neighbouring 
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countries by its attractiveness.101 Referring to the question about the extent of the EU’s influence on 
the behaviour of the South Caucasus countries, the scholar explained to the researcher: 
When the Cold War ended there were many people using traditional models of international politics. … The 
fact that the model of democracy, open markets [from] Brussels attracted the Central Europe to join the EU is 
a profound historical purpose and it remains a very important factor e.g. in the Balkans and in Turkey.102 
 
The EU identifies itself with liberal values and projects the same image across its borders. Civil 
society assistance is an essential part of the EU’s soft power, which is touched upon in the fourth 
chapter. However, the EU also derives its power from being the largest trading partner with the 
neighbourhood. In Nye’s words, beyond norms and values, free market and democracy are crucial 
for the countries in their aspiration to accede to the European community.103 For Telò a soft power 
is insufficient to grasp the nature of the EU and the author develops a civilian power concept, which 
is different from a soft power and complements a hard power.104 As a civilian power, the EU adopts 
the role of a peacebuilder in its south-eastern borders to mitigate instability across Europe’s 
boundaries.105 Without necessarily alluding to the concept of a soft power, Moravcsik also agrees 
that “power of attraction” is the most powerful foreign policy instrument of democratisation that 
European governments possess.106 The EU has, indeed, asserted itself in the South Caucasus by 
using tools of enforcement in the maritime sector as the forthcoming chapter demonstrates. 
 
Debates exist whether the EU has moved from being a normative and civilian power towards a 
military power. As Merlingen suggests, instead of being a post-sovereign normative power, military 
elements are now beginning to prevail in the EU’s external policy.107 The EU’s power is now 
pursued with military components under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
previously European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as a major part of the CFSP, first 
developed in the Petersberg tasks by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992.108 Having 
launched its first military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR 
Concordia) in 2003, the EU is no longer a civilian power. Although the EU does not engage in 
enforcement operations and its military capabilities imply intervention not prevention, since its 
civilian policy instruments have been increasingly replaced by the military, it has changed the EU’s 
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civilian power identity. According to Bono, an integration of civilian and military tools makes the 
EU as an autonomous entity both internally and externally.109 However, according to Smith, the EU 
is unlikely to become a military power because national parliamentary oversight makes it difficult 
to engage militarily.110 Smith positions the EU between two types of civilian and military power by 
distinguishing between civilian non-military (economic policy and diplomacy) and civilian military 
instruments (use of armed forces).111 The most appropriate role for the EU, as Maull suggests, is a 
combination of civilian force with a regional focus.112 The EU refrains from engaging in 
enforcement operations because of its economic and political cooperation with regional partners. 
 
Although the notion of the common foreign policy implies that the EU exercises power on the 
international stage, it misses the differing political and economic interests that the EU member 
states have. This research feeds into the heart of the nature of EU foreign policy, which is that, as a 
unitary actor, the EU behaves according to its normative basis with combined soft, civilian and 
military identities. However, its internal political fragmentation limits its effective engagement in 
its neighbourhood. This conclusion argues, in line with the realist and liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspective, that the preferences of the powerful member states shape the EU’s common policy. 
 
2.3. Realist and Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theoretical Framework 
 
The most prominent theory, which has thus come to oppose the notion of the EU as a unitary actor, 
is the realist paradigm, notable neoclassical realism of EU foreign policy suggested by Posen, 
Hyde-Price, Mearsheimer, Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman. The thesis brings in liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspectives developed by Moravcsik, which provide a synthetic theoretical 
framing of EU member states’ behaviour. By combing elements from neoclassical realist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspectives, discussed in the first section of this subchapter, this framework 
of explanation contends that during the intergovernmental coordination of national politics with 
supranational institutions, it is the preferences of the most powerful member states that shape EU 
foreign policy. Contrary to the liberal constructivist explanation, this framework argues that the 
EU’s foreign policy does not reflect a common view of all members, but instead it adheres to the 
positions of those states, which influence the outcome of major intergovernmental negotiations 
explained in the second section. 
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2.3.1. Neoclassical Realist and LI Synthesis 
 
The realist and liberal intergovernmentalist account is based on the assumption that the EU 
conducts its foreign policy in a state-like manner to implement the pragmatic national interests of 
the member states. This theoretical account lies in the spectrum of realist tradition developed by 
Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and Stephen D. Krasner.113 As this 
school of thought suggests, arguably, great powers instead of competition do not seek cooperation. 
 
The starting point in classical realism maintains that the international system is anarchic in the 
absence of a superior power.114 Waltzian balance of power purports that under conditions of 
anarchy, states seek security and power maximisation.115 According to the structural realist account, 
the notion of power politics dominates in IR. Because of the salience of power in the structure of 
international relations, international law and norms are inherently limited, especially in national 
security. The reemergence of regional powers during the early Cold War demonstrated changes 
within the system in terms of polarity. To maintain bipolar balance, Kennan advocated for a 
containment policy by the US towards the Soviet Union.116 Among the realist scholars the 
conventional view now is that the bipolar international system of the Cold War order has been 
replaced with the unipolar world.117 The emergence of the European security and defence policy 
follows this realist logic of consequences. Although hard balancing of the US was advanced by the 
most powerful nuclear states of the EU, such as the UK and France, the EU’s role in the 
geopolitical balance has been insignificant. 
 
Another issue to be taken into consideration is the emerging European security complex that also 
contains regional powers such as Russia and Turkey.118 Despite the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and the South Africa, the so called BRICS countries, the major powers are unlikely to follow 
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multipolar policy practice.119 Hence, Hyde-Price predicts that the EU will be able to balance the US 
by acquiring a security dimension in the form of the CFSP.120 Realist scholars accentuate the 
regional importance of the South Caucasus. Hyde-Price observes that the point of convergence for 
the EU, the US and Russia is the South Caucasus.121 Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson agree that 
EU diplomacy is entangled in a “strategic triangle” on the transatlantic level.122 Since the 1990s, the 
realist paradigm has predicted intra-European conflict. In view of these changes, the realist 
perspectives make four assumptions about the EUFP: a) the EU seeks to increase its presence in its 
eastern neighbourhood to balance Russia; b) the EU tries to establish itself as a regional power to 
decrease its dependence on the US; c) the EU creates several balances of force with minor regional 
powers, such as Turkey, and views the South Caucasus as a platform to extend its presence in 
Central Asia; d) the EUFP remains in discretion of the member states which are unlikely to pass 
their competencies to supranational bodies. 
 
Within the realist school of thought, two perspectives of offensive and defensive realism, 
transcending their dichotomy, explain the great power behaviour. These perspectives argue that 
since power maximisation of the states is embedded in the international system the world is not 
destined to peace. Offensive realism, focusing on theory of great power politics maintains that the 
international system always generates incentives for expansion. Mearsheimer derives five 
assumptions regarding the system: first, anarchic nature of international system; second, inherent 
possession of military capabilities; third, uncertainty of intentions; fourth, survival and security as 
primary objectives; fifth, great powers attempt to prevent wars.123 In contrast with the liberal 
intergovernmentalist thought, where cooperation prevails irrespective of states’ interests, offensive 
realism sees self-interest of nation-states as motivating their behavior.124 In offensive realist 
critique, Taliaferro argues that the international system provides incentives for expansion only 
under certain conditions; and states often seek to expand because their leaders perceive aggression 
as the only way of security.125 Discussing the offensive-defensive dichotomy, the author observes 
that distinction between neorealism and neoclassical realism transcends the intra-realist debate, with 
the first explaining international outcomes, and the second foreign policy strategies. Within this 
                                                          
119 S. Neil MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?” International Affairs, 82 (2006): 41-58. 
120 Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” 230; Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity (England: Routledge, 2007); Adrian Hyde-Price, “A ‘Tragic 
Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’,” International Affairs 84 (2008): 29-44; Adrian Hyde-Price, 
“European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force,” European Security 13 (2004): 323-43. 
121 Hyde-Price, European Security in the Twenty-First Century, 55. 
122 Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson, “A New Strategic Triangle: Defining Changing Transatlantic Security 
Relations,” in Changing Transatlantic Security Relations: Do the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic 
Triangle? eds. Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson (London: Routledge, 2006), 2. 
123 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29-31. 
124 Ibid., 49. 
125 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” 129. 
33 
spectrum, neoclassical realism merits particular attention. Neoclassical realist approach as an 
emerging school of foreign policy theories, seeks to explain grand strategies of behaviour of 
individual states. As Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro argue, the actual diplomatic, military, and 
foreign economic policies that the states and institutions are likely to pursue, depend to a greater 
degree on the perceptions of the leaders.126 As the next section explains, this approach bridges 
liberal intergovernmental view of national preference formation of the EU member states. 
 
2.3.2. LI Perspective on Preferences 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) as a political theory, as well as a baseline theory of European 
integration and regional integration rooted in IR, explains outputs of the EU actions. Andrew 
Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig suggest that the theoretical soundness of this “grand theory” 
rests in its utility for synthesis with other explanations.127 LI purports that not only the values and 
norms that the EU closely draws on, but also the collective preferences of the member states 
explain the outcome of the major intergovernmental negotiations including their common positions 
on foreign policy achieved with international bargaining. 
 
Central to the liberal theory are the national interests of the states, with different socio-economic 
links, values, social coalitions and institutions that determine states’ preferences. By state 
preferences is meant, as Moravcsik put it, “fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic 
calculations of governments.”128 Moravcsik takes a sequential approach to analyse three elements of 
LI: a) an assumption about rational behaviour, b) a liberal theory of national preference formation, 
and c) an intergovernmental analysis of interstate negotiations.129 Intergovernmental analysis 
regards states as rational actors. Governments constrained at home by domestic pressures, and 
abroad by a strategic environment, calculate and choose utility of alternative actions that maximises 
their utility. National preferences of the states rarely converge, as they are driven by geopolitical 
ideas as well as the economic interests of the states.130 The liberal theory of preference formation 
purports that domestic pressures on the states shapes their objectives and preferences. John Peterson 
agrees with Moravcsik on the argument that domestic economic preferences determine choices of 
national elites when bargains are subjected to influence.131 To explain the outcomes of international 
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negotiations with differing preferences, LI draws on a bargaining theory of international 
cooperation. It is the intensity of the states’ preferences that shapes behaviour and the outcome of 
bargaining, but states will still seek to achieve cooperation for mutual benefits. 
  
In view of the four expectations predicted above, Moravcsik challenges the opinion about Europe’s 
declining global influence and argues that it remains the only superpower after the US in a bipolar 
system next to other major powers, such as China and India.132 By adopting this view, liberal 
analysis, with the exception of according equal importance to the EU, shares the core tenets of the 
contemporary worldview with those of the realist account. Moravcsik corroborates that Europe, 
while exerting influence across the spectrum from “soft”, “hard,” “smart” and “quiet superpower,” 
remains a civilian power with comparative advantages by using economic and civilian 
instruments.133 According to Moravcsik’s assessment, after the Balkans, the security threats closest 
to the European continent are in the Caucasus, and negotiating a ceasefire in Georgia is considered 
to have been successfully accomplished by European governments.134 Even though eventually the 
EU had a common output of action, two levels of divergence occurred before the states agreed on 
their engagement, both between some old and new member states as well as among some old 
member states. The compromise on engagement, may be viewed as a product of a normative 
convergence, yet dichotomy among the member states requires substantial examination. 
 
The decisive factor in EU mediation in 2008 was a result of common decision of the EU member 
states, despite divergences among them, caused by their preferences consequent of their historical 
experience with Russia. This decision overrode other factors, such as economic interdependence 
between the member states with Russia. The EU took a common position towards Russia, despite 
the fact that Russia comprises over 60% of the EU’s energy consumption,135 and EU trade accounts 
for 40% of external trade in Russia.136 Contrary to a widespread view,137 there was no significant 
corresponding level of support among the states for the EU’s mediation and economic 
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interdependence between EU member states and Russia. Notably, the Baltic states and the UK were 
supportive of EU mediation, even though gas imports from Russia to the Baltics constituted 100% 
of consumption, Hungary 80%, Czech Republic 77.9%, Poland 72.6%, and in contrast, 41.2% in the 
UK in 2008.138 These figures demonstrate that interdependence was not the major factor 
determining the preferences of the member states in 2008. Although Russia and the member states 
have a significant economic partnership and interdependent energy relations, the most energy-
dependent countries of the EU took a firmer approach towards Russia. In contrast, security-related 
challenges emanating from Russia were of essential concern for the new member states. Those 
challenges, were generally interpreted by policy makers differently. The Eastern bloc countries had 
reason for sympathy towards Georgia, given their experience of the Soviet military campaigns in 
Poland in 1939, the Baltic states in 1940, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Germany 
despite historical animosity with Russia, did not interpret Russian actions with potential 
repercussions to Western Europe. 
 
Different preferences, as a central causal factor, falls within the broader theoretical framework of 
the IR theory of a neoclassical realist and liberal intergovernmentalist framework of explanation. 
Supranational decision-making is subordinate to intergovernmental bargaining based on preferences 
and national interests which differ. By transposing this view onto the EU foreign policy, it can be 
seen that these interests vary from national economic interests to political interests, dictated by 
different perceptions. 
 
The EU sees itself as a normative project uniting European states and exporting its values to its 
neighbourhood. This said, it must be acknowledged that the states have various political and 
economic considerations. EU foreign policy making understandably mirrors interests of its member 
states.139 They remain reluctant to move the decision-making authority on foreign and security 
policy to supranational institutions.140 Taken together, although the EU is meant to be a unitary 
actor, divergence between the member states, such as that which took place during the crisis in 
Georgia, shows the opposite. 
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2.4. EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus141 
A wide range of literature on EU foreign policy suggests that the EU is a significant global actor, 
yet another part of literature emphasises the EU’s institutional deficiencies with regard to a conflict 
resolution strategy. Authors agree that, without a strategy, the EU has been unable to pursue 
conflict resolution in the neighbouring South Caucasus. The role of the EU as a political actor in the 
international system is the subject of debate. According to Charlotte Bretherton and John Volger, 
the fundamental purpose of the EU is to take a common European stance on the global stage.142 
Merlingen observes that EU security policy and external reasons push the EU to be a global 
actor.143 Within the EU’s multilayered system of national foreign policies, and supranational 
foreign policy, the CSDP as an intergovernmental policy underpins the capacity of the EU to 
conduct military and civilian operations based on consensus decision-making. Reuben Wong and 
Christopher Hill hold that, although the primary focus of the CFSP is intergovernmental, a number 
of the EU’s external actions involve the Council and Community method with prevalent national 
policies.144 Preventing conflicts, as the Council states, is a “primary objective of the EU’s external 
action.”145 S. Neil MacFarlane refers to the EU’s growing capacity of the EU for conflict 
management in all dimensions of response.146 Kronenberger and Wouters consider that the 
successes the EU has had in preventing crises within its borders supports the idea that the EU can 
manage conflicts outside the European area.147 Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, however, 
consider that the EU faces challenges in materialising its objectives for an institutionalised global 
conflict management strategy.148 To be a global conflict manager, the EU needs to adopt an 
“enlarged comprehensive strategy”149 that combines external action instruments with the 
institutions and capabilities of the member states. 
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The EU is made up of 28 member states with multiple foreign policy agendas, yet it acts as a 
unified actor. Writing about the EU as an international actor, Hill identified a “capability-
expectations gap” between the stated and delivered objectives of the EC/EU, which had three 
components: the EC’s ability to reach agreement, the availability of resources and instruments.150 
The difficulty to agree on its engagement in the crisis in Georgia showed the gap between 
consensus and expectations. Fraser Cameron notes that the EU does possess the necessary 
instruments, but is unable to deliver assertive policies because of the difficulty in achieving 
consensus.151 Those authors who think that the EU is a powerful international actor, are inclined to 
believe that a territorially enlarged EU cannot remain disinterested in its immediate neighbourhood. 
As Roland Dannreuther writes, the EU can no longer subordinate its policy to other external 
powers, such as Russia reasserting its claims in its neighbourhood.152 An absence of EU strategy 
towards the region and the inability to sustain engagement is often raised in the literature. 
 
The EU does not have a clear strategy towards the South Caucasus as a whole. Macfarlane argues 
that EU strategy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia region does not exist, because of the 
absence of coherence in the relationship between the means and objectives of the EU towards the 
region.153 On conflict resolution, the author refers to the weakness of interests of the EU and the 
major Western European powers in this region.154 Even though the EU accounted for 70% of 
foreign trade in the South Caucasus, it has not remained a major player in the region.155 The EU’s 
limited political determination, despite security-related interests, as the cause of a weak strategy for 
conflict mediation is an often emerging argument.156 Unlike the scholars who consider that the 
EU’s capacity is limited, Michael Merlingen, Manuel Mireanu and Elena Stavrevska maintain that 
new borders have created more incentives for the EU to Europeanise its neighbourhood. Michael 
Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, add that the EU has no strategy in the South Caucasus nor in the 
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post-Soviet space as a whole.157 Conflicting roles of the EU as a neutral peacebuilder and a 
politically engaged mediator affected the EU’s performance in conflict management in Georgia. As 
Nicu Popescu put it, the EU faces dilemmas about its engagement and its relations with Russia.158 
Despite seemingly increased interaction, the EU policy towards conflict resolution in the South 
Caucasus remains limited. 
 
2.5. EU External Governance in Transport 
 
The debate over EU foreign policy has to date focused on conflict resolution. There is only limited 
literature relating to EU policy in sectoral areas of cooperation with its neighbourhood. The 
consistency within the EU’s foreign policy cannot be determined without studying other aspects of 
its policy, such as transport. Studies about EU governance have limited themselves discussing two 
aspects: transport governance within the EU, and external governance of the EU with third 
countries. Whilst the EU extended its governance to the eastern neighbourhood by harmonising 
legislation in transport with its eastern neighbours, creating a common transport area, establishing 
transport networks and connecting the South Caucasus and Central Asia with transit routes through 
TRACECA. The topic of external governance of the EU in transport remains underanalysed in the 
academic literature. 
 
Literature that mentions EU policy on transport looks at transport governance within the EU from 
the 1980s. Incepted in the Treaty of Rome as a common transport policy, the institutionalisation of 
transport networks for a wider European integration started with the single market within the 
EC/EU under the Single European Act (1986).159 This literature primarily covers the EU transport 
acquis.160 As John Volger notes, transport policy has developed slowly, but with the increasing 
international commitments of the EU member states, it was no longer possible to contain this policy 
within the boundaries of the common market.161 According to David Phinnemore and Lee 
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McGowan, slow progress in a common transport policy was conditioned by member states’ 
interests in road haulage licenses, customs documents, subsidies for railways and shipping, and 
protection of national airlines.162 Although after the Court of Justice (ECJ) recommended 
liberalising international transport in 1983, until 1990s there were still no changes in the 
institutionalisation of CTP.163 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks note that the Commission continues 
to take the lead in international obligations to negotiate with neighbourhood countries on economic 
cooperation with the EU in transport, energy and fisheries policies.164 Mark Aspinwall observes that 
whilst CTP has long been in existence as an inextricable part of European integration, a governance 
system in transport has emerged only recently.165 Literature has not dealt with neither CTP or 
transport governance as applied to the EU’s neighbourhood. 
 
Studies on EU governance suggest a general analysis of external governance of the EU with the 
third countries. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier observe that the growing intensity of 
EU relations with its neighbourhood has prompted the EU to devise policy strategies towards 
potential membership candidate countries.166 An analysis by Sandra Lavenex and Frank 
Schimmelfennig, that captures the expansion of EU rules beyond its borders, is the first study that 
systematically assesses the ENP in the scope of rule transfer by using the concept of external 
governance as a form of integration of third countries that are below the threshold of membership 
into European rules.167 Building on this study, Sandra Lavenex, Dirk Lehmkuhl and Nicole 
Wichmann examine several sectors of EU external governance, including transport, with a sole 
focus on aviation policy to the ENP countries, and identify that modes of such governance follow 
sectoral dynamics, which are stable across the ENP countries.168 Only a few studies have focused 
on rule transfer in the EaP countries,169 but none seems so far to have tried to apply an external 
governance framework in transport towards the South Caucasus. 
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An important concept of the Trans European Network – Transport (TEN-T) introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty created basis for common transport area beyond the EU’s borders. With TEN-T, 
the EU intended to restructure national transport networks into a single market, to build a transport 
infrastructure network for Europe, and to extend the TEN-T to accession countries. Declaring that 
“[a]n integrated transport system between the EU and its neighbours is vital to further integration,” 
the Commission attributed importance to close transport cooperation among the EU member states 
and the ENP partners to extend with five major TEN-T axes.170 Katri Pynnöniemi has recently 
identified cooperation between the EU and Russia in transport and infrastructure networks with two 
Northern and Central axes connecting the EU and Russia.171 Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard 
also mention support from Germany and France for such cooperation with Russia without further 
elaboration on the specificities of this policy.172 Reiterating support to transport and infrastructure, 
European Parliament resolutions single out three corridors connecting the Black Sea and Caspian 
Sea regions having potential for diversifying supplies and routes: Trans-Caspian energy corridor, 
TRACECA, and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE).173 External governance 
framework in transport towards the South Caucasus can apply to transport network and transport 
corridor that lie at the heart of external economic relations between the EU and the region. 
 
After devising its neighbourhood policy in the 2000s, transport was one of the areas where the EU 
decided to introduce mutually beneficial cooperation with its eastern neighbourhood. To achieve its 
political objectives, the EU needed to master the instrument of economic statecraft as a foreign 
policy tool.174 Economic relationships motivated this behaviour towards the neighbouring countries. 
A prime example of such statecraft was sharing expertise and technical assistance programmes with 
those countries. Security-related interests in the EU’s neighbourhood are also seen to have 
determined the acceleration of the EU’s external transport policy. According to Bastian Giegerich 
and William Wallace, EU external policy regarding transport gathered momentum after the 
Capabilities Conference in 2000, which identified the necessity for the overseas missions to 
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improve strategic transport in order to strengthen European military capabilities.175 Yet economic 
interests have been central to the EU’s transport policy. The priority of EU policy in the South 
Caucasus and Central Asian countries, which has economic importance for the European markets 
with their location and natural resources, is to maintain stability and create conditions for 
implementing transport and energy policies.176 The EU had expected that, by moving to a common 
rewarding goal, the South Caucasus countries, besides the sectoral benefits, would engage in a 
certain level of cooperation. Whilst such cooperation did not necessarily contribute to conflict 
resolution, it visibly aligned Georgia in legal practices with the EU. This will be analysed in the 
next chapter. 
 
This chapter reviewed current major scholarship on EU foreign policy. The EU neighbourhood 
policy is based on the liberal standpoint that interaction between EU member states and its 
neighbouring countries results in a common understanding. The EU sees itself as a normative 
power that reaches convergence within the member states and, likewise, convergences outside its 
borders with its neighbours. Perspectives on normative, soft, civilian, and military power Europe 
describe the conduct of the EU in its neighbourhood. Although the EU declares that it acts with its 
normative basis, empirical investigation using realist and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches 
shows that preferences of the member states limit the EU’s common position on engagement in its 
neighbourhood in terms of conflict resolution policy. Analysis of another aspect of its policy, EU 
external governance in transport towards the South Caucasus, remains scarce. 
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Chapter 3. EU Foreign Policy on Transport towards the South Caucasus 
 
 
This chapter makes the argument that the key determinants of the EU’s common policy coherence 
with its eastern neighbourhood are legislative alignment and a common transport area. For the 
purpose of the argument, this work examines EU policy towards the South Caucasus divided in 
three phases: 1) since the inception of the EU in 1992 until 2004 when the EU included the South 
Caucasus in the ENP, 2) from 2004 to 2008, the year of the EU’s mediation, 3) from 2008 to 2014 
when the EU concluded an association agreement with Georgia. Across these phases, the EU 
coherently developed sectoral cooperation in transport in two stages: 1) in 1993-2009 when the EU 
established the TRACECA programme and utilised the EaP mechanism for transport policy, and 2) 
in 2009-2014 when the EU elaborated transport provisions in the AA. 
 
This chapter extends the existing ideas about the significance of EU transport policy towards the 
South Caucasus. The first subchapter examines the EU’s neighbourhood policy regarding transport. 
Policy coherence is illustrated in the first section with the evolution of EU policy in its treaties and 
PCA agreements, and in the second section by EaP mechanisms as applied to the South Caucasus. 
The third section shows the significance of the AA for transport policy. The second subchapter 
analyses particular factors that enhance EU policy: (i) legislative alignment, (ii) common area, and 
(iii) restrictive measures for institutional reforms. The next section investigates the unexplored topic 
of maritime entry in Abkhazia that the EU has not considered in the prism of engagement without 
recognition. The third subchapter argues that corridor development with the TRACECA programme 
shows the coherence of EU’s transport policy. The same subchapter discusses EU’s energy 
diversification through the South Caucasus. The final section notes that EU maritime transport 
policy is reinforced with the IMO. The lesson that can be drawn from the case of Georgia is the 
overriding importance of those three factors applicable to other South Caucasus countries. 
 
3.1. Transport Policy as an Example of EU’s Coherent Policy177 
 
This subchapter overviews transport relations between the EU and the South Caucasus countries 
from 1993. EU foreign policy with these Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is conducted by aligning 
them with the EU rules and regulation, and economic and political institutions translated into policy 
instruments, such as partnership, association, free trade, and visa facilitation agreements. The 
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second section examines the EU’s approach to transport with its eastern borderlands using the EaP 
mechanism. The third section analyses the significance of association agreements for transport 
policy in the South Caucasus concluding that the EU has succeeded in creating an integrated transit 
system with the region. It also briefly mentions an overlooked issue of a nuclear power plant that 
has dominated security-related agenda between the EU and Armenia. 
 
3.1.1. Transport in the EU Treaties 
 
EU policy regarding transport towards its neighbourhood established in the EU treaties remains 
underanalysed. Transport as an objective towards the EU neighbourhood was first identified in the 
TFEU Treaty noting that “[T]he Union may decide to cooperate with third countries to promote 
projects of mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability of networks.”178 Under Title VI on 
Transport, the treaty provides for the objectives of the Union to be pursued in the framework of a 
common transport policy in rail, road and inland waterway.179 When the TL came into force, the 
EU committed to a special relationship with its neighbouring countries by extending sectoral 
cooperation.180 The EU became clearer about its aim to ensure compatibility of the EU legislation, 
standards and technical characteristics in transport with those of its major trade partners in the 
neighbourhood.181 Bilateral PCA agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed in 1996 
created the basis for transport cooperation between the EU and these countries. Title II of the PCA 
with Georgia states that the EU supports political and economic changes as a novel form of 
cooperation.182 Transport cooperation was strengthened with Georgia after signing the AA.183 
Chapter 1 on Transport under Title VI solidifies the basis for EU transport policy in Georgia “to 
enhance the main transport links” between the EU member states and Georgia.184 By strengthening 
transport links, the EU instills political association and economic integration with Georgia. 
 
EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus in the 1990s was somewhat timid. The EU 
established its delegations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1992. Out of the ten bilateral 
agreements that the EU concluded with the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and Russia, the PCAs with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia created the framework 
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for political dialogue and economic relations. Among the three institutions, Cooperation Council, 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, and Cooperation Committee, that the PCAs set up, the 
subcommittee of energy and transport was tasked with dialogues of mutual interests within the last. 
 
Adding ENP to its foreign policy, the EU widened its engagement with its eastern neighbourhood. 
Emblematic was the inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the ENP in 2004.185 After the 
ENP Action Plan, two important documents that the EU concluded with Georgia186 were visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements.187 To encourage regional cooperation, the EU proposed the 
Black Sea Synergy (BSS).188 Another regional platform for “greater political association and 
economic integration” was the EaP with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine, which was initiated by the Swedish and Polish proposal under the French presidency in 
2008.189 The head of department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the foreign office in 
Sweden in 2008 recalled, that the EaP was also envisaged as a peacekeeping tool.190 Due to concern 
about the implications of the 2008 conflict, the EaP was established expeditiously at the Prague 
Summit in 2009, followed by a renewed commitment at the Warsaw Summit.191 Since then 
transport cooperation with the South Caucasus has been conducted through the EaP mechanism. 
 
3.1.2. Transport Cooperation in the Scope of Eastern Partnership 
 
The EU pursues regulatory approximation, which is bringing regulatory practices in sectoral areas, 
with the South Caucasus in the scope of the EaP. Of the four multilateral platforms, which are the 
main tools for cooperation with the Eastern partner countries (governance, economic integration 
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and convergence with EU policies, energy security, and contacts with people), the EU set up a 
transport network within the second platform to connect with the EaP members, and the partners 
among themselves. This network evolved into the Eastern Partnership transport panel arrangement 
to address interagency level issues in maritime, land, rail and civil aviation, which was set up in 
2011 by the Ministerial Conference on Eastern Partnership in Transport.192 “Since then, we 
[European Commission] have worked quite closely with them [Eastern Partnership countries] in the 
context of the EaP transport panel which was established by the member states, by the partners 
rather [sic], from entire neighbouring EaP countries, including of course the Caucasian states,” 
recalled the head officer from the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) of 
the European Commission.193 Besides increased legislative alignment, the panel has also 
accelerated the implementation of infrastructure projects along the EaP transport network. The 
officer envisages other prospects of cooperation too: 
At some point, when we have enough agreements in this region, three, four, what we could envisage is to 
gather all these agreements within one between two regions and … we could have Georgia, and Azerbaijan, 
plus perhaps also Armenia, at the same meeting discussing about implementation of the block to block 
agreement, as we have in the case of the Western Balkans.194 
 
In the face of existing functional cooperation in transport, the EU and Russia have different 
opinions about the EaP mechanism used by the EU in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood. The 
Commission maintains that the EaP facilitated regional cooperation in sectoral areas in its eastern 
neighbourhood, and strengthened transport links with the EU as well. With the ENP and EaP used 
as instruments of foreign policy, the EU sees transformative change in transport in the South 
Caucasus. Using the EaP’s regional platform for dialogue, the EU seeks to attain economic 
integration with the involvement of Russia in their common neighbourhood. As the Commission 
official from the Russia desk explained back in 2008 capturing the gist of recent EU discourse: 
It will be the economic integration between the six countries of the Eastern neighbourhood policy and the EU 
not at the expense of Russia. On the contrary, we would see economic integration in the region including 
Russia. We would like those free trade agreements to be done in a way consistent with the free trade 
arrangements which already exist between Ukraine and Russia, which exist on paper but not in practice 
between Georgia and Russia. There is an economic integration of the region as a whole in everybody’s 
interest. Georgia can be closely integrated with the EU and alongside closely integrated with Russia.
195
 
 
In contrast to its transport policy, the EU’s achievement in conflict resolution policy with the EaP 
countries remains limited. According to the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership 
Countries in 2013, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan intensified their links with the EU; Ukraine 
had less intense relations in comparison to 2012, while Moldova and Belarus registered no 
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change.196 This limitation is caused by different attitudes of the EaP countries towards this policy, 
and likewise different approaches among the EU member states to the EaP. In the view of a 
political scientist from Russia, the EaP countries have had several levels of interest in the EaP: 
diversification of foreign policies away from Moscow, solving internal issues, and their civil 
societies’ needs in European values.197 The Russian political scientist referred to the Ukraine crisis 
suggesting that instead of being presented with a choice of the West or Russia, post-Soviet states 
should engage in cooperation with both.198 Despite reciprocal interests, overall approximation with 
the South Caucasus has been achieved to a limited extent.  
 
Differing stances of the EU member states towards the South Caucasus and their varying levels of 
commitments hindered the EU from brining transformative changes in its conflict resolution. As a 
member of an the All-Party Parliamentary Georgia Group (APPG) from the UK Parliament rightly 
shares, despite the importance of stability around Europe, the EU finds it difficult to sustain its 
engagement in the South Caucasus for an extended period.199 According to a Georgian foreign 
affairs officer in the Netherlands, the EU’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus does not 
exist in a collective form.200 An international relations academic and a representative of Georgia to 
the EU also observes that the member states have had divergent approaches to their policy towards 
the EaP and the South Caucasus.201 The director of a policy institution on EU-Russia relations 
maintains that the EU has no common policy in this region since the member states are divided in 
their attitudes to Russia.202 This view is also shared by a Eurasian programme director from a 
research institute in the UK, who asserted that the lack of unity within the EU follows from its 
division into three parts: on the one side are the countries of the former Soviet Union, including the 
Baltics and eastern Warsaw pact countries; then the Scandinavian countries and the UK; and on 
another side France, Germany and Italy.203 Their stances are dictated by their preferences, 
conditioned by historical experience and conviction, which are not common to all countries. The 
analyst continued to say that the EU tends to be preoccupied with its internal issues, such as the 
euro crisis, and the debt crisis in Spain and Greece.204 Limits to member states’ capacities to 
contribute to peacekeeping missions, one example of which is Britain being overstretched since 
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2001, is another reason mentioned by a member of the APPG.205 Beyond its immediate 
neighbourhood, the EU has engaged globally with fifteen ongoing and thirteen completed 
operations under the CSDP/ESDP in 2002-2014.206 Such breadth of involvement puts a strain on 
the EU’s economic, military and human capabilities resulting in competing priorities in global 
engagement.207 In addition, an issue of democratic deficit in national politics and disconnect 
between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the people are felt on EU level.208 EU 
disengagement is also caused by its enlargement fatigue after its expansion to include the ten CEE 
states in 2004 and 2007. 
 
The EU has demonstrated different levels of commitment to relations with each of the South 
Caucasus countries. On different policy priorities towards the three states, a founding director of a 
policy think-tank in Armenia opined that in Georgia the EU supports democracy as a commodity, in 
Azerbaijan the EU is preoccupied with energy resources, whilst in Armenia security is the priority 
for the EU.209 The EU is the main trade partner with each country, its trade accounting for 27% of 
total trade with Georgia, 45% with Azerbaijan, and 28% with Armenia in 2014.210 Despite strong 
trade links, the EU maintained different levels of integration with them. At the policy think-tank in 
Armenia, EU policy is assessed as pragmatic in view of the EU-Armenia sectoral cooperation.211 
Policy analysts at the regional studies center based in Yerevan, opined that the EU have made 
progress in sectoral areas, such as customs, visa facilitation, and institutional infrastructure in 
Armenia.212 More specifically, the EU investment in financial and human capacity building at state 
administrations contributed to infrastructure reforms. The EU’s “more-for-more” principle offered 
greater incentives for democratic reforms. However, according to the analysts, the EU was unable 
to project a stronger image against Russia to the Armenian public.213 Although the EU was 
Armenia’s main trade partner with imports in goods, crude material and transport equipment, 
similar to Azerbaijan, this did not influence the country’s choice to conclude the AA with the EU. 
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The EU and Azerbaijan cooperate in political, economic and trade terms. Azerbaijan conducted 
negotiations on the AA, restored talks on visa facilitation and signed key agreements on 
transportation of gas from the Shah Deniz field to the European markets. In 2014, EU foreign 
policy was characterised as increasingly substantial by the head of the EU delegation to 
Azerbaijan.214 On the other hand, a founding director of a Baku-based NGO assessed the EU’s 
policy as neutral.215 Yet the head of a government think tank in Baku could not identify the EU’s 
clear cut policy on Azerbaijan.216 Being an oil-based economy, despite an impressive economic 
growth that averaged an annual 14% in 2003-2013,217 Azerbaijan ranked 79 in the 2014 Prosperity 
Index for good governance followed by Georgia at 80 and Armenia at 95.218 Despite trade 
preferences with the EU, Azerbaijan decided to slow down the pace of its European integration.219 
Overall it has been difficult for the EU to bring about changes in the South Caucasus because it did 
not have an adequate capacity to address individual structural obstacles to reform.220 As Leila 
Alieva explained, the EU was unable to reconcile two policy objectives: increasing the efficiency of 
the EaP and managing expectations of accession among those countries.221 The EU has, however, 
managed to incept a good basis for sectoral cooperation in transport with the South Caucasus. By 
transferring its rules externally, guided by its normative agenda, the EU promoted the values of the 
rule of law and market economy to its neighbourhood.222 Overall, with regional integration in the 
EaP, visa facilitation and association agreements, the EU, by avoiding stronger commitments and a 
conflict resolution strategy, created an alternative to accession for the South Caucasus countries. 
 
3.1.3. Significance of Association Agreements for Transport in the South Caucasus 
 
Association Agreement, a politically stronger document than the PCAs, creates a new legal 
framework of cooperation with the respective countries. Promoting closer economic integration, 
DCFTA envisages reciprocal liberalisation of establishment and trade in services including in the 
transport field. Emphasising mutual gains, the HR/VP referred to AA as “a very important 
milestone, opening the way to comprehensive modernisation and reform based upon shared values, 
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political association, and economic integration with the European Union.”223 The EU conducted 
negotiations with all EaP countries with various degrees of outcome. Having started negotiations in 
2010, the EU and Georgia initialled the AA at the EaP Vilnius Summit in 2013 and signed it a year 
later in 2014. Divergences among the member states revealed themselves in their reservation about 
reference to Georgia. As a national diplomat recalled,224 whilst negotiators from Georgia proposed 
stronger reference to the country’s European identity, the EU decided to refer to Georgia as “an 
Eastern European country.”225 Moldova was another EaP country where the EU has engaged in 
reform process and managed to initial the AA.226 The two countries are, however, the cases of good 
cooperation, as negotiations with Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan went into a stalemate. 
 
Negotiations on the AA including the DCFTA with Armenia and Azerbaijan started in 2010, but the 
EU could not achieve a conclusion with either. Azerbaijan, which put on hold DCFTA negotiations, 
preferred to proceed with a more equitable Strategic Modernisation Partnership agreement.227 
Whilst Azerbaijan accepts economic and trade cooperation with the EU, the leadership does not 
wish the EU to prescribe how it should uphold the values of democracy and human rights in 
Azerbaijan. In contrast to Azerbaijan, as a deputy minister of economy the Republic of Armenia 
and a principal negotiator on EU-Armenia DCFTA stated, Armenia conducted negotiations up until 
2013.228 However, the country decided not to initial the AA in view of its choice to join the 
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) (2010) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAU) (2014) which 
was established to consolidate an economic area in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Membership of this interregional structure allows Armenia, Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic preferential access to the CIS markets, but Azerbaijan, the Republic of 
Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were hesitant about joining.229 
 
Instead of going the European way, Armenia has chosen closer economic relations with Russia.230 
A founding director of a Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center Richard Giragosian explained 
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Armenia’s decision to opt out from the AA as “inherent asymmetry of the Armenian-Russian 
relations,” and Russia’s assertive course to reassume domination by pushing back against the EU, 
as evidenced in its military actions in Crimea.231 As de Waal notes, Russia as a major regional 
power has a more sustained interest in the South Caucasus region on its borders than any Western 
power has.232 In the interview with the author in 2014, it was mentioned that “the South Caucasus, 
as a small region can only function well if its countries are connected by economic links, 
transportation routes, and communication.”233 The head of a political and economic section at the 
EU delegation to Armenia noted that adhering to its value-based approach, the EU agreed with 
Armenia to update the ENP Action Plan, as well as to revisit the legal basis for their relations.234 An 
academic representing a network of scholars from the Caucasus and Europe observed that parallel 
of joining the ECU, Armenia is seeking new formats of cooperation with the EU.235 Although the 
EU is unlikely to offer security guarantees comparable to those that the Armenian leadership 
expects from Russia, the academic agreed that if Armenia and the EU intensify economic and 
political interaction, Armenia may succeed in combining European integration and partnership with 
Russia.236 Being mindful of Russia’s prevailing interests, a substantial policy that the EU can 
conduct in the South Caucasus is to continue encouraging cooperation in sectoral areas. Once the 
association with Armenia and Azerbaijan went into a stalemate the EU, in contrast to Ukraine, has 
not pursued deepening its political and economic relations further. 
 
Another issue area where the EU has not been able to incentivise compromise with Armenia has 
been the closure of a power plant that in fact, has dominated the security-related agenda between 
the EU and Armenia, that has been overlooked in current policy literature. It has often been pointed 
out by the Azerbaijani side that the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) situated on the site of the Soviet-era 
Medzamor Atomic Power Station near Yerevan, in a seismologically active area, 120 kilometres 
from the borders of Azerbaijan and Georgia, despite safety concerns was reopened in 1995, 
following the energy blockades from Azerbaijan and Turkey.237 In 2002, the European Parliament, 
in its resolution on the EU’s Relations with the South Caucasus, accentuated the need for an active 
policy to address “environmental hazards, like the Medzamor nuclear power plant situated in an 
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earthquake region in Armenia.”238 In 2003 the NPP was transferred into the trust management of 
the OAO Inter RAO EES Company and since then has been operated by Russia.239 The EU noted in 
2011 that unless Armenia considered changing its use of nuclear energy to other renewable sources, 
the country would not be considered for ENP tools. Armenia rejected the Commission’s proposal to 
develop alternative energy capacity, due to the predicted rise of electricity tariffs after the plant’s 
closure.240 Despite the availability of alternative sources, such as hydropower, wind and solar 
energy, investment has continued in nuclear energy, which was declared an asset for economic 
development in Armenia.241 Even though Medzamor poses a problem for environmental security in 
its eastern neighbourhood, the EU has not managed to alter Armenia’s energy policy and its 
cooperation with Russia. 
 
Reaching the AA with Ukraine triggered a hostile reaction from Russia. Although the EU worked 
closely on the AA and DCFTA with Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych, the government 
suspended initialling the agreement, suggesting that closer economic relations with the EU would 
conflict with Ukraine’s trade relations with Russia.242 In a wider competitive background between 
Russia and the EU, Russian diplomacy criticised EU reform processes in its immediate common 
neighbourhood as hindering Russian-led Eurasian integration. Protest movements, placing 
Ukraine’s European identity within internal political division, ended with the resignation of 
President Yanukovych. Political provisions and the economic part of the AA were signed by the 
new President, Petro Poroshenko, and ratified by the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament 
in 2014. In response, between February and September 2014, Russia subjugated Ukraine’s south-
western and eastern regions.243 In reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in 
eastern Ukraine, the Council in its conclusions condemned Russian support to the separatists, and 
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imposed restrictive measures on Russia.244 With respect to engagement and humanitarian 
assistance, the Council opted to rely on the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Russian 
attempts to dismember Ukraine has posed a challenge for wider European security that the EU has 
been neither prepared to prevent nor able to facilitate a solution. 
 
The Ukraine crises, besides revealing the EU’s miscalculation in negotiating the AA agreement, 
showed a split within the EaP. Armenia and Belarus voted against the UN General Assembly 
resolution 68/262 (2014) upholding territorial integrity of Ukraine.245 According to a high-ranking 
diplomat from Central Europe, Ukraine’s decision not to initial the agreement was a surprise in 
European partnership diplomacy and the failure of the EaP.246 As Péter Balázs highlights, there is a 
need for the EU to be more substantial in the region where it is no longer “the exclusive pole of 
attraction.”247 For Eberhard Rhein, although EU governance outside its borders has reached its 
limits, the EU has to prepare for membership of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.248 According to 
Balázs, the EaP should include a membership perspective based on conditionality and subregional 
cooperation with the EaP countries similar to cooperation with the Visegrád Group (V4) of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic formed in 1991.249 
Although Visegrád countries depend on Russian energy supplies, as their vulnerability was 
apparent during the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, when Russia reduced gas 
supply with 20% to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the V4’s common gas strategy can be used 
to overcome Russia’s energy dominance over the Visegrád group.250 The disruption of gas supply is 
a frequently used policy by Russia against other countries in EU’s eastern neighbourhood. Belarus 
also experienced a cut-off in 2012 after debt negotiations between Gazprom and the gas 
transportation company, Belarus Beltransgaz.251 Fawn notes that as the Visegrád Group facilitated 
accession of Central European countries to Western institutions to advance in its eastern 
neighbourhood, the EU can apply a similar format to the post-Soviet countries. In doing so, the EU 
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can use common experience of the Visegrád group similar to the EaP countries for political and 
economic transformation.252 In view of developments in Ukraine, it may be worth indicating that 
subregional formation with the EaP-3, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine can now be of growing 
relevance. Relations between the EU and the South Caucasus over the past twenty years show that, 
with the ENP and the EaP mechanisms, the EU has been coherent in sectoral cooperation. 
 
3.2. Legislative Alignment and Common Area in Transport 
 
This and the next subchapters puts forward the core argument that legislative alignment, a common 
area created by putting in operation technical assistance programmes, and restrictive measures are 
key preconditions for the EU’s external transport policy coherence in the South Caucasus. The first 
section of this subchapter analyses legislative alignment with EU law. It then examines a common 
transport area that the EU has created to meet European safety, security and environmental 
standards. The EU aims to integrate its neighbourhood in all transport modes, but bearing in mind 
that Georgia shares a maritime borderline with EU new members Bulgaria and Romania, maritime 
cooperation stands out in EU-Georgia relations. The recent example in EU’s maritime transport 
shows that by using coercive measures and inducements, the EU has succeeded in making 
institutional changes in Georgia’s maritime sector, which is discussed in the third section. 
 
3.2.1. Legislative Alignment 
 
Transport policy cooperation with the EU’s neighbouring region in practical terms was first 
outlined in the policy on a European transport network in 2004. This policy had a focus on 
investments for 30 priority transnational axes to connect the EU’s internal market with the 
neighbouring countries via transport links.253 Five transnational axes were adopted to link the major 
axes of the trans-European networks with axes of the neighbouring countries: Motorways of the 
Seas, Northern Axis, Central Axis, South Eastern Axis, and South Western Axis.254 Separately, in 
1999 Iceland and Norway created the Northern Dimension policy (ND) for thematic cooperation 
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with Russia, such as transport and logistics.255 In 2011, the Commission in its Communication 
“Renewed Approach to Transport Cooperation” placed transport policy with the ENP countries 
within the context of strengthening the ENP policy: 
The EU is a major political and economic partner of countries in neighbouring regions. Strengthened 
cooperation in the transport sector can make a difference in helping our neighbours to become economically 
stronger and politically more stable.256 
 
This strategy document reinforcing transport policy reflects a clear vision of the EU on transport 
towards the neighbourhood. To create a legislative framework of cooperation, the EU concluded 
comprehensive agreements with the neighbouring countries on par with the EU rules and 
regulations. As a policy officer on international transport affairs from DG MOVE outlined in 2013, 
association agreement with Georgia stipulated regulatory approximation in transport legislation.257 
Moreover, a head officer on transport affairs from the DG MOVE stressed: 
We think it is very important to develop framework of cooperation with all the neighbours, in particular with 
the South Caucasus states in terms of sharing common objectives when it comes to the regulation of 
transport, because we have a lot of common issues about safety, security and environmental protection.258 
 
Closer legislative alignment with the South Caucasus countries is sought in all transport modes, 
namely, maritime, road, rail and civil aviation. Approximation is achieved by involving countries in 
the process of developing their legislations, which creates a feeling of a common stakeholding and 
commitment. Drawing on the example of how old member states helped the EU accession countries 
bring their vessel traffic management legislation into compliance with EU regulations, a permanent 
representative of the European Commission stated that the EU first identifies responsible points of 
contact in national administrations and helps them redraft their legislation.259 Following the AA, 
Georgia now approximates its national legislation with EU legislation by transposing maritime and 
land transport-related directives and regulations. The Georgian side has committed to aligning its 
legislation in “the stipulated timeframes” but underlines the gradual nature of approximation.260 To 
promote observance of international standards in aviation safety and security, Georgia amended its 
air code in accordance with international regulations of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).261 The EU has thus achieved high 
level of coherence in transport by embedding common legislative practice and cooperation within 
specialised international organisations in the South Caucasus countries. 
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3.2.2. External Dimension of Single Transport Area 
 
Next to legislative alignment, the EU has created a single European transport area as part of its 
coherent strategy. Expansion of the EU’s transport and infrastructure policy to its immediate 
neighbours is guided by a roadmap to a Single European Transport Area.262 With a common view 
on an external aviation policy to the eastern neighbourhood put in the Council Conclusions adopted 
in 2012, the EU established the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) that covers all 
neighbouring countries on the EU’s eastern borders.263 Of the EaP countries, the EU concluded a 
comprehensive air services agreement with Georgia,264 is negotiating similar agreements with 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, and is planning to enter into negotiations on an agreement of a 
similar nature with Armenia. The head officer from the DG MOVE confirmed that “the Council 
was absolutely supportive to the idea to progress in view of establishing this common aviation area 
between the EU and its eastern neighbourhood.”265 Regulatory approximation and the creation of a 
single area, also implies the gradual opening of new markets for transport services for the EU. 
 
Rail transport is the third mode to link with the South Caucasus. As the DG MOVE head officer 
noted, the EU member states are taking an interest in a rail interconnection between the Caucasus 
states.266 Transport and logistics are viewed as accelerators of integration of the Black Sea and 
Central Asia with the South Caucasus into a “transport hub.”267 Current agenda to enhance 
multimodal transportation and logistics centres along the TRACECA corridor evolved into 
waterborne connections among the riparian states of the Black Sea with the Logistics Processes and 
Motorways of the Sea (LOGMOS). With the Silk Wind project, the EU created a transportation 
system for containers by rail from China and Kazakhstan through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
to Europe. While extending the railway network to the east, the Trans-European and Trans-Asian 
railway (TER-TAR), advanced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), is important for the EU. The new corridor Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad Line (BTK), in 
operation since 2015 and connecting Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey to Europe, was 
                                                          
262 Commission of the European Communities, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a 
Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System, White Paper, COM (2011), Brussels, 2011, Accessed 31-07-13, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF, 16. 
263 Council of the European Union, Conclusions, “The EU’s External Aviation Policy – Addressing Future Challenges,” 
3213th Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting, Brussels, 2012, Accessed 7-08-13, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/134518.pdf. 
264 Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its Member States of the One Part, and 
Georgia, of the Other Part, Brussels, 2010, Journal of the European Communities L 321 2012, Accessed 10-08-13, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&t
reatyId=8821. 
265 Interview 43. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Shirin Akiner, Rovshan Ibrahimov and Ariz Huseynov, “International Cooperation in Eurasia: Transport and 
Logistics,” SAM Review 10 (2013), 51. 
56 
predominantly constructed by the participating states. As the head of a transport department at a 
ministry of transport in Azerbaijan put it, the BTK provides the EU with access for goods and 
passengers, increases transit potential of participating countries, and enhances intermodal transport 
volume in both directions.268 The EU seems to focus more on logistics whilst rail transport 
initiatives tend to be conducted in multilateral formats. 
 
Another component of EU policy implementation to the South Caucasus is the transfer of 
knowledge, competence and technical assistance to the neighbouring counties. This interaction is 
achieved by drawing on the EU’s technical regulatory agencies, such as the European Maritime 
Safety Agency (EMSA), European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and European Railway 
Agency (ERA). EU transport policy is also conducted in conjunction with other international 
transport policy organisations notably the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), IMO, and International Road Transport 
Union (IRU), in which the EU usually has an observer status. Such multilateral formats push the 
South Caucasus countries to harmonise their national legislation by enforcing international 
conventions. Legislative alignment and the creation of a single European transport area in civil 
aviation, maritime and rail transport constitute the EU’s coherent strategy. 
 
3.2.3. Restrictive Measures in Maritime Transport 
 
Parallel to approximation, the EU has used economic restrictive measures as a foreign policy tool to 
compel maritime reform in Georgia. The prominent measure was when the EU suspended 
recognising Certificates of Competency (CoC) issued in Georgia. To regain recognition was a 
strong incentive for the Georgian Government to reform its maritime sector. Unlike other EaP 
counties with which the EU has a land border, it shares a maritime border with Georgia. This border 
is important for Europe, because almost 90% of external freight trade in tonnage is seaborne, and 
most of the trade is conducted by maritime transport in Europe. The virtue of the Black Sea, which 
is shared by Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey, reinforces the importance of Georgia, 
as a maritime nation becoming a gateway for cargo flow from Central Asia to Europe. Bearing this 
seaborne trade in mind, the EU Maritime Transport Strategy 2009-2018 calls on the EU to enhance 
cooperation with its trading and shipping partners in the neighbourhood.269 On this part of the Black 
Sea shore, the EU’s interest lies in port operations, safety and security. 
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In 2009, due to the CoCs incompliance with EU maritime standards, namely with the requirements 
of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW Convention 1978),270 the EU stopped recognising the Georgian CoCs.271 This 
decision affected 3,700 seafarers out of total of 18,000 seafarers residing in Georgia who used to 
work on vessels flying flags of the EU member states. This restrictive measure turned the wheel for 
the government to reconsider its approach and to take corresponding measures. In particular, the 
Parliament of Georgia amended the Law of Georgia on Management of Regulation of Transport 
Field,272 and the Maritime Code of Georgia.273 Besides legislative amendments, the government 
instituted reforms in the flag state sector in line with 22 EU directives on maritime safety and 
security, port state control, vessel traffic monitoring, accident investigation, passenger ships and oil 
tankers, and social conditions.274 To deal with the detention ratio of vessels flying the Georgian 
flag, from over 270 substandard ships listed in the Georgian Ships Registry only three ships were 
left undeleted.275 Reform of ship registration removed Georgia from the high risk category of ships, 
otherwise known as the black list of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
(Paris MoU).276 After adopting restrictive measures, the European Commission assisted Georgia to 
bring its maritime system into congruence with the EU standards via its funding tools for maritime 
safety and security in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. Most prominent among these have been 
instruments of the Ship Pollution Prevention Project for the Black and Caspian Seas (SASEPOL), 
and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX). 
 
After regular monitoring conducted by EMSA, having noted progress in corrective measures, the 
Commission first granted the country a re-recognition prospect. As the director of a maritime 
transport agency in Batumi stated, this acknowledgment motivated the national maritime 
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administration, and as the captain reassures propelled the reforms process.277 After a year later, the 
Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS), the member states 
jointly re-recognised seafarers’ certificates issued in Georgia allowing the seafarers to resume their 
work on board of the EU flagged ships in 2013.278 The EU mastered positive statecraft in maritime 
transport towards Georgia by imposing sanctions and rewarding the country for progress. 
 
3.2.3.1. Navigation to Abkhazia 
 
Incidents of maritime entry to the ports of Abkhazia that constitutes about half of Georgia’s Black 
Sea coastline, elucidates a striking aspect of how countries manage to navigate away from 
sovereignty. Despite its engagement strategy the EU has not been involved in resolving the matter 
of prohibited maritime entry in Abkhazia that adds to the argument that the EU remains disengaged 
in addressing overlapping issues of maritime transport policy and conflict resolution in Georgia. 
 
After the 1990s, links with Abkhazia through all modes of transport were closed. During Soviet 
times, the railway lines of Senaki-Enguri-Gali (1930), Gali-Ochamchire-Sokhumi (1938), and 
Sokhumi-Adler (1949) were the shortest routes for the transportation of goods between Georgia and 
Russia.279 Stopping the railway connection through Georgia affected Abkhazia’s economy and 
deprived Russia of railway links with Armenia.280 In 1996 all sea-ports of Abkhazia were also 
closed for navigation as the Georgian Government was incapable of exercising its sovereignty over 
the Abkhaz section of Georgian territorial waters to ensure the secure voyage of vessels with 
reference to the decrees of the President of Georgia, and UN Security Council resolutions.281 In 
2008, the status of the ports located in Abkhazia was reiterated in the Law of Georgia on Occupied 
Territories that defines territorial inland waters, waters adjacent to the coastline from the River Psou 
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to the River Enguri, and waters of Georgia, located in the aquatic territory of the Black Sea, as an 
occupied territory with prohibited navigation, except for humanitarian purposes, with reference to 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).282 Despite the special procedures, the Georgian 
coast guards have been reporting incidents of vessels flying flags of a third country or owned by a 
shipowner registered in a third country entering Abkhaz ports.283 To address this matter, as the 
safety and security of shipping falls under the IMO’s remit, Georgia has been appealing with note 
verbale to the IMO since 2004 to remind the IMO member states about the special procedures of 
control, which, in some instances, are also EU member states or accession candidates. 
 
Despite notifying the IMO and its member states regarding these restrictions, incidents of 
clandestine navigation to Abkhazia was not an issue the EU considered necessary to resolve. The 
fact that the EU has not engaged in maritime issues that occur in disputed territorial waters 
demonstrates the limitation of the EU’s remit to engage in conflict resolution. 
 
3.3. The South Caucasus as a Transport Corridor 
 
This subchapter, by analysing the EU’s first regulatory framework of relations using the technical 
assistance programme TRACECA in the South Caucasus for more than twenty years, argues that 
the EU’s transport policy has been coherent. This transit region has been particularly prominent 
with diversification of oil and gas to the European markets that the second part of this subchapter 
engages. It concludes with analysis of EU relations with the IMO arguing that the EU’s maritime 
transport policy is reinforced by its cooperation with other specialised international agencies. 
 
3.3.1. TRACECA Corridor 
 
The EU had devised its transport policy towards the South Caucasus before the regulatory 
framework of relations with its eastern neighbours has been introduced. In 1993 the EU launched 
the TRACECA programme as a component of Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) programme with the former Soviet countries, created earlier in 1991.  
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Table 1 
 
TRACECA Map 
 
 
Source: Permanent Secretariat of IGC TRACECA. 2015. 
 
TRACECA brings together the Eastern European, the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries 
of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.284 The permanent Secretariat of Intergovernmental 
Commission – PS IGC TRACECA established in Baku in 2000 regulates provisions of a founding 
multilateral agreement on international transport for Europe-the Caucasus-Asia corridor (MLA) that 
governs trade and transport among the countries.285 Between 1993 and 2014 TRACECA supported 
66 technical assistance projects and 14 investment projects from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), and private investors, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the World Bank (WB), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
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TRACECA has been a regular tool towards all three South Caucasus countries for cargo and 
passenger transportation. Georgia with its maritime border with the EU member states of Romania 
and Bulgaria, has preponderant within TRACECA. As a deputy minister of economy and 
sustainable development of Georgia in charge of transport, and a permanent representative (national 
secretary) of the IGC TRACECA in Georgia stated, transport is significant in the Georgian 
economy as well as in its relations with the EU.286 The country’s potential for redeveloping 
transportation routes to European markets was confirmed in the interview with an energy advisor in 
a UK government department.287 Transport and communications made up 11.1% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of Georgia’s national economy; and transport and communications had the largest 
share in foreign direct investment (FDI) that tripled from 11.4% in 2011 to 34.9% in 2014.288 Using 
TRACECA commercial routes, in 2013 imports to Georgia came from Europe (22.63%), Turkey 
(15.85%), the Caucasus (9.28%) and America (8.12%); and exports were also westbound to Europe 
(23.68%), America (15.14%), the Caucasus (11.87%) and Turkey (11.28%).289 In all of this, trade 
with TRACECA countries constituted half of Georgia’s global trade flow (46.14% of total imports, 
and 41.64% of total exports).290 That TRACECA routes have facilitated an increase in cargo 
transportation over two decades is a testament to EU coherent transport policy. 
 
Besides Georgia, the EU has worked closely with Armenia and Azerbaijan within TRACECA as 
well as on infrastructure projects for the integration of their transport networks into the TEN-T. As 
the civil servant at a ministry of transport in Azerbaijan noted, transport relations between the EU 
and Azerbaijan have been strategic.291 For a permanent representative of IGC TRACECA in 
Azerbaijan, transport cooperation through TRACECA marked the first instance of the EU’s 
engagement in Azerbaijan.292 Moreover, the EU has assisted Azerbaijan with technical assistance 
tools, such as Twinning, TAIEX and Support for Improvement in Governance and Management 
(SIGMA). In order to eliminate obstacles at border crossings, as the country does not have direct 
transport links with the EU member countries, Azerbaijan works closely with Georgia were the 
major inland transport routes pass. After the inception of TRACECA, cargo transportation in 
Azerbaijan increased from 3 million tons in 1993 to 53 million in 2007.293 Armenia, besides 
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improving transport connections, is particularly positive about the technical assistance component. 
As a permanent representative of the IGC TRACECA in Armenia stated, while actively 
participating in TRACECA from the outset, the country has welcomed more technical assistance 
and investment opportunities.294 There is a reciprocal increasing need for the EU to open up 
markets for transport services in the South Caucasus. The importance of regional transit also came 
up in the interview with the head officer at the DG MOVE in Brussels: 
We have mutual benefits to gain from sharing and operating our respective transport chain and the same rules 
and requirements. And there are projects which could take benefit of that when it comes to the carriage of 
goods for instance from Caspian Sea to the EU through the Black Sea.295 
 
TRACECA enabled the EU to extend the European transport network, to access alternative 
transportation routes, and to set up intermodality of transport systems. The transit corridor has also 
enhanced capacity for production growth in the partner countries. In addition, TRACECA has 
facilitated trade by creating an environment for the unobstructed flow of goods and a single window 
system at customs. Carriage of goods by maritime, road, railway and civil aviation has also 
strengthened regional links between the European, South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. 
Cooperation in technical areas among the partner countries is also seen to have contributed to a 
political solution of existing conflicts. Bearing in mind the safety and security of cargo 
transportation, regional stability has been of major importance for the EU, as the head of team of 
experts at the PS IGC TRACECA underlined.296 Separately, although regional agreements in 
transport are unlikely to solve territorial disputes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, common 
work on technical issues with very specific purposes, can contribute towards a gradual settlement of 
their dispute.297 Overall, technical assistance for seamless transportation and a functional corridor 
shows tangible sectoral progress in the EU’s engagement with the region. 
 
While TRACECA aimed to stimulate transport operations in the member countries through the 
East-West Transport Corridor, Russia proposed a North-South Transport Corridor at the European 
Commission session in Helsinki in 1993.298 Although that route was a direct maritime, rail and road 
option running from India to Europe, Western countries continued to bypass Russia. TRACECA 
has existed next to other regional economic unions, the most notable of these being the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EAEC), with an agenda of unified transport, and the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), advancing regional transport and trade. 
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Cooperation among the South Caucasus countries across TRACECA corridor demonstrates the 
EU’s consistent policy regarding transport to the South Caucasus. 
 
3.3.2. Energy Diversification 
 
Their growing economies and uncertainties in Russia’s actions, have prompted the EU countries to 
diversify their energy supply from Central Asia through the South Caucasus. Since the 1990s, the 
European states have pursued the investment in the construction of pipelines, the extraction of oil 
and gas from Central Asia transported through the South Caucasus. The Commission and the 
Council, on their part, have expressed support of the pipeline infrastructure development. As a 
result, the domestic economies of Georgia and Azerbaijan have benefited with export growth and 
increased government revenues. In addition, energy diversification has forged the political and 
economic independence of these transit countries. 
 
By controlling sources of supplies and their transportation routes, Russia has exerted economic and 
political leverage over the Central Asia. The region is significant in terms of proven and estimated 
oil reserves, reaching 190 billion barrels.299 In the early 2000s, almost all oil pipelines in 
Kazakhstan, the country with an abundance of hydrocarbon resources, crossed Russia.300 In 2006, 
US Vice President Dick Cheney, being discontent with this, called Russia’s use of oil and gas “tools 
of intimidation either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolise transportation.”301 This 
monopoly decreased in 2005, when one-third of total oil exports from the Caspian fields went to 
Iran and China, and two-thirds transited through Russia, of which only a quarter travelled through 
Georgia and Azerbaijan.302 The EU has been increasing its cooperation with Central Asian 
countries with a special focus on Kazakhstan, but has not been observant of conditionality 
principles towards the local political elites.303 In its policy conduct, Kazakhstan has sought a “multi-
vector” policy as well as that of “Eurasianism,” which cultivates good relations with all external 
powers.304 This multilateral foreign policy and energy diversification increased Kazakhstan’s 
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exports to Europe. As Adam Hug found, in 2010 the EU made up 39.4% of Kazakhstan’s overall 
exports and the European imports constituted 25.5% of the country’s total imports after Russia and 
China.305 The EU became Kazakhstan’s largest export market and the European countries continued 
to invest in Kazakhstan. In recent years, China has emerged out of various players, including India, 
Japan and South Korea.306 China’s growing presence was made possible by consumption demand 
and by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). As Alexey Malashenko outlines, Central 
Asian states have pursued strategies that entailed relations with various economic and political 
forces in China, Russia, countries of Europe and wider Muslim world.307 Paata Tsagareishvili and 
Gogita Gvenetadze conclude that the oil transportation corridor through the South Caucasus has 
ultimately created competitiveness in the Caspian.308 Despite deliveries to Europe and China, after 
2008, and with the presence of a strong national company, JSC KazMunaiGaz, Kazakhstan returned 
from trans-Caspian transportation to the Russian market.309 Turkmenistan, which is a key gas 
producer in Central Asia, also declined to participate in the South Caucasus corridor to transport gas 
through pipe or to ship Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).310 The diversification of Central Asian 
resources has to a certain extent changed Russia’s position within the region. 
 
Energy sensitivity remained a principal factor in EU-Russia relations prior to 2008. The EU had 
already decided to decrease dependence on Russian and Middle Eastern energy by diversifying 
supplies from the Caspian with alternative routes through the transit corridors of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey. This policy was welcomed in both Georgia and Azerbaijan because, since 
1993, these countries have sought to attract Western investment to reduce dependency on Russia 
and to gain international support for conflict resolution. The head of the EU delegation to 
Azerbaijan agrees that the EU has thus attributed great importance to Azerbaijan as an energy 
partner.311 The Council official responsible for the assessment of external energy and their foreign 
policy implications observes that dictated more with global politics rather than market economics, 
Georgia looks favourably on transit-related policy decisions that also guarantee the country’s 
economic stability.312 Another official notes the EU’s interest in greater diversification of sources of 
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supplies and investment in the region.313 However, as a head of unit on relations with Russia at the 
European Commission clarifies, energy interests provide a further reason for wanting to maintain 
stability and predictability in the South Caucasus: “[o]ur interest is not confined to the energy 
interest alone. We have interests also related to trade and investment in the wider sense but also 
[that] prosperity and democracy are encouraged in the region.”314 To meet Europe’s rising energy 
demands, the Commission scrutinised its energy policy to avoid tensions with Russia: 
The key will be to facilitate the transportation of Caspian resources towards Europe, be it via transit through 
Russia or through other transport routes. Indeed, secure and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas will be 
important for the EU’s security of energy supply.315 
 
Dispute between Turkey and Armenia complicate transit from Central Asia and the Middle East via 
Azerbaijan to Turkey. As the personal representative of SG/HR for CFSR for energy and security 
policy explained, the most pressing issue in the region in 2009 was unblocking the way between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia.316 On Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, the Azerbaijani side 
holds that the border between the two has to remain closed.317 Ankara’s foreign policy, under the 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in 2009-2014 advanced energy cooperation with Europe.318 
The EU now accounts for half of the country’s exports and tourism, and, likewise, the EU’s energy 
security depends on transportation through Turkey.319 Despite increasing cooperation, the EU has 
not been able to open the transit route to Turkey. 
 
The interlinked economic relations between the Western states and the South Caucasus require an 
overview of the pipeline system in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The oil and gas pipeline 
network in the region presently constitutes a system of three major oil pipelines and six current and 
projected gas pipelines.320 The three oil pipelines are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, that 
carries oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the Baku-Supsa 
oil pipeline, that connects Baku with the Black Sea port of Supsa, and the Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline (Northern route) running northwards. This last pipeline brings oil from Baku to the Russian 
port of Novorossiysk and is operated by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), 
and the Russian Oil Transporting JSC Transneft. 
                                                          
313 Interview 9. 
314 Interview 10. 
315 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, “Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, Its Neighbours and Partner Countries,” 
COM (2003) 262, Brussels, 2003, Accessed 12-01-14, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/doc/2003_communication_en.pdf, 12. 
316 Interview 15. 
317 Interview 52. 
318 Gamze Coşkun, “The New Face of Turkish Foreign Policy and its Repercussions Following the Arab Uprisings,” 
Caucasus International 3 (2013): 75. 
319 Gareth Winrow, “Turkey and EU Energy Security,” in Turkey in Europe, ed. Adam Hug (London: The FPC, 2008), 
66. 
320 See Table 2. 
66 
Table 2 
 
Select Pipelines in the South Caucasus and Central Asia 
 
 
Source: The Economist. 2015. 
 
 
The six existing and projected gas pipelines in the region are BTE, Trans-Caspian, Nord Stream, 
Blue Stream, White Stream, and the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP). The South Caucasus 
pipeline, known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), transports gas from Shah Deniz gas fields in 
Azerbaijan to Turkey and is owned by BP, a Norwegian multinational Statoil ASA, SOCAR, the 
Russian oil company OAO Lukoil, the French multinational Total SA, the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC), and Turkish national oil and gas company, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı 
(TPAO). The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which is expected to bring gas from Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, is supported by the EU and SOCAR. 
Taking into account the high demand for gas, as the head of EU delegation to Azerbaijan stated, the 
implementation of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is a good opportunity to diversify energy supplies 
to the EU.321 The Nord Stream that brings gas from Russia via the Baltic Sea to Germany, is 
operated by the Russian gas company, Gazprom, the German company, Badische Anilin- & Soda-
Fabrik (BASF) SA, gas companies of European-holding E.ON Ruhrgas, and NV Nederlandse 
Gasunie. The Trans-Black Sea pipeline, or the Blue Stream, also run by Gazprom, and ENI is 
projected to carry gas from Russia to Turkey. The Southern Corridor, for which the Council and 
Commission expressed their political support to diversify supply routes, presently comprises two 
concurrent pipeline projects – White Stream and TANAP. This gas corridor is expected to deliver 
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60 to 120 bcm natural gas per year to the EU, relative to the total European gas demand for 500 
bcm.322 According to an energy consortium representative, White Stream, which is a Georgia-
Ukraine-EU initiative to transport gas from the Caspian to Romania, Ukraine, and Central 
Europe,323 is “the project of the common European interest” and “reinforces the EU’s other 
southern corridor projects.”324 Two gas pipeline projects – the South Stream, which was to run from 
Russia to Bulgaria, and Nabucco, from Azerbaijan via Georgian-Turkish border to Austria – were 
suspended. The first created controversies about noncompliance with competition rules by Russia 
and Bulgaria and the latter was considered commercially unfeasible.325 Nabucco was replaced by 
TANAP, financed by SOCAR, the Turkish state-owned petroleum corporation BOTAŞ, and the 
TPAO, that would deliver gas from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe. The involvement of the 
European and regional multinational companies in the construction of oil and gas pipelines 
demonstrates their interlinked economic relations. 
 
Since the 1990s, the Western governments and transnational corporations have accessed the 
Caspian resources via three major oil pipelines: the BTC and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, and the 
BTE gas pipeline. The EU’s primary interest in the region began with the BTE pipeline to secure 
transportation of gas from Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe.326 It was decided 
that three pipelines would run across Georgia along the Kura basin that hosts Azerbaijan’s oil 
fields.327 The shortest route, which ran as a straight line across Iran and Armenia, was rejected 
because of those countries’ close relations with Russia, together with Azerbaijan’s opposition to 
Armenia’s exclusion, due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
 
The construction of the BTC was considered one of the biggest energy projects since the demise of 
the Soviet Union. The US invested USD 3.7 billion in the construction of this key east-west energy 
corridor to ensure the economic independence of the newly independent states.328 As BTC was 
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owned by a European consortium, with the largest share held by the multinational energy company, 
British Petroleum (BP), the West was closely involved in the region.329 Critical of this project, 
Russian officials pointed out the economic ineffectiveness of the BTC.330 After its completion, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey earned substantial revenues through pipeline transit fees. To a 
certain extent, the economic growth of Georgia and Azerbaijan counterbalanced Russian economic 
dominance.331 The energy diversification achieved with these projects affected Russia’s ability to 
influence the political situation in both countries. Nevertheless, Russia remains a dominant force in 
the South Caucasus and Caspian region because it retains control of other oil and gas pipelines. 
 
3.3.3. EU Maritime Transport Policy Reinforced by the IMO  
 
EU transport policy also rests on the multilateral work of the EU conducted in conjunction with the 
UN and its specialised agency the IMO. By considering multilateral dimensions in its external 
relations, the EU endorses the UN millennium development goals, that include transport 
infrastructure, an area in which the EU can add value by drawing on its expertise.332 As a 
representative of the European Commission to the IMO noted, the EU assists the Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea coastal states to implement their maritime legislations by synchronising various 
existing initiatives conducted in cooperation with the European Commission and the IMO.333 To 
address common challenges related to the pollution of the marine environment in littoral states in 
the Black Sea, the EU facilitates the adoption of regional legislation whereas the IMO provides 
technical backstopping for the implementation of global maritime conventions. As the head of the 
CIS and Eastern Europe section at the IMO explained, the IMO encourages cooperation among 
national maritime administrations in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea by implementing technical 
cooperation activities to control oil pollution preparedness and response.334 As the director of the 
International Tankers Owners Pollution Federation – ITOPF commented, given low tanker traffic 
density and fewer natural maritime hazards, the Black Sea is considered a relatively safe area for 
shipping.335 Environmental problems in the Black Sea, which is one of the world’s largest marine 
environments with a surface area of 420,000 km2, are partly caused by oil pollution since the 
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majority of oil input is chronic.336 However, owing to the amount of oil transported through the 
region, as the director of international oil pollution compensation funds indicated in 2009, Georgia 
was still regarded as a high risk area for oil spill incidents.337 The South Caucasus countries, 
therefore, remain party to the international liability and compensation regime based on the 1992 
Fund Convention.338 The IMO facilitates relations between national governments and the petroleum 
industry to ensure preparedness in the event of major oil pollution incidents.339 These companies 
also seek to monitor the EU’s projects on maritime actions in the region.340 
 
As for ecological insecurity and water governance, the South Caucasus is also in the high risk 
category of the states facing political instability as a consequence of climate change.341 The INGOs, 
indicating the single ecosystem for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia around the shared Kura-Aras 
River, encourage them to take mitigation measures for river management that transcends borders.342 
It is in this line of reasoning that a programme associate at the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in Azerbaijan emphasised a holistic approach for sustainable development for 
economic growth.343 The EU harmonises its activities in legislative compliance and technical 
cooperation with other international actors, which, in this case represents a case for the consistent 
nature of EU policy formulation and implementation towards the South Caucasus. 
 
By examining the regulatory alignment, a common transport area, technical assistance and the 
application of restrictive measures taken by the EU, this subchapter has proved that, with regard to 
the transport sector, EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus countries has been coherent. 
Economic integration and energy relations are expected to bring stability in the region. Although 
unauthorised maritime entry that occurs in Abkhazia circumvents the EU’s transport relations in the 
South Caucasus, results found in this chapter lend support to the argument that the EU’s 
cooperation with the South Caucasus in transport has been coherent. 
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Chapter 4. International Involvement in the South Caucasus Conflicts 
 
 
This chapter argues that mediation in the South Caucasus conflicts of western nations and 
international actors prevented the EU from engaging in conflict resolution. The EU was unable to 
address the underlying regional security and, in particular, the destabilising role of Russia. This 
chapter first examines three phases in the foreign policy conduct of Georgia: in 1991-1995 Georgia 
sought good relations with Russia, in 1996-2003 the country reoriented towards the West, and in 
2004-2013 it pursued an intense European and Euro-Atlantic policy. This chapter then investigates 
the causes and consequences of wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, arguing that autonomous 
statuses created in the soviet constitutions and nationalistic tendencies, prepared the ground for 
ethnic conflicts. Subchapter three observes Russia’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Georgia, 
which was apparent in its role as an interlocutor in signing peace agreements about South Ossetia 
(1989-1991) and Abkhazia (1992-1993), while offering assistance in mediating peace. 
 
Subchapter four examines Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic policy, which affected relations 
with Russia and influenced the escalation of the armed conflict. This overview has particular 
relevance for the analysis about the resumption of hostilities and the EU’s mediation therein, that is 
discussed in subchapter five on EU engagement without recognition strategy towards Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. After shedding more clarity on definitions of mediation and conflict resolution, the 
same subchapter touches upon involvement of the UN and CSCE/OSCE in conflicts in Georgia and 
refers to the absence of the EU from Nagorno-Karabakh. Subchapter six argues that, despite its 
isolation, Abkhazia is asserting itself with nascent trends of statebuilding. The seventh subchapter 
examines the EU’s external policy with civil society in the region. Subchapter eight makes 
comparative analysis of the EU’s engagement with Northern Ireland, suggesting implications that 
can be drawn from the Northern Irish peace process for the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. 
 
4.1. Foreign Policy of Georgia in 1991-2013 
 
After regaining its independence, Georgia struggled to define its national identity and formulate 
both domestic and foreign policy priorities. The Georgian Government adopted a differentiated 
policy, simultaneously seeking good relations with Russia between 1991 and 1995, and increasingly 
reorienting towards the West from 1996 to 2003, with an intense European and Euro-Atlantic 
policy in 2004-2013. The first two phases fall within the foreign policy agenda of President Eduard 
Shevardnadze (1993-2003), and the third within that of President Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2013). 
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National identity was essential for building a state after the independence. Fawn writes that foreign 
policy and inclusion in Europe were important aspects in the creation of national identity among 
post-Soviet states. These included two major elements: reorientation from Marxism-Leninism 
ideology, and the emergence of collective identities of nationhood.344 Stephen Jones notes that 
foreign policy in Georgia underwent a “re-ideologization of politics,” which was as an instrument 
used by new elites to assert legitimacy through a new national identity.345 Writing on cultural 
paradigms in Georgian foreign policy, Jones does not identify a single ideology across four 
suggested paradigms: a religious identity, a Western identity, pan-Caucasianism and anti-
Russianism.346 As Jones argues, whilst Georgian foreign policy has been reactive, economic 
difficulties, civil war and the Soviet legacy manifested in 2008 characterise three decades of 
struggle to form statehood.347 In a militarised country, state leaders attempted to align themselves 
with the Western capitals. With this alignment policy, Georgia aspired to re-embrace a European 
identity that the state leaders and educated elite have claimed to be lost after the Bolshevik 
advancement. In geopolitical terms, the country retained its Caucasus identity and, to distinguish 
itself from Russia, ascribed itself a re-emerged South Caucasus identity, as well as a more 
westwards-leaning Black Sea identity as a way to stabilise the region. 
 
From 1991 to 1995, Georgia experienced a domestic crisis that reflected on its foreign policy. 
Identified with anti-Soviet sentiments, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a leader of the nationalist bloc Round 
Table within the Supreme Council that convened the first parliamentary elections, was elected as its 
Chairman and in May 1991 became the first president of Georgia. After confrontations between 
supporters of President Gamsakhurdia and his opponents, that descended into civil war in Tbilisi in 
1991, the Military Council, headed by Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, Commander of National Guard 
Tengiz Kitovani, and Jaba Ioseliani, the leader of Paramilitary Mkhedrioni, deposed President 
Gamsakhurdia in 1993.348 In March 1992 Eduard Shevardnadze, previously the First Secretary of 
the Georgian Communist Party (1972-1985), and Soviet Foreign Minister (1985-1991), was invited 
to head the State Council. The state was too weak to enforce its jurisdiction in Georgia’s south-
western autonomy of Adjara where, to prevent atrocities, Aslan Abashidze, the leader of the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara, closed the border, that was only regained in 2004 by the central 
government. The retention of an autonomous status for Adjara demonstrates the existence of the 
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good practice of autonomy in Georgia. Ethnic tensions, fuelled with nationalistic sentiments in 
artificially created federal structures, caused armed confrontation between the Georgian and 
separatist minorities, first in South Ossetia in 1991-1992 and then in Abkhazia in 1992-1993. 
 
The peace agreements that Georgia signed with Russia, concerning wars in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, legitimised the continuance of the Soviet military base in Gudauta and the Russian 
troops along the conflict lines. Otar Janelidze and Nodar Asatiani recount that Georgia sought 
Russia’s mediation in the conflicts despite its support to the separatist entities.349 In March 1993, 
President Shevardnadze openly declared conflict with Abkhazia as a conflict between Russia and 
Georgia. Irrespective of such a stance, with the peace agreements that Georgia signed on South 
Ossetia (Kazbegi Protocol on Disarmament 1991,350 Dagomisi Agreement on Conflict Settlement 
1992351), and Abkhazia (Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire 1992,352 Sochi Agreement on Ceasefire 
1993,353 Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces 1994354), Russia solidified its 
military peacekeeping presence. It is striking that the signatories of the peace agreements are 
Georgia and the Russian Federation; Abkhazia and South Ossetia are absent from the documents. 
This indicates that Russia, as a signatory of peace agreements, was a party to the conflicts. 
 
Anti-Russian sentiment arose in Georgian society during the war period, but officially, Tbilisi 
established diplomatic relations in pursuit of good neighbourly relations with Russia in July 1992. 
In 1994, the two countries signed a document on the fundamental principles of the bilateral relations 
Framework Agreement on Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation, that the 
Georgian Parliament approved but the Russian State Duma did not ratify, causing a renewed 
impasse. The ambiguity of Georgia’s foreign policy was also reflected in Georgia’s forced 
accession to the CIS in 1993 and to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), created by 
Russia as an alternative security organisation. President Shevardnadze explained such foreign 
policy as “a way of returning Abkhazia.”355 The institutional format of the CIS provided some 
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benefits of economic cooperation to the CIS members.356 In addition, subregional cooperation 
emerged within the CIS among Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, referred to as GUAM – 
the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.357 Although Georgia’s presence in 
the CIS was regarded as politically and economically not viable, Georgia did not manage to leave 
the CIS until 2008. In response to Georgia’s demarche, the mandate of the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established in 1993 to monitor ceasefire and the CIS forces, was 
not renewed when it ended in 2009, due to Russia’s opposition within the Security Council. 
 
In the first few years of its independence, Georgia struggled to secure international recognition. 
Instead of democracy as the criterion for recognition, it was the personality of Eduard Shevardnadze 
that was crucial in favouring recognition of the regime’s lack of legitimacy. Despite apparent 
democracy, it was not until the Soviet Union disintegrated, and Shevardnadze pledged to respect 
disarmament that Georgia received recognition.358 Among the EC/EU, Germany was the first 
country to recognise Georgia’s sovereignty in 1992.359 Since then, Georgia has established bilateral 
relations with over 110 countries, and acceded to European intergovernmental institutions. A 
political culture with a European identity was famously voiced in a declaration by the Chairman of 
the Parliament, Zurab Zhvania, before the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) upon joining the CoE: 
“I am Georgian and therefore I am European.”360 With political alignments, the state accessed 
foreign economic assistance from the large financial institutions, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). With 
accession to European institutions, the Georgian political elite tried to distance itself from Russia. 
The economic importance of inclusion in the TRACECA corridor motivated Georgia to turn to the 
West as well as to retain its regional identity. Regional trade interests prompted the country to 
maintain a balanced policy by participating in an emerging Organization of Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC). Although Georgia gradually managed to place itself in the international arena 
by embracing a European identity, instability caused by the wars persisted in Georgia. 
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The EU had limited itself to reactions to the political and economic restrictions that Russia had 
imposed on Georgia since 2000. Initially, Russia introduced a visa regime in Georgia that was not 
applied to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia then encouraged them by conferring 
on them Russian citizenship, and on the elite level, by supporting de facto presidents.361 For 
example, Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation received the presidential 
candidate, Raul Khajimba, in Sochi before the 2004 election in Abkhazia. The presidential 
inauguration of an opposition candidate, Sergei Bagapsh, who won the election, was attended by the 
representatives of State Duma and the Moscow City Hall. The European Commission refrained 
from statements on elections. The European Parliament noted in its resolutions that elections in 
Abkhazia were illegitimate.362 Despite the ambiguity of relations, President Shevardnadze and 
President Putin met in March 2003 in Sochi and reached an agreement about the restoration of 
railway connections between Georgia and Russia.363 After resumed negotiations during the interim 
presidency of Nino Burjanadze, the Chairperson of the Parliament in 2004, the disruption of energy 
supplies and an embargo on Georgian wine averted this rapprochement. The EU again limited itself 
to a Parliamentary resolution calling on the Russian authorities to lift the ban on Georgian 
imports.364 In the second and third phases, running from 1996 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2013, 
Georgia re-orientated its focus towards the West and pursued stronger integration into the European 
family of states. During this time, the EU has not adopted a coherent policy in conflict resolution. 
 
4.2. Conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia365 
 
This subchapter examines wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. First identifying the origins of the 
wars, it offers suggestions for a varied interpretation of the Soviet constitutions and the practice of 
autonomies that created the two political-territorial entities of the Autonomous Republic of 
Abkhazia, and the SOAR. Ethnic tensions and a nationalist ideology reinforced by elites nurtured 
secessionist movements, causing their de facto fragmentation outlined in the second section. 
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4.2.1. Construction of Autonomies in Soviet Constitutions and Nationalist Ideology 
 
The political construction of federal structures in the soviet constitutions is the primary reason for 
ethnic tensions. The study of three constitutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
from 1924, 1936 and 1977366 show that autonomies as political-territorial entities originated in the 
1924 Constitution and were incorporated into the union level republics in the later constitutions. 
 
The 1924 Constitution did not suggest a definition of autonomy but instead mentioned that the 
“autonomous republics of Adzharya and Abkhazya as well as autonomous regions (oblasts) of 
Yugo-Osetya, Nagornyi Karabakh and Nakhichevanskaya” delegate one representative to the soviet 
of nationalities of the Central Executive Committee.367 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia of 1921 viewed the autonomy of Abkhazia differently, stating that “integral parts of 
Georgia Abkhazia (Sokhumi district), the Muslim Part of Georgia (Batomi district) and Zaqatala 
(Zaqatala district368) were granted autonomous governance.”369 The 1936 Constitution clarified that 
the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR) was composed of the Nakhichevanskaya 
Autonomous SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (Oblast) (NKAO); and the 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (Georgian SSR) included Abkhazyan and Adzharyan 
autonomous SSRs and the Yugo-Osetyan Autonomous Regions (Oblast).370 The 1977 Constitution 
confirmed relationship of Georgia and Azerbaijan with their autonomies specifying that only a 
union republic was a sovereign Soviet socialist state, and an autonomous republic and an 
autonomous region (oblast) were its constituent parts.371 The Georgian SSR, a union republic since 
1921 with 1936 and 1977 constitutions, included the autonomous Abkhazian and Adzharian ASSRs 
and SOAR. Nagorno-Karabakh was a constituent NKAO in the Azerbaijan SSR. Although an 
autonomous republic was subordinate to a union republic, in 1977 it received a right to a 
constitution that opened up a loophole for constitutional claims. The study of Soviet constitutions 
shows that the three political-territorial entities did not have a constitutional right to sovereignty 
within the administrative boundaries of Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
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Georgian history purports that, from the 3rd century B.C. until the 16th century, Shida Karli, 
present day South Ossetia, constituted the head of the principalities (saeristavo) within the united 
Georgian feudal monarchy of the Kingdom of Sakartvelo.372 According to Georgian sources, 
Ossetians migrated across the Caucasus Mountains in the 17th century, appearing first in the 
lowlands of Shida Kartli, making the compact settlement that would become SOAR with an 
administrative centre of Tskhinvali.373 In the 1880s people of diverse backgrounds lived together in 
Tskhinvali. In his book, Young Stalin, a prequel to Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Simon Sebag 
Montefiore writes about Ioseb Jughashvili, known as the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, a native of 
Gori municipality, mentioning that, by the 19th century, the Ossetian population was assimilated 
with the Georgians and this continued during Stalin’s time.374 The political participation of 
minorities is evident in the demonstrations in 1956 by the Georgians and Ossetians in response to 
rebuke by Nikita Khrushchev towards the Soviet purges.375 Narratives about the misuse of ethnic 
diversity to breed confrontations are usually connected to the fallout of the Soviet Union. 
 
Autonomous status was granted to South Ossetia in 1922, with a Decree on Administrative 
Arrangement of SOAR from 20 April 1922 adopted by the Council on People’s Commissariat of 
Georgia. The administrative arrangement was determined with the Law of the Georgian SSR on 
SOAR from 1980. The South Ossetian nationalists, encouraged by their kin in North Ossetia within 
the Russian Federation, rejected their subordinate status and elected the Supreme Council of the 
South Ossetian SSR in December 1990, contradicting the constitution of Georgia. In response to 
separatist elections, the Supreme Council of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, in accordance 
with the 1921 Constitution, passed a bill annulling the 1922 Decree and the Georgian SSR Law, 
effectively abolishing the autonomous status as well as invalidating the elections of the Supreme 
Council.376 Similar to the Georgian Government’s response, after the Karabakh Armenians adopted 
the declaration of secession from Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani Parliament abolished the autonomous 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh in November 1991,377 and the Azerbaijani minority boycotted a 
subsequent referendum for independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). 
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The secessionist movement in Abkhazia, a relatively wealthy part of the country which constitutes 
roughly 9% of Georgia’s territory, began with appeals in the late 1980s. In this socially diverse 
region of Abkhazian ASSR, according to the 1989 population census, out of the total 525,061 
population, Abkhazis constituted a minority of 17.8%, Georgians 45.7%, and the rest made up of 
Armenians, Russian, Greeks, Ukrainians, Ossetians, and Jews.378 Abkhaz scholars refer to this 
demographic representation as a result of a resettling process in Abkhazia that started in the 19th 
century, marking the increase in Georgians from 6% of the total population in 1886 to 31.8% in 
1926, reaching 17.8% before the outbreak of hostilities.379 In order to manipulate the region, an 
earlier generation of Soviet leaders created a multiethnic atmosphere by resettling various ethnic 
groups of Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Estonians, Lazs, and Turks. The origins of 
conflicts in former Soviet countries are rooted in rival interpretations of history and demography. 
 
During Soviet times, the Abkhaz minority was represented as proportionally higher than their 
demographic percentage in local administrations. As Julie George observes, Abkhaz autonomy 
within Georgia was increasing after Moscow’s concessions on their appeals for separation.380 
Svante Cornell records the Abkhaz representation within leadership positions in administrative 
districts (raikoms) and regional districts (obkoms).381 From 1965 to 1985, the percentage of ethnic 
Abkhazis in positions as raikoms’ first secretaries increased from 42.9% to 50%, whereas the 
Georgian representation in the same positions decreased from 57.1% to 37.5%. Similarly, by the 
1980s, the Abkhazis dominated with 67% in the government minister positions and constituted 71% 
of the department heads of the obkoms.382 These data confirm that ethnic Abkhazis were favoured 
on the executive level of the administration. A Georgian scholar in international law recalls that 
“from the outset the policy of the central government was very humane towards the Abkhazis and 
South Ossetians. In contrast to other autonomies in the USSR, their rights of language, education 
and broadcasting were protected.”383 Minority representation is contested by the Abkhaz side, 
indicating that high level appointments were meant to redress an enforced Georgianisation policy 
carried out in 1937-1953.384 Similarly, Armenian scholars note that the NKAO has been populated 
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mostly by Armenians affected by the Azerification policy.385 Disputes over NKAO escalated after 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan attained independence from the Soviet Union. As the Georgian state 
weakened, in response to the issue of an underrepresented status next to a titular nation, minorities 
radicalised allowing them a relative leverage over the central government.  
 
In March 1989, Abkhaz nationalists from the Abkhazia Regional Committee of the Communist 
Party of Georgia, and the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic met in the village of 
Likhni. They appealed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to 
regain the Union Republic status that they had had before 1931. This appeal was grounded on an 
argument that, in 1921-1931, the Abkhazian SSR, formed in 1921 and headed by Nestor Lakoba, 
existed independently and, as per the 1925 Constitution of the Abkhazian SSR, it was associated 
with the Georgian SSR only with a “special treaty agreement” (dogovornaya respublika).386 This 
contractual status was ratified by the Abkhazian SSR under pressure from Stalin and Sergo 
Orjonikidze, Chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee (kavbyuro).387 Through 
this, in 1922 the Abkhazian SSR was part of the Transcaucasian SFSR and thus part of the USSR. 
In 1931 Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, Chief of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, reduced 
its status from “treaty agreement,” affiliated with Georgia, to the Abkhazian ASSR. Despite this 
incorporation, the Abkhazian SSR Constitution implied Abkhazia’s sovereignty and its right of exit 
from the USSR.388 The creation and then abolition of the autonomous statuses of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, as well as that of Nagorno-Karabakh nurtured people’s desire for independence. 
 
Majority voting is another reason for the conflicts in Georgia. Making reference to the nationwide 
referendum for the restoration of the independence in Georgia in 1991, the Georgian side has 
dismissed the claims for the independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The referendum held 
throughout Georgia, including in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, on 
31 March 1991 voted to restore state independence of Georgia deprived in 1921 in accordance with 
the Act of State Independence of Georgia from 26 May 1918.389 The polls were boycotted by the 
separatists, but a considerable proportion of the population did vote, including the Georgian, 
Abkhazis and Ossetian, who made up 61.27% of total voters. The restoration of the independence 
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of Georgia was supported by 97.73% of the voters in Abkhazia. Election results showed that with 
88% voter turnout in Georgia, 98% (3.3 million people) supported Georgia’s independence and this 
was regained with the Act of Restoration of State Independence of Georgia on 9 April 1991.390 
 
The attitude of ethnic minorities towards independence from the Soviet Union did not imply that 
they supported the territorial integrity of Georgia. Vyacheslav Chirikba makes reference to the 
Union-wide referendum convened earlier on 17 March 1991, and suggests that 52.4% of the 
population in Abkhazia supported retaining the USSR implying that Abkhazia had the legal right to 
secede and stay within the USSR.391 The majoritarian system of voting, that imposes majority rule 
by majority vote, can be contentious, especially in conflict entities. Contesting the West’s 
interpretation of democracy as majoritarianism, Peter Emerson suggests that a multioptional and 
preferential referendum could have been a viable option in the South Caucasus. As the author said: 
“the force of arms followed the force of numbers exercised by the majority.”392 Whilst majority 
voting divided societies in Yugoslavia, as noted by the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia 
known as the Badinter Committee in 1991,393 in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, referendums were 
used retrospectively to “justify” violence.394 The quest of Abkhaz minorities for greater power 
against the centre resulted in an inverse majority of the Abkhaz population and discriminated 
against the Georgian minority currently living in the eastern part of Abkhazia. Besides political 
construction and majority voting, the nationalist ideology was an additional cause of the conflicts. 
 
The nationalist ideology of the new Georgian leadership exacerbated existing divisions identified 
by scholars of nationalism. As Terry Martin writes, the rising tide of nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, was a result of the Soviet nationality policy that simultaneously promoted the national 
consciousness of its ethnic minorities and dictated the substance of their cultures.395 Nationalistic 
motives were evident in what is often assigned as Gamsakhurdia’s party slogan “Georgia for 
Georgians.” According to Gamsakhurdia, Georgia in 1980s confronted a demographic threat from 
the Azerbaijani population in the regions of Kartli and Kakheti, adjacent to Azerbaijan; The country 
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faced chauvinism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia carried out by extremists and encouraged from 
Russia.396 Nationalistic sentiments voiced by the Georgian Government invigorated the minorities’ 
claim for self-determination with violence.397 Ghia Nodia writes that the critique of 
Gamsakhurdia’s ethnic policy does not explain the motives – the absence of civic consciousness 
and territorial claims – for ethnic violence in post-communist societies.398 
 
The elite manipulation by the ruling elites as a reason for the conflicts is a recurring argument that 
also merits attention. In an often cited comparative study of conflicts in the Caucasus, Svante 
Cornell describes conflicts as ethnopolitical, i.e. based on the politicisation of ethnicity that is 
strengthened by autonomous institutions. For Cornell, autonomy is a source of conflicts in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, prompted by minority elites driven by their rational calculations to retain ruling 
positions with external encouragement.399 In her theory of ethnic bargaining, Erin Jenne succinctly 
observes that the separatist minorities were unable to negotiate with the centre and policies aimed at 
addressing their economic disparities could not de-radicalise minority movements so long as the 
minorities were receiving cross-border support.400 Exponents of peace and conflict theory have put 
forward related arguments. Chaim Kaufman has suggested territorial partition, arguing for the 
separation of opposing groups into defensible enclaves,401 whereas a power-sharing approach is 
offered by Arendt Liphart, to resolve ethnic divisions without partition, by granting extensive 
autonomy.402 Conflicting parties are unlikely to accept a power-sharing agreement because it fails 
to generate an division of resources. For Nino Kemoklidze a combination of factors: institutions, 
elites and external forces lead to the wars.403 Other authors hold that third party mediation can 
manage inter-ethnic relations after international conflicts and this is discussed next.  
 
In the case of Abkhazia, the early interaction in 1991 between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides did 
involve negotiations on sharing power to increase trust. The power-sharing agreement aimed to 
enlarge the powers of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic within Georgia with the influence of 
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the Abkhaz minority over the republic’s administration.404 According to Stanislav Lakoba, the first 
Deputy Speaker of the Abkhazian Supreme Council, those negotiations suggested introducing a 
quota system in the Abkhazian Parliament in 1991.405 In the interview, a member of the legislative 
body of Georgia in 1990, who authored and was commissioned to negotiate the power-sharing 
model with the Abkhaz and Georgian authorities, describes the talks as extremely hard: 
It was made clear to the Georgian side that with the 1989 population census in Abkhazia, the Georgians 
(45.7%) would most probably end up with 40% of votes for the parliamentary election, placing the rest of 
Abkhazis (17.8%) in a majority. According to the power-sharing model, out of 65 Parliamentary seats, ethnic 
Abkhazis would get 28, Georgians 26, and the rest 11 seats. Decisions would pass with 2/3 of votes 
guaranteeing decision-making rights of both. In addition, a chairman of the Parliament and a vice prime-
minister was to be an Abkhaz, the vice-chairman of the Parliament and the prime-minister a Georgian.406 
 
Civil war in Georgia disrupted a negotiated solution. The Abkhaz and Ossetian separatist forces 
influenced by the Russian political elites could not reach a settlement with the centre. Eventually 
the Georgian state, losing control of its entities, fell into de facto territorial fragmentation and both 
wars cemented ethnic tensions. 
 
4.2.2. Wars in South Ossetia in 1991-1992, and Abkhazia in 1992-1993 
 
This subchapter evaluates the wars in South Ossetia (1991-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993) and 
places this evaluation in context of international mediation, the EU’s conflict resolution strategy and 
the EU’s mediation in 2008 discussed in the next subchapters. It resonates to the first phase of 
Georgia’s foreign policy conduct (1991-1995), suggesting that Russia’s dominant position in 
addition to being an interested third party proved its mediation in both wars to be not impartial. 
 
In South Ossetia and Abkhazia Russia created proxy regimes and supported insurgency. The first 
manifestation of popular movements in South Ossetia, mobilised by the people’s assembly Adamon 
Nikhas, was ignited with the release of the Act on the National Programme on the Georgian 
Language by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in 1989.407 Tensions grew 
in Tskhinvali in 1991 between the Ossetian insurgent armed units and the National Guards. Russia 
asserted its claim to be an interlocuteur privilege in the South Ossetia conflict. To deescalate the 
crisis, President Gamsakhurdia met with Boris Yeltsin, the Chair of the Supreme Council of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), in the town of Kazbegi where the parties 
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agreed on the disarmament of militia groups in the territory of the SOAR.408 Hostilities in 
Tskhinvali ended in 1992, after the Head of the Republic of Georgian, Eduard Shevardnadze, and 
the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, signed an Agreement about Resolution 
Principles of the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict in the Dagomisi area of the town Sochi in 
Russia.409 The Dagomisi Agreement established a quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) 
between Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia, to deal with political issues, and its 
peacekeeping body, the Joint Peacekeeping Forces group (JPKF), observed the ceasefire. The JPKF 
battalion of 500 servicemen from the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian sides, in principle, worked in 
a peacekeeping format, but, in practice, it was under Russian command. 
 
The first armed clash between Abkhazis and Georgians occurred in July 1989, triggered in part by 
the decision of the Georgian Government to turn the Sokhumi State University into a branch of the 
Iv. Javakhishvili State University. Vladislav Ardzinba, the leader of the “Soyuz” faction, elected in 
December 1990 as a Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Abkhazian ASSR, mobilised electoral 
support for an independent Abkhazia. Tensions extended to the legislature when, in July 1992, the 
Council decided to abolish the 1978 Constitution and restore the 1922 Constitution of the 
Abkhazian SSR. In a reaction to this move, the central government dispatched its forces in August 
1992. Following the armed confrontation between the Georgian National Guards and the Abkhaz 
Guards of the Supreme Council, the government managed to reassert control. In September 1992, 
the ceasefire document signed in Moscow between Eduard Shevardnadze and President Yeltsin 
created the Control and Inspection Commission, consisting of Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia.410 
According to the document, the Georgian forces withdrew from the Gagra district but the ceasefire 
was apparently violated from the Abkhaz side, which attacked the civilian population.411 Despite 
the peace agreement, in October 1992, Sokhumi also came under attack from the separatists, joined 
by the fighters from the Confederation of the Caucasus Mountain Peoples.412 Military forces in 
Abkhazia acquired weapons for insurgency from unidentified sources. Largely supported by the 
Russian military stationed in Gudauta, the Abkhaz forces gained control over Gagra and Tkvarcheli. 
In a way similar to the South Ossetian conflict, whilst being party to the conflict, Russia signed a 
peace agreement in Abkhazia. In July 1993, under a tripartite Agreement on Ceasefire and its 
Controlling Mechanism in Sochi,413 the Georgian side was made to withdraw, and despite the 
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ceasefire agreement and international monitoring, deployed by the UN to verify compliance earlier 
in July 1993, Sokhumi was taken between 16 and 27 September 1993. After hostilities stopped with 
the Moscow Agreement in 1994, the UN undertook to observe the peacekeeping operation offered 
by Moscow on behalf of the CIS with a predominant Russian composition. General elections, 
establishing the Parliament, adopted the Constitution in 1995, and President Shevardnadze was 
elected in two subsequent parliamentary elections in 1995 and in 2000. 
 
The war in the Tskhinvali Region caused the first displacement of population followed by assault 
and looting on both sides. The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees is 
contested.414 In 1991-1992 between 60,000 to 100,000 people were displaced from South Ossetia.415 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that 60,000 Ossetians and 
ethnic Georgians fled from South Ossetia.416 This displacement was followed by the mass exodus 
from Abkhazia in 1992-1993, where the Georgian Government sources reported deaths of 3,000 
ethnic Abkhazis and 10,000 Georgians, and the displacement of 300,000 Georgian and 40,000 
Abkhaz, as well as other ethnic population.417 The Georgian state statistics currently record 248,415 
internally displaced people registered in Georgia from both entities,418 whereas the Abkhaz side 
suggests 160,000 displaced people.419 According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), out of 
the total 247,000 displaced people, the vast majority was driven in the 1990s.420 Repatriation of the 
refugees and displaced remains critical for negotiations. The Georgian side underlines the right to 
return but retains the presence of displaced people in Tbilisi showcasing the unresolved nature of 
the conflict. The decrease in the numerical superiority of the Abkhazis and the recurrence of 
tensions in the southern-most district of Gali in Eastern Abkhazia with a predominant Georgian 
population raises concerns with the Abkhaz political leadership. In a way similar to Georgia, the 
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, with a contested chronology from 
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1987 to 1994, left 800,000 people displaced and 14% of Azerbaijan’s territory occupied.421 In the 
1999 referendum in Abkhazia, and in South Ossetia in 1992 and 2006 respectively, residents with 
the exclusion of the Georgian population, voted for independence. Since the 1990-s, Georgia has 
lost control of both jurisdictions which have sought to establish themselves as independent states.  
 
4.3. Foreign Policy of Russia towards the Caucasus422 
 
This subchapter examines Russia’s political influence in the South Caucasus with the focus on 
Georgia. After presenting an academic debate about Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia, the 
first section takes an overview of the most important instances that have shaped Russia’s policy. 
These include: the inception of their relations in the 16th century and Georgia’s presence in the 
Russian Empire, the annexation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, 
Georgia’s struggle for the independence from the USSR, the involvement of Russia in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008. The next section investigates 
Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea region and Russia’s approach to Chechnya and Ukraine. 
 
4.3.1. Russian Policy towards Georgia 
 
The topic of Russia’s involvement in Georgia since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
has been gaining interest among academics and policy experts. John Lepingwell holds that Russia, 
driven by its urge to maintain its Eurasian power status against the competing influence of the US 
and to deter the rise of Turkey’s regional influence, intentionally hindered Georgia’s 
statebuilding.423 Looking at international engagement in statebuilding in Georgia, MacFarlane 
agrees that Russian policy inhibited Georgia’s statebuilding by supporting breakaway regions and 
imposing a trade embargo.424 Monica Duffy Toft characterises Moscow’s interests as “foreign-
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policy inertia and the grasping of a superpower in rapid decline.”425 Similarly, Allen Lynch, and 
Janusz Bugajski argue that Russia has vested interests in the region and seeks to maximise its power 
in what Russia views as its “near abroad” (blizhnee zarubezhe).426 A policy expert in London notes 
that Russia still seeks suzerainty over the former Soviet Union countries and particularly in Central 
Asian, the Baltic countries, and even more so, in the South Caucasus and Ukraine: 
The fact of matter is that Russia regards independence of the former Soviet Union countries as a historical 
aberration. Central concept to incentives behind Russia’s policy is that the South Caucasus is a historically 
conditioned mutually privileged sphere of interest of Russia.427 
 
Behind Russia’s assertive policy towards Georgia, the majority of scholars identify the continuation 
of Russia’s pragmatic and realpolitik approach.428 Archil Gegeshidze finds that Georgia, as a 
“geographic buffer zone,” has been in quest of a niche strategy to balance the regional powers.429 
With supremacy over the strategically located Georgia, Russia expands its influence southwards.430 
Discourse analysis indicates that the Russian Government often talks about its policy in a covert 
manner. This, for example, resonates in a statement of a member of the State Duma, Andrei 
Kokoshin: “Russia is not interested to see Georgia as a hotspot of instability, instead Russia with 
strategic interests in the region hopes that Georgia treats Russia as a real strategic partner.”431 For 
Aleksandr Skakov, Russia has maintained a confused foreign policy approach towards Georgia.432 
Malkhaz Matsaberidze evaluates relations between Russia and Georgia as contradictory since 
Russia has sought to dominate over Georgia whilst the latter, with a “maneuvering politics,” has 
hoped to normalise relations.433 Rather than Russian interference, Givi Bolotashvili believes that it 
was the civil war, wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, economic crisis and inept governance that 
accounted for instability in the early 1990s.434 Analysis of Russia’s involvement in the South 
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Caucasus has expanded considerably over the last decade. Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, 
and more recently in Ukraine in 2014-2015, has posed a challenge to the European regional order. 
 
The conflict between Russia and Georgia has confirmed the changing nature of international law, 
sovereignty and norms in the international system. S. Neil MacFarlane and Natalie Sabanadze 
observed that Russia has employed a redefined concept of international responsibility in relation to 
sovereignty and minority self-determination in Georgia’s conflict entities.435 According to Roy 
Allison, the clashes in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya between Russia and the major Western powers over 
military interventions since 1999 have demonstrated differences in legal justifications for the 
Western-led military operations and for Russia’s use of force in the post-Soviet region.436 Through 
its military interventions, Russia has more extensively contested Western constructs of international 
society, norms and sovereignty.437 In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia justified its peacekeeping 
enforcement by invoking self-defence for its citizens abroad. Russia has instrumentalised concepts 
of human rights for political expediency.438 According to Lilia Shevtsova, the response of the liberal 
democracies revealed that the Western nations do not have instruments to check Russia from 
violating international norms.439 For Ronald Asmus, the conflict in 2008 showed that Russia is 
prepared to assert itself forcefully as a broader strategy to compete with the West and, as a result, 
this war “shook the belief that a democratic and cooperative peace had triumphed in Europe for 
twenty years after the Iron Curtain fell.”440 In Ukraine, Russia, however, failed to manage crises and 
would struggle to deal with a multi-front campaign.441 Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia and 
Ukraine reflects competitive relations against the West more generally. 
 
Originating in the 16th century, interaction between Russia and the Caucasus continued with the 
Russian expansion to the Crimea during the reign of the Empress Catherine II. With the Treaty of 
Georgievsk, between the Tsarist Russia and the Georgian Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti (1783), 
Georgia became its protectorate and turned into a governorate (guberniya) in 1801. In the 19th and 
20th centuries, the Georgian political and social elite familiarised itself with the European ideas 
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mainly through Russia.442 Orthodox Christian religion and culture connected the two nations. 
Relations between them became ambivalent because Russia was both promising protection of 
Georgia against Persian advances and was manipulating of its vulnerabilities. Following the 1917 
Revolution, after a brief independence in 1918-1921, as the Russian army annexed the Democratic 
Republic of Georgia, the Bolsheviks isolated Russia from the West. Georgia’s presence in the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union created a common identity different from a European one. 
 
The desire to restore its independence remained fundamental to Georgia. In 1980s the fall of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the failure of General Secretary of the Communist Party, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, to reform socialism, with the restructuring perestroika policy, made the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union inevitable. The rise of the national movements calling for the 
independence in Tbilisi, suppressed by the Soviet forces on 9 April 1989, left traumatic memories 
among Georgians. Starting in 1991, Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan 
declared their independence, followed by other union republics. Although with the Belovezh 
Accords signed by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist, in order to secure its political dispensation as a legal successor of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian Federation continued an interventionist approach by making the newly independent states 
join the CIS founded in place of the USSR.443 Despite power changes in both Georgia and Russia, 
over the past two decades, relations between them have not substantially changed. 
 
4.3.2. Russia’s Military Presence in the Post-Soviet Space 
 
In 1996-2003, relations between Georgia and Russia were marked by a standoff. After President 
Putin’s accession to power in 1999, Georgia’s cooperation with the US was interpreted as an 
encroachment on the Russian sphere of interest. Since then the Russian influence in Georgia has 
waned.444 The Georgian authorities demanded the closure of the four previously Soviet military 
bases in Vaziani, Akhalkalaki, Batumi and Gudauta, that had been deemed occupying forces since 
1991.445 At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, Russia committed to bases closures in Georgia, as 
well as withdrawal of troops from Moldova,446 when it signed the Charter for European Security as 
part of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that requires the decrease of 
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military equipment in Europe.447 Between 2001-2008 Russia ceded control of all but the Gudauta 
base in Abkhazia, that remains occupied by the CIS, the naval presence near Abkhaz coast, as well 
as troops in Transnistria, with inspections hampered by difficulties of access.448 Russia also 
extended its deployment in Armenia by expanding a military base for 49 years from 1995, and 
conducted military exercises of the CSTO, that is likely to have consequences for tensions between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.449 Since 2008 the Russian military presence in the region has changed. 
 
Shortly after 2008, Russia increased the CIS peacekeeping forces to 2,542 troops in Abkhazia, 
which, under the ceasefire terms from 1994, cannot exceed 3,000. Russia next established Treaties 
on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in September 
2008,450 and Agreements on Cooperation on Protecting the State Borders of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in April 2009.451 These four documents created the legal basis for Russia’s presence as an 
allied force of separatists and as an occupation force in Georgia. As reported by the Georgian side, 
Russia landed fighter and transport aircraft at the Bombora airfield near Gudauta where it has been 
constructing a military base, and, by 2009, Russia completed construction of another base, 
Ugardanta, in South Ossetia.452 The media have quoted the Russian commanders on the deployment 
of military vehicles, air defence missiles, and the construction of a marine military base in 
Ochamchire.453 The treaties concluded by Russia with Abkhazia on strategic partnership in 2014, 
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and on integration with South Ossetia in 2015, creating joint security and unified customs, preclude 
Georgia from engaging with these regions economically. In response to Russia’s increasing 
presence, the Presidency of the Council limited itself to concerns in a declaratory form.454 Relations 
in political and economic realm between the EU and Russia accounted to this limitation. 
 
In the mid 1990s, foreign policy of pursuing good relations with the EU, under the Russian first 
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrov, was discontinued during Foreign Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov.455 The early years of Russian foreign policy under President Putin has gone through 
several phases in its relationship with the EU. Competition shifted to security collaboration. Since 
2008, EU-Russian relations have been marked by fluctuating crises, due to Russia’s military actions 
in their common neighbourhood. As a Russian political scientist from Carnegie Moscow Center 
observes, the relationship between the EU and Russia in 2014 is undergoing change, with official 
Moscow rebalancing its foreign policy, retaining an emphasis on its Eurasian neighbours and 
China.456 Despite their internal political divisions, Russian political groups of the ruling 
conservatives (United Russia), nationalists (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), communists 
(Communist Party of the Russian Federation), and Social Democrats (Just Russia), maintain a 
consensus on Russia’s external policy regarding the West.457 This consensus has been retained 
under the leadership of President Putin. Regime and such cohesiveness ensures stability in both 
energy relations and institutional interaction of Russia vis-à-vis the EU.458 However, their relations 
are affected by fundamental divergences, namely protectionist measures for doing business, despite 
its accession to WTO, and pressure on its EU neighbours.459 Denis Corboy commented that EU-
Russia political and economic relations necessitated an improvement in diplomacy;460 Yet the EU 
was compelled to use sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine crises. 
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Chechnya is another conflict area where Russia has projected its military power in the Caucasus, 
with virtually no conflict resolution involvement by the EU. In 1991-1994 Chechnya was a major 
centre of oil refining with important transportation junctions of the Rostov-Baku highway and 
railway line between Moscow and Grozny. The first war in Chechnya took place in 1994-1996, 
followed by the second in 1999-2007, with fighting initially stopping in 2002 and gradual 
withdrawal. Whereas the first military campaign went against the will of the Russian Parliament 
and people, the second counter-terrorism operation, also found domestic appeal. Chechnya was 
severely damaged with terrorist attacks and retaliations at the Budyonnovsk hospital, the Moscow 
theatre and Beslan school in 1995-2004. As part of the international responses, the EU urged Russia 
to end the use of force but, apart from providing humanitarian aid, the EU refrained from 
engagement. The renewed war in Chechnya coincided with 9/11. This internationalised domestic 
problems in Russia caused realignment with the US in the fight against terrorism.461 The Chechen 
crises, by conceding to the American presence, challenged Russia’s strategic interests in the 
Caucasus.462 The European Council, in its Declaration on Chechnya, did condemn bombardments, 
but the Council did not challenge the right of Russia to protect its territorial integrity.463 The 
Council also raised concerns about the spill-over from Chechnya to Georgia. Allegedly targeting the 
Chechen terrorist cells in Pankisi Gorge sheltering refugees across the border from Chechnya, the 
Russian military aviation bombed the Georgian territory.464 Once Pankisi was announced as a haven 
for terrorism, the US sent military trainers for anti-terrorist purposes.465 This military threat 
prompted Georgian authorities to cooperate with the US, as discussed in the next subchapter. 
 
As an added dimension, Russia’s latest military coercion in Ukraine, in 2014-2015, showed a 
reversal of earlier power politics on the European continent. In 2010, the treaty on the Black Sea 
Fleet (BSF) in Crimea was extended until 2042,466 for a reciprocally reduced gas price to Ukraine. 
This created the basis for a Russian Navy sub-unit in Sevastopol, which raised legitimate security 
concerns.467 Having been a republic within the USSR after 1917, then downgraded to the Crimean 
Region (Oblast) in the Second World War, and then transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, the 
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Autonomous Republic of Crimea, with a 2.4 million Russian majority, has been a subject of 
territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia since 1991. Security concerns manifested themselves 
in 2014 when Russia signed the Treaty of Accession after recognising the independence of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the municipality of the Special Status City of Sevastopol in a 
disputed referendum of March 2014, invalidated by the UN. Russia further supported separatist 
forces at the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts within the Donbas region (Donetskyi basein) of eastern 
Ukraine that ended with their secession and a ceasefire under the auspices of the OSCE, concluded 
in Minsk in February 2015.468 The strategic partnership with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
subjugation of Crimea, and military intervention in Donbas all raise concerns about Russia’s 
intentions in other conflict regions in the wider Black Sea region and further afield in the Baltic 
states.469 Against the backdrop of potential ramifications for European security, the lack of action 
by the EU reveals the inconsistency of its policy regarding both the South Caucasus and Ukraine. 
 
4.4. Georgia’s Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic Institutions 
 
In 1996-2003, during the second phase of its foreign policy conduct, Georgia focused on integration 
with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. This took place against the backdrop of the EU’s lack of interest 
in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus in the early 1990s, and intensified in the third phase of 
policy conduct in 2004-2013. The strengthening of ties with the US and NATO has become a 
contested issue in policy direction that requires analysis of the US involvement as another actor in 
the region and this subchapter engages with this subject first. The next section takes an overview of 
Georgia’s foreign policy after the Rose Revolution in 2004. Georgia has conceptualised its external 
policy towards the West in terms of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Analysis of the annual 
reports from the Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia 
shows that the country continues to view this policy in duality, although it has different agendas of 
cooperation with NATO and the EU, as well as intersecting reforms policy applicable for both.470 
Section three explains that increased cooperation with NATO, in line with the debate over NATO’s 
eastwards expansion, is considered to provoke Russia in 2008. This section also touches upon how 
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the precedents of international recognition of Kosovo, resonated in the de facto entities of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, although it has not been applicable to Georgia. The final section analyses the 
outbreak and aftermath of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia by presenting the ways in 
which it has been narrated from the perspectives of the conflicting parties. In substance, Georgia’s 
foreign policy has embraced multilateralism, reflected in its integration into European and Euro-
Atlantic institutions, but sometimes contradicted itself, creating tensions with Russia. 
 
4.4.1. US Interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia 
 
The historical landscape of the South Caucasus and Central Asia has been marked by the competing 
interests of Russia, the Western states, the US, and Turkey. The quest of the British Empire and the 
Tsarist Russia to dominate in the broader region is often described as a New Great Game, a 
reference to the 18th-century Great Game rivalries for supremacy in the Middle Eastern countries of 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and India.471 Since the 20th century, the number of players in the region has 
increased to include Turkey, Iran, China, the US, and other Western powers. 
 
In the 1990s the US started extending its political, economic and military interests towards the 
South Caucasus and Central Asian region. The primary obvious reason for the US involvement was 
that of economic interests in the Caspian resources, as an alternative source to Middle Eastern oil 
and gas.472 David Harvey thinks that, since the world oil reserves have become depleted, it has 
become a priority for the US to access oil in the Middle East and to secure its presence within the 
distance of the Caspian oil fields in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.473 John Rees is of the same 
opinion, that the US has taken an interest in the “arc of oil states” spanning from Iran and Iraq to the 
Caspian on Russia’s southern rim.474 Another incentive for the US to access Caspian energy was to 
reduce its dependence on imported oil from countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). American policy towards regionalism in Central Asia produced contradictory 
impulses.475 S. Neil MacFarlane and George Khelashvili identify inconsistency in the American 
policy in the South Caucasus, reflecting an amalgam of ideological considerations, economic 
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interests, and convictions of the leadership.476 Rick Fawn and Sally Cummings explain the responce 
of US and Europe with common policies to the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict by two features of the 
post-Cold War order: first, the US and West European economic interests are mutually constitutive 
in the Caucasus, and second, Western positions were solidified by the insignificance of US-Europe 
competition, and Russia’s influence in the Caucasus.477 Economic interests have also prevailed in 
the EU’s involvement in Central Asia, dictated by the diversification of supply. 
 
US political engagement and economic interests in Central Asia and the South Caucasus gradually 
generated hostile reaction from Russia. After establishing its military presence in Central Asia, in 
2002, the US contributed USD 64 million to the Georgian national security establishment, with the 
Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), granting the country the largest US financial assistance 
per capita.478 Whilst Russia agreed to close down the military bases under the condition that other 
bases would not appear in the country, the former Soviet military airport in Vaziani, in fact, did host 
trainings of Commando Battalion, set up by the US in 2003, until 2008.479 Russia perceived the US 
forces on the former Russian base as a continuation of the Cold War competition that culminated in 
the Russian attack on Vaziani as a regular strategic target on 8 August 2008.480 After the conflict, 
the US actions to launch the Cooperative Longbow and Cooperative Lancer military exercises; 
under the United States–Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership in 2009,481 speeded up Russia’s 
response to station its border guards in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
Involvement of the EU in Central Asia for a short period of time was not a sign of a meaningful 
policy. When the EU took an interest in Central Asia, as Giovanni Grevi describes: “the EU has 
become a part of a greater game of geopolitical competition for political influence and natural 
resources.”482 Despite energy interests, it was only in 2005 when building on the PCAs with five 
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Central Asian states, the EU appointed EUSR for Central Asia who was maintained only until 
2013.483 The EU was also limited with its financial assistance under the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) to Central Asia.484 Despite the EU’s preoccupation in TRACECA corridor and its 
investment in the region, consistency in the EU’s other aspects of external policy towards Central 
Asia, much like in the South Caucasus, has remained uneven. 
 
4.4.2. Georgia’s Policy Conduct after Rose Revolution  
 
Domestic and foreign policy conduct of Georgia altered after the Rose Revolution of 2003. This 
first democratic movement, was one of the coloured revolutions, such as Orange in Ukraine and 
Tulip in Kyrgyzstan, that was encouraged by the West and provided an example of transformation 
in the former Soviet states.485 Following the resignation of President Shevardnadze, after the 
disputed parliamentary elections in 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the party United 
National Movement (UNM), identified with a strong Western policy, came to power and declared 
conflict resolution a priority of his presidency. Nevertheless, in his inaugural speech on 25 January 
2004, President Saakashvili extended “an arm of friendship to Russia.”486 The second part of his 
presidency was marked by a reform process and domestic tensions. After the 2007 demonstrations 
and the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, in responce to the EU’s concern on judicial 
independence in Georgia, the government pointed to transformation compared to the rest of the 
South Caucasus countries, reflected in international assessment tables.487 According to the annual 
corruption index of Transparency International, Georgia ranked at 66 out of 179 countries, whilst 
Armenia ranked 120 and Azerbaijan 143 in 2009. This compares to the countries’ standing in 2003, 
when they ranked 124, 78, and 124 respectively.488 Despite economic growth, political insecurity 
coupled with a lack of internal legitimacy prompted Georgia to seek external legitimacy. 
 
Although since 1991 Georgia has made obvious its intention of increased cooperation with the 
West, it was after 2006 that an official foreign policy agenda was promulgated in national security 
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and foreign policy doctrines. The national Security Concept of Georgia, drafted under the pro-
Western administration, declares that “[o]ne of Georgia’s major foreign and security policy 
priorities is membership in NATO and the European Union.”489 Distinguishing between integration 
into the EU and membership in NATO, the Foreign Policy Strategy aspires to “establish Georgia’s 
place in the common European family by deepening integration into the EU and joining NATO.”490 
After 2008, the amended Strategy lists occupation by Russia as a threat to Georgia’s national 
security, a position reinforced by the Law on Occupied Territories. Comparing this national security 
document versus the country’s national security, MacFarlane explains that, because of Georgia’s 
marginality to major European and Euro-Atlantic states and their institutions, the country 
underplayed the real challenges.491 Whilst the newly elected government in 2013 has not changed 
the Western foreign policy direction, foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia slightly differs. As a resolution 
on the foreign policy adopted by the Parliament of Georgia in 2013 declares: “Georgia cannot be in 
diplomatic relations or be in political or customs relations with the states which recognise the 
independence of the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region,” but despite this reservation, the 
document acknowledges that “Georgia conducts relations with Russia in both, the Geneva and 
bilateral formats, aiming to conflict resolution and development of good neighbourly relations with 
Russia.”492 After 2013 the dual policy towards Russia has been conducted against the alignment 
policy with the European institutions elaborated at the end of this subchapter. 
 
International recognition of the independence of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008, as well as that of the 
less controversial independence of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006, resonated in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. The independence of the former Serbian province was recognised by many Western 
countries, including 22 EU members and the US, and remains opposed by Belgrade, Moscow and 
Beijing. Although Kosovo’s recognition was referred as sui generis by Western counties, it raised 
broader concerns about the inviolability of borders across the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, East 
Asia, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. By some, recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty was taken as a 
precedential practice, by others, proclaimed independence cannot be seen as precedent setting. 
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Kosovo’s independence presented Moscow with issues about its internal boundaries and it was the 
Russian position that took the issue to international salience. The central aspect of Kosovo’s 
precedents is that of rhetorical positions and the perception of the claim that was reflected in the 
positions of the conflict entities.493 The political leadership in Abkhazia welcomed the referendum 
on the independence in Montenegro. In May 2006 the Abkhaz de facto President Bagapsh (2005-
2011) referred to the referendum as a precedent for the international community.494 It was 
announced by the Russian MID in 2008, that the independence of Kosovo should be applied to 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.495 The Georgian MFA immediately underscored a distinction between 
the cases of Kosovo and that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.496 Comparisons of these three imply 
that the Georgian population was the minority in Abkhazia, committing atrocities against the 
Abkhaz majority. In fact, as the Georgian side repeatedly clarifies, whereas the Serbian majority 
committed genocide against the Albanian minorities, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia it was the 
majority Georgian population who was displaced.497 The independence of Kosovo did resonate in 
the de facto entities, yet it did not set a precedent for independence in the former Soviet space. 
 
4.4.3. Georgia’s Partnership with NATO 
 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic policy has emerged at the forefront of the international debate on NATO’s 
eastward expansion, with the debate largely falling across two lines of thought. On the one side, a 
structural realist approach sees the growing irrelevance of NATO, whilst the classical realist vision 
still finds a raison d’état for this alliance. In the 2000s, Ian Thomas, and Kelly-Kate Pease argued 
against NATO’s expansion towards the regions where Russia has strategic interests.498 Frank 
Schimmelfennig, Karin Fierke, and Colin Dueck add that, by not interfering in the Caucasus, 
NATO avoids overextension.499 For David G. Haglund, NATO is becoming more “Europeanised,” 
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similar to that of the ESDP, with less global reach.500 Opponents thus argue that there is no reason 
for NATO enlargement as it does not serve the immediate self-interests of the member states. 
 
Proponents of NATO eastern enlargement suggest that extending integration can stabilise the 
Balkans and the South Caucasus. William Wallace observes that the enlargement to the former 
communist countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, which signified shift to 
the new structure of the European post-Cold War order, meant that the relationship between this 
structure and other states, particularly Russia and Turkey, was not defined.501 As a result, this 
caused disagreement among the Western governments in their policies towards Europe’s peripheral 
states. Responding to concerns about the return of Russian nationalism in Central and Western 
Europe and the Caucasus, Nicholas Burns, a US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2005-
2008), sees that NATO and the EU need to keep an open door policy on enlargement with accession 
criteria.502 In the words of the former American diplomat: “Georgia has a long way to go to meet 
membership requirements, but as a democratic state it should be free to choose an entry into 
alliances.”503 After examining the ramifications of Euro-Atlantic integration on relations with 
Russia, the remaining section focuses on the Atlantic partnership with an emphasis on cooperation. 
 
Georgia’s Atlantic policy has been contested in academic and policy circles. One line this has been 
taken is that Georgia’s integration brings security by enabling the country to exercise its sovereign 
power over the conflict entities. As a Georgian high-ranking foreign policy maker stated in 2009, 
the country would remain in the spiralling conflicts unless it joins the Atlantic collective security 
community.504 Apart from security guarantees, whilst NATO aims to transform military culture by 
promoting democratic control over the armed forces, Georgia expects to receive support in the 
modernisation of infrastructure, equipment and military technologies. However, as a Euro-Atlantic 
policy maker in Georgia correctly recollected, it is important to understand whether NATO 
integration is a means or end goal for Georgia, and as for its transition to membership it largely 
depends on country’s reforms implementation.505 The reform process intersects the policies of both 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration alike. For the Georgian Government joining NATO has 
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meant the resolution of territorial disputes.506 However, as the NATO Study on Enlargement 
explicitly requires: “[s]tates which have ethnic disputes … must settle those disputes by peaceful 
means in accordance with the OSCE principles.”507 NATO is clearly unlikely to invoke Article 5 on 
collective self-defence of the North Atlantic Treaty to resolve conflicts in Georgia.508 Joining 
NATO without territorial integrity may reestablish the territorial status quo in Georgia. Another 
point is the country’s humanitarian contribution to international peacekeeping that has been added 
to the other matter of antagonising Russia. Sceptics are unconvinced of the argument that 
membership of NATO, on the contrary, improve Russian-Georgian relations through balancing 
their political collaboration. Notably, the reliability of partnership relations between Georgia and 
the US and the EU is questioned as neither of these actors has managed to foster a genuine policy 
towards Georgia.509 Since the early 2000s, the closer Georgia cooperated with the US the more it 
has aggravated Russia. Such a reactive response was not only true in terms of Georgia’s policy to 
join NATO, Russia treated with same hostility bilateral relations between Georgia and the US. 
 
Despite ambivalent prospects, Georgia has steadily pursued NATO integration. Initially in 1992, 
the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), developed the first individual 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in the former CIS, and engaged in the NATO peacekeeping 
operations. In 1999-2008, the Georgian military units participated in the Kosovo Peacekeeping 
Force (KFOR). In 2003-2008 Georgia contributed to the Coalition Forces in Iraq and since 2004, 
the country has maintained the second largest military contingent in the International Security 
Assistance Force Operation (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In addition, the South Caucasus has become a 
logistical transit for the US and Coalition aircrafts to the Middle East.510 Based on the Georgia-
NATO Agreement on the Provision of Host Nation Support and Transit of NATO Forces and 
NATO Personnel signed in 2005, the ISAF mission was allowed transit via air, road and rail 
infrastructure.511 Georgia’s commitment to fight international terrorism was recognised in an 
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interview with a private secretary to a defence secretary in a major NATO member state.512 Whilst 
appreciating country’s role in overseas operations, the NATO, as reflected in remarks by the 
Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, tends to refer to Georgia as a “strong and 
committed NATO partner.”513 Likewise, instead of membership, it is cooperation that the US, as a 
major NATO state, uses in relation to Georgia as voiced by the US President George W. Bush 
during his visit to Tbilisi on 10 May 2005: “We respect Georgia’s desire to join the institutions of 
Europe. We encourage your closer cooperation with NATO.”514 NATO member states have 
different attitudes towards enlargement, whereas Georgia remains in the area of Russian influence 
with a divided opinion whether or not the country should seek a military alliance or a balanced 
policy. Therefore, the prospect of cooperation with NATO is clear but membership is dubious. 
 
Despite the ambiguity of membership, Georgia has participated in programmes for aspiring 
countries in their preparation for membership. As the first partner country to implement the 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, having completed the IPAP in 2004-2008, 
and being within an Intensive Dialogue format with NATO since 2006, Georgia has hoped to move 
to the next stage of cooperation by receiving the MAP. Participation in the MAP prepared Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania and Croatia for membership in 
2004 and 2009. The decision taken at the Bucharest Summit of NATO in April 2008 by the NATO 
leaders not to grant Georgia and Ukraine the MAP, was interpreted by the Georgia authorities as 
politically motivated by Germany and France to appease Russia.515 In this line of reasoning, as a 
Georgian diplomat in the UK viewed, political signals emanating from the major member states 
allowed Russia carte blanche to re-examine its new power status towards Georgia.516 The decision 
of the EU member states within NATO conflicted with common Western values and shattered the 
credibility of NATO as a collective alliance as a guarantee security on the European continent.517 
Given this controversy, the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) took cooperation further. The 
portrayal of the Bucharest Summit as a cause of the armed conflict in August 2008 did not convince 
the member states to revisit their decision on the next summit in Wales in 2014. 
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The outcome of the Bucharest Summit influenced opinions in the Georgian leadership for 
intensifying institutional relations with the EU. This understanding is not uncommon in Georgia 
that, in contrast to NATO policy, it is more achievable to draw closer to the EU. European policy 
has gradually been shaped against the backdrop of limited prospects of closer cooperation with the 
Atlantic institution. Similar to that of respecting a country’s choice of alliance, a Commission 
official responded that since several member states had embarked on a strong European-NATO 
membership, the EU would not discourage Georgia from following a similar path; however, it was 
clearly asserted that Georgia does not have an accession perspective to the EU or to the NATO.518 
The view of a Council official in 2009 was that because many members of the EU would not be 
willing to offer Georgia an accession perspective, it is more feasible to seek an alignment of 
economic and political institutions with those of the EU through its neighbourhood instruments 
notably association, free trade, and visa facilitation agreements.519 This is how Georgia is seen to 
remain committed to the European approximation agenda. 
 
The EU tends to emphasise that relations with Georgia are conditional upon the country’s reform 
progress. Such a conditional approach is evident in the response of an MEP that Georgia will have 
prospects of integration into the EU when the country meets the set criteria.520 Shortly after the 
2008 war, a personal representative of the SG/HR said that, whilst Georgia needs an accession 
perspective for stability, the more crisis-prone Georgia seems, the less likely it is to receive such an 
assurance yet the more Georgia needs it; this is what the official called the “paradox of integration 
perspective.”521 This view of foreign policy behaviour is significant in that it tacitly reflects the 
position of the Georgian Government. As the official suggested, Georgia can only anchor itself into 
the EU family through the intermediate steps of becoming a more robust democracy: 
What Georgia needs most is a democratic consolidation. It needs better governance, less polarisation at home 
and to find a modus vivendi with Russia. Georgia needs to achieve this to join the European Union.522 
 
The EU has pledged to support the country’s institutional reform commitment, but has also kept 
boundaries clear by emphasising conditionality. As Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron observe, 
contrary to the previous enlargements to the CEE, where the prospect of EU membership was an 
inducement for transformation, being nebulous about similar prospects with the South Caucasus 
countries, the EU has limited scope to alter their behaviour.523 On EU policy in this part of its 
neighbourhood, Fawn notes that in contrast to the Western Balkan countries, the EaP excludes 
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membership and its influence on three South Caucasus countries hence remains constrained.524 By 
2014, among the South Caucasus countries, Georgia had embarked on visa, association and free 
trade agreements, the EU is therefore more likely to incentivise the country’s reform process by 
stronger sectoral cooperation in other areas, similar to its external transport policy. 
 
Cooperation in the EU’s international peacekeeping operations under the CFSP, similar to 
participation in the NATO missions, has been an important dimension of Georgia’s contribution to 
the EU that to date has received little policy and academic attention. This significant security-
related aspect of EU-Georgia cooperation, agreed at the EaP Vilnius Summit in 2014, received little 
policy attention. Since 2012, Georgia has participated in the EU’s three new peace operations under 
the CFSP – European Union Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor), European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), 
and European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). By signing a 
Framework Participation Agreement on Georgia’s contribution in the EU’s crisis management 
operations at the Summit, Georgia and the EU created a permanent legal basis for Georgia’s 
involvement in the EU’s peace missions.525 Similar to relations with NATO, contribution to CFSP 
peacekeeping missions is seen to strengthen political links between the Council and Georgia and 
enhance the national capacity in maritime security.526 The absence of a naval fleet in Georgia, 
however, raises a question about the relevance of technical and human resource capacity building 
and substantial validity for Georgia’s contribution to international peacekeeping missions. 
 
Without clear integration prospects into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Georgia has not 
been dissuaded from its policy direction intensified in the third phase of its foreign policy in 2004-
2014. With increasing political and military insecurity, the Georgian Government has viewed 
integration into European institutions much as it has regarded cooperation with NATO, as a means 
of resolving territorial disputes, as is demonstrated in the following section. 
 
4.4.4. Armed Conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 
 
Responsibility for the renewal of the conflict in August 2008 is contested. From July 2008, a series 
of incidents and frequent hostilities developed into a combined inter-state and intra-state conflict, 
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between the opposing Georgian and the separatist South Ossetian, as well as with Abkhaz forces on 
one level, and the Georgian and Russian forces on another.527 Regarding the situation prior to the 
night of 7 to 8 August 2008, the date in question which is considered the start of the war, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in its Resolution 1633 (2008) stated, 
“the outbreak of the war … was the result of a serious escalation of tension, with provocations and 
ensuing deterioration of the security situation, which had started much earlier. ... The initiation of 
shelling of Tskhinvali constituted a disproportionate use of armed force by Georgia. ... The Russian 
counter-attack, including large-scale military actions equally failed to respect the principle of 
proportionality.”528 According to a Georgian scholar in international law, the “start of the war was a 
preventive defence from the Georgian side in response to continuing artillery shelling affecting the 
civilian population.”529 The EU commissioned its fact-finding mission (IIFFMCG), the first of its 
kind, to verify the situation.530 This mission produced three major findings: a) in the broader run-up 
to the conflict with violent incidents, an armed offensive in South Ossetia was conducted by the 
Georgian armed forces on 7 August, b) the force was used by South Ossetia and Russia against 
Georgia, and c) there was no justification for humanitarian intervention and the disproportionate use 
of force by invitation of the South Ossetian authorities.531 It is critical that the focus on who fired 
first shifts the emphasis on to how the crisis came about in the first place. It is more beneficial to 
examine security conditions on the ground. 
 
The unfolding narratives about the commencement of the armed conflict suggest insight to 
contradictory primary sources and secondary interpretations. The findings of preconditions to the 
conflict are to agree with Rick Fawn and Robert Nalbandov, in whose view “the start of the conflict 
must be understood in terms of an interlinking cycle of events.”532 In their article, the authors put 
forward that each party framed the conflict in their own ways with their meta-narratives and the 
contested narratives make it impossible to verify.533 On the Georgian side, the narrative includes the 
reincorporation of the lost territories, Euro-Atlantic integration and the Russian plans for war. As 
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the high-ranking Georgian diplomat accounted, reflecting this narrative, following the outcome of 
the Bucharest Summit, first, Russia established official relations with the autonomies; second, after 
building a military base in the town of Java near Tskhinvali, Russia increased its contingents in 
both territories and conducted military exercises of the 58th army at direct borders with Georgia; 
third, Russia delivered arms through the Roki tunnel across the shared border with Georgia; fourth, 
Russia proceeded with the reconstruction of the railway line between Russia and Ochamchire.534  
The deteriorating security conditions at the Georgian borders constituted the preconditions to the 
war. From the perspective of the Georgian leadership, military strikes embodied Russia’s intentions 
to force regime change. 
 
The Russian version of the narrative is objection to the functioning of the international system. The 
South Ossetian side is preoccupied with historical efforts to be kept in Georgia.535 During the war, 
President Putin accused the Georgian political leadership of receiving “political and material 
support from their foreign guardians.”536 Next to justification by the argument of collective self-
defence, Russia explained its military actions with the principle of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).537 The R2P concept, stipulated in the UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (2005), means 
that the international community assumes responsibility to protect populations with a political 
decision to intervene taken by the Security Council.538 As MacFarlane clarifies, intervention must 
be justified with normative principles accepted by international society in order for it to be 
legitimately mandated.539 In Georgia’s case, without the UN approval, there was no legitimate 
ground for the R2P-based intervention. After the military strikes, Russia extended its operations to 
the other parts of Georgia by targeting military bases in Gori and stopping short of Tbilisi. On the 
western flank, the separatists in Abkhazia took upper Kodori Gorge, captured the Senaki Junction 
and blocked access to the port of Poti. Both sides used cluster munitions as neither was party to the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, the usage of which Georgia acknowledged but Russia denied.540 
Besides damaging Russia’s international image with another armed conflict waged in the Caucasus 
after Chechnya, the conflict caused a downturn in Moscow’s stock exchange market and a net 
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foreign capital outflow of USD 133.9 billion in 2008 that slowed to USD 33.6 billion in 2010.541 
For some experts, apart from the great power’s coercive policy, the conflict was a mixture of the 
Georgian Government’s attempt to reverse military actions in South Ossetia back in 2004, coupled 
with miscalculation and confidence about US support.542 This view also resonated in the words of a 
Council official: “Georgia should pursue a responsible and mature foreign policy towards its 
neighbours.”543 Georgia, being uncertain about Russia’s offensive intentions, perceived survival to 
be vital for the state. 
 
The human consequences of the “five-day war” added to the demographic issue in Georgia. 
According to the EU enquiry, the Georgian side reported 412 servicemen and civilian casualties and 
1,747 wounded; the South Ossetian side claimed 365 casualties; the Russian side spoke of 67 
servicemen killed, altogether 850 lost lives excluding people wounded and missing.544 The UNHCR 
estimated 138,000 displaced, of which 30,009 have still not been repatriated.545 18,500 people were 
put in temporary settlements in Tserovani and Tsilkani, with very basic facilities.546 The Federal 
Migration Service of the Russian Federation reported that, out of 3,013 Georgian residents who 
appealed for a refugee status, 76 were granted this status and 1,526 were provided temporary 
settlements in Russia.547 The displacement, in 2008, added to 247,000 internally displaced from the 
previous two wars amounting to 6% of Georgia’s total population.548 To put this into context, 
internal developments and third party involvement constituted the preconditions of conflict. 
 
The change of power in 2013 marked another shift in Georgian foreign policy conduct. The 
coalition Georgian Dream, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, building on the opposition Alliance of 
Georgia (Republicans, the New Rights Party, the Georgian Way, and the Free Democrats) that 
served as a precursor movement, became a competitive opposition led by Bidzina Ivanishvili who 
come to power as the first Prime Minister after constitutional amendments in 2009.549 After 
                                                          
541 United States Department of State, Investment Climate Statement Russia Report, Bureau of Economic and Business 
Affairs, 2012, Accessed 23-02-13, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191223.htm. 
542 Nargiza Gamisonia and Dodo Pertaia, Ruset-sakartvelos 2008 tslis omi da misi shedegebi [The Russian-Georgia War 
2008 and Its Consequences], (Tbilisi: Universali, 2009), (in Georgian); James Sherr, “Culpabilities and Consequences,” 
REP BN 08/01, London: Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008, Accessed 9-01-14, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0908rep_sherr.pdf. 
543 Interview 13. 
544 Tagliavini, IIFFMCG Report, Volume I, 11. 
545 UNHCR, Gap Analysis, 5. 
546 Amnesty International, Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Russia-Georgia Conflict (London: AI, 2008). 
547 Federalnaya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba, Doklad o rezultatakh i osnovnikh napravleniyakh deyatelnosti Federalnoii 
migratsionnoi sluzhbi na 2010 god, Zadacha 2.4. Predostavlenie inostrannim grazhdanam ubezhishcha v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, Mosvka: FMS, 2009, Accessed 22-03-14, 
http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/otchet_doklad_gosorgana/drond_2010/index.php, (in Russian), 35. 
548 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, State Strategy for Internally Displaced 
Persons, Tbilisi: MIDPOC, 2007, Accessed 28-01-13, http://mra.gov.ge/res/docs/2013103012364252646.pdf, 2. 
549 Interview 5. 
105 
President Saakashvili left office following the 2013 presidential elections, Giorgi Margvelashvili, as 
the President of Georgia, and Irakli Gharibashvili, as the Prime-Minister of Georgia, made dual 
promises about foreign policy priorities: to continue the European and Euro-Atlantic integration and 
to improve relations with Russia.550 European and Euro-Atlantic integration has remained a main 
priority of Georgia’s foreign and security policy, evidenced in the signing of the AA.551 Since then 
relations with Russia have been separated into political and economic terms. The introduction of the 
post of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Relations with Russia opened direct 
dialogue with Russia represented at the rounds by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin. In the 
economic realm, road transportation of cargo was reopened between the two countries in 2013.552 
By 2014, trade increased with Russia becoming the main trade partner, with 6% of imports and 
10% in exports with Georgia.553 Despite resumed economic exchange, relations between the two 
have remained in a political impasse. Georgia has sought gradual redress of tensions with Russia 
but retained the lines of contestation unchanged, and, likewise, Russian policy towards Georgia has 
remained unshaken, with Moscow expecting Georgia to accept the new reality. 
 
4.5. EU Foreign Policy on Conflict Resolution towards the South Caucasus 
 
There has been a lack of coherence in the EU’s attitude to conflict resolution in the South Caucasus 
from the early 1990s until the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict. After defining conflict 
resolution and mediation, this subchapter offers three explanations for the lack of coherence: 
limited awareness, the presence of international actors, and an inability to incentivise the conflicting 
parties. For the purpose of the argument, mediation and conflict resolution should be defined. 
 
This thesis draws on a leading criteria of a contextual instead of a general definition of terms.554 As 
Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson explain, conflict resolution is a process that helps parties 
achieve a better modus vivendi.555 According to Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, 
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mediation is a form of third-party assistance in which an outsider helps the parties with their 
conflict management.556 Drawing on these definitions, conflict resolution is a durable political 
solution to a conflict that works for the conflicting parties. Mediation, as a method of conflict 
resolution, is an influence by an external actor on the conflicting parties to reach a settlement of an 
escalated conflict. Since the 1990s, in specialist subfield of conflict, John Darby and Roger Mac 
Ginty advanced a concept of a peace process, Patricia Hayner proposed reconciliation, disarmament 
was set forth by Herbert Wulf, whereas John Paul Lederach, and Roger Fisher recognized the 
tendency of protracted conflicts to reignite.557 According to Roger Mac Ginty, an issue to the 
conceptualization of peace is that peace has no end point, and therefore, attempts to “solve” or 
“resolve” conflict misunderstand fluid nature of peace and conflict.558 The critics of orthodox 
literature of conflicts, notably David Chandler and Oliver P. Richmond argued that states emerging 
from conflicts had to confirm to neoliberal economic models of governance.559 Taken over by terms 
of conflict management, assuming that peace actors are conflict managers, the term conflict 
transformation that recognizes conflict as part of human existence is now current. Andrew Williams 
and Roger Mac Ginty propose that a more overarching category of peacebuilding is creating a 
lasting peace, above conflict settlement, management or resolution.560 According to the authors, the 
vital point underlying conflict resolution is that conflict and development is excluded from the 
discourse about “liberal peace.” From here follows that imposition of conflict resolution by 
intergovernmental institutions is a main driver for a “resolution” failure.561 As I. William Zartmann 
observes, whilst a mediator helps conflicting parties in de-escalation, mediation does not determine 
the outcome of a negotiation process.562 Karin Aggestam is thus cautious that a mediator is a third 
party which “may help the parties to minimize risks and uncertainties by assuming a credible role as 
a guarantor and sponsor of a negotiation process.”563 In the South Caucasus before the EU added 
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mediation, as a form of conflict resolution to its foreign policy in 2008, as the forthcoming section 
explains, conflict resolution, as a whole, was conducted by the UN and CSCE/OSCE. 
 
Despite the emerging conflict literature, the early part of 1990s, there was a shallow level of 
understanding in Europe of the way to approach conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former 
Soviet Union. As the director of a Northern Ireland-based NGO recalls, “Europe was unable to 
respond with institutional diplomacy to the rising issues in the Balkans and in the South 
Caucasus.”564 For most of the 1990s, the EU did not engage in civilian peacekeeping, and was not 
involved in the principal multilateral negotiations of the UN and CSCE/OSCE. It follows from this 
that legal documents adopted by the EU about the South Caucasus did not set out terms of conflict 
resolution policy. More specifically, the PCA agreements concluded by the EU with Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1996 did not refer to conflict resolution. The primary reason EU conflict 
resolution remains underdeveloped was that, in line with liberal intergovernmentalist perspectives, 
the EU major member states held different views in their foreign policies. 
 
The second reason EU conflict resolution was forestalled was the presence of the UN and the 
CSCE/OSCE, considered by the EU to be better suited to mediate in its neighbourhood. By 
examining the involvement of the UN in Abkhazia, and CSCE/OSCE in South Ossetia, the first 
section argues that the international presence perpetuated the status quo of those conflicts. The third 
circumstance that has hindered EU policy coherence, as suggested in the second section, is the EU’s 
inability to use its political image and financial assistance drawing on its engagement without 
recognition strategy, to incentivise the conflict parties to settle disputes. 
 
4.5.1. International Mediation of the UN and OSCE 
 
The presence of the UN in Abkhazia and of the CSCE/OSCE in South Ossetia limited the EU’s 
involvement in conflict resolution. The activities of these two international actors were neither 
productive nor complementary and they merely perpetuated the status quo of the conflicts. The UN 
and OSCE were in no position to mediate when the conflict in 2008 escalated. The EU was, 
therefore, confronted with a state of heightened security in its eastern neighbourhood. This section 
overviews UN and CSCE/OSCE mediation and against that EU’s limited approach. 
 
Most academics and conflict experts agree that the international presence maintained protracted 
conflicts in the South Caucasus. In words of Mient Jan Faber and Mary Kaldor, international 
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engagement “has primarily served to legitimise the status quo.”565 Gela Charkviani has a similar 
view, that, in Georgia, the separatists have retained jurisdiction over their territories, and the 
peacekeepers confirmed this reality.566 Vakhtang Kolbaya, Rafael Galantiya, David Latsuzbaya and 
Teimuraz Chakhrakhiya explain the passive observer stance of the Western states as a result of their 
relations to Russia.567 Solveig Richter and Wolfgang Zellner specify that the inability of the EU and 
NATO to prevent the conflict revealed a crisis in the cooperative security in Europe and argued that 
the OSCE would have provided a better framework for a dialogue.568 Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard 
and Andrew Wilson are right to believe that in the presence of stronger international peacekeeping 
in South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia would have been unlikely to engage in military strikes.569 It 
was therefore imperative for the EU to prevent the recurrent tensions and build confidence. 
 
The conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a predecessor to the OSCE, was 
the primary international actor in South Ossetia, starting to monitor the conflict following the 
memoranda of understanding reached between the CSCE/OSCE, Georgia and South Ossetia.570 The 
peacekeeping force of the CSCE/OSCE took over the JPKF force of the JCC for monitoring. 
Russia, dominating the JPKF, presented itself as an intermediary, but being a signatory to the peace 
agreements, in fact, was a party in conflicts. Similar to South Ossetia, the CSCE/OSCE was also 
involved in the main forum for the settlement of conflict in Moldova (1991-1996) within the JCC, 
made up with representatives from the Republic of Moldova, Pridnestrovan Moldavian Republic 
(PMR), as well as Russia and Ukraine. In an analysis of the European context for the conflict 
resolution in Moldova, Williams notes that, with limited resources, despite good expertise in 
political conflicts, in the absence of political will, the CSCE/OSCE was not capable of committing 
to conflict resolution.571 The CSCE/OSCE reconfirmed the status quo in South Ossetia. 
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In early years of conflict in Abkhazia, whilst Georgia faced secessionist moves, the UN was 
misinformed that Georgia was mistreating minorities. Not until 1993 was the UN persuaded to send 
a small group of observers, that was not enough against the military support provided by Russia.572 
In July 1993, the UN agreed to deploy 88 UNOMIG military observers (that varied to 150), with 
the presence of the United Nations Special Representative (UNSR), appointed the following year.573 
Recalling 35 Security Council resolutions reaffirming Georgia’s sovereignty, the UN was extending 
the UNOMIG mandate before Russia vetoed its renewal in 2009. Although between in 1993-2015 
the UN has played various roles in the peace process, it has been unable to facilitate a political 
solution.574 Both the OSCE and the UN could not act impartially, considering the consensus nature 
of the OSCE and Russia’s influence in the UN as a permanent member of the Security Council. 
 
A group of major Western nations, Germany, France, the UK, the US, together with Russia, 
involved in peace efforts under the aegis of the UN in 1993. Initially called the Friends of Georgia 
(FOG), it changed to Friends of the Secretary-General (FOSG) to reflect impartiality. However, in 
contrast to Russia, Western countries as UN member states, inherently supported Georgia’s 
sovereignty.575 The FOSG addressed security and political issues, the return of the displaced and 
economic cooperation, but their involvement simply reinforced a stalemate. With a slightly 
different mission, the New Group of Friends of Georgia, set up in 2004 by the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic 
and the Kingdom of Sweden, urged the EU to participate in conflict resolution. This Group pursued 
post-conflict diplomacy instead of mediation in 2009. Another focal negotiating framework in 
Abkhazia was that of the discussions in Geneva, set up under the UNSR with the participation of 
the European nations, the US and Russia in 1994.576 Although the Geneva Process, led by the UN, 
contributed to the ceasefire in 1994, it turned into an open-ended dialogue that, in the opinion of 
Kornely Kakachia, compares favourably with the current Geneva Process led by the EU.577 The EU 
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had no operational role in the peacekeeping forces either in the JCC, led by the CSCE/OSCE in 
South Ossetia since 1992, or in the UNOMIG, led by the UN in Abkhazia since 1994. 
 
Settlement proposals offered by two governments in 2001 and 2008, about unlimited autonomy and 
wider federalism within Georgia, were not accepted by the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides. 
Repeated appeals by President Saakashvili to review the mandate of the JCC in South Ossetia were 
not taken into account by OSCE states.578 In 2006, in an attempt to resolve their status, the central 
government relocated the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in-exile to Kodori 
in Upper Abkhazia, and in 2007 established the Provisional Administration of South Ossetia in 
Kurta. These moves were criticised as damaging the trust of people living in the entities.579 A five-
point plan suggested by the Provisional Administration under Dmitry Sanakoev, concerning the 
formation of a government with de facto Administration under Eduard Kokoity, was also 
dismissed.580 In response to the insurgency in Kodori in 2006 and the capture of Georgian 
peacekeepers in Tskhinvali, the Georgian authorities attempted to regain control over its entities. As 
part of economic reintegration, prior to 2008, Georgia suggested establishing a joint free economic 
zone in the Ochamchire and Gali.581 Despite these initiatives, rising tensions were reported among 
the Georgian and South Ossetian leaderships.582 The increase in defence spending in Georgia, from 
USD 339 to 1,037 million in 2006-2008, implied a growing preoccupation with the country’s 
military security.583 In July 2008, Russia carried out large-scale military exercises with 8,000 troops 
and 700 armoured vehicles at the border with Georgia.584 Georgian Air Force Commander, Colonel 
David Nairashvili, stated in August 2007 that an aircraft entering 72 km into Georgian territory 
fired an air-to-surface anti-radar missile.585 In April 2008, the UNOMIG, with 129 military 
observers and 13 police officers, reported reduced military activities in its area of responsibility 
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(Gali, Zugdidi and Ochamchire sectors, and Kodori Gorge).586 The UN’s position can be attributed 
to misguided efforts not to aggravate Russia as a major regional actor and military power. 
 
The OSCE suggested two accounts of the monitoring situation in South Ossetia. According to one 
account, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Ambassador Roy Reeve, raised concerns over 
security in South Ossetia as early as 2007.587 For its part, Russia was uncomfortable with the role 
OSCE played in South Ossetia, particularly in 2008.588 According to another account, Ryan Grist, a 
senior OSCE representative in Georgia during crisis, recounted in the media that, although the 
OSCE was informed about the build-up of the Georgian military around South Ossetia that would 
give an excuse to Russia to support its own troops, severe escalation was not duly taken into 
account on the higher diplomatic level.589 The Georgian side believed that the OSCE had difficulty 
in performing a functional role due to its mandate and the small size of the mission.590 With its 
mandate limited to the vicinity of Tskhinvali, the OSCE had only eight observers, three of whom 
were deployed at the time in Tskhinvali, that became the major site of warfare, and these stated on 7 
August that they were not in a position to verify an attacking party.591 After the crisis erupted, the 
OSCE increased the number of its Military Monitoring Officers to 100 and contributed 20 observers 
to the EUMM.592 The OSCE has not advanced its resources to monitor hostilities in early stages. 
 
In case of another conflict in the South Caucasus in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, the EU has not pursued a conflict resolution policy. In contrast with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the EU has not adopted an engagement strategy, nor has it assisted Azerbaijan with a 
border team or mediated in recurring tensions. Negotiations between the conflict parties has been 
conducted under the auspices of the Minsk Group, spearheaded by the CSCE/OSCE and co-chaired 
by France, Russia and the US.593 A reluctance to shift narratives towards the benefits of mutual 
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development and a limited international presence has descended into the incidence of shootings 
along the bordering villages, with the most recent escalation in August 2014. Such stalemate 
therefore poses a risk to regional stability.594 The EU has supported the efforts of the OSCE in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but it has not been a party to multilateral negotiations. 
 
Not until 2002 did the EU make statements about the non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Instead, the EU limited itself to declarations by the Council Presidency that confirmed the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan and denounced the 2002 and 2007 de facto presidential elections, and 2010 
parliamentary elections in Nagorno-Karabakh.595 In a slightly more decisive manner, the European 
Parliament resolutions from 2010 and 2013 called on the parties to comply with the UN resolutions 
calling for withdrawal of the Armenian military that have been ignored.596 In 2013 the Parliament 
referring to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations stated that the occupation by one EaP country of another 
was a violation of the principles of eastern partnership.597 In fact, the Azerbaijani Government has 
been cautious of third party engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh that also accounts to EU’s 
limitation. As Craig Oliphant observes, the EU has had a low-profile role in Nagorno-Karabakh due 
to little internal interest or external demand from the relevant partners.598 According to Leila 
Alieva, the political stagnation in Azerbaijan is a factor in international involvement in conflict 
resolution.599 As the head of the government think tank in Baku stated, the “balanced” approach 
taken by the US, EU and other countries towards Nagorno-Karabakh is unacceptable to 
Azerbaijan.600 An academic from a diplomatic academy of Azerbaijan notes that, although 
Azerbaijan regards the EU as a reliable partner, the country is not willing to deepen its political 
relations with the EU.601 As argued earlier in this chapter, the EU has minimal influence on the 
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conflict without an accession perspective for Azerbaijan and Armenia.602 As the head of the EU 
delegation to Azerbaijan states: “The EU is concerned over the lack of visible progress in 
negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the conflict.”603 Without an incentivising compromise 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the EU is unable to facilitate conflict resolution. 
 
In all three cases of conflicts in the South Caucasus – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh, the EU’s conflict resolution approach in presence of the UN and CSCE/OSCE has been 
limited in scope. In contrast to the transport policy pursued by the EU in unison with the South 
Caucasus, EU policy regarding conflict resolution towards the region has largely been incoherent. 
 
4.5.2. Engagement without Recognition Strategy of the EU 
 
The EU has developed its engagement without recognition strategy towards Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. However, neither this strategy nor its political image and economic assistance have brought 
progress to the EU’s efforts to incentivise the parties to resolve the conflicts. In addition to its 
international peacekeeping presence, its inability to draw on an engagement policy and its political 
status, provides the third reason why the EU has not achieved coherence in Georgia. 
 
Since the 2000s, the EU has increased its diplomatic involvement in Georgia. Namely, in 2003 the 
EU appointed a EUSR to the South Caucasus to assist all three countries in their political and 
economic reforms, to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to ensure the EU’s coherent work.604 
Despite the EU’s willingness to take a more visible political role in the region, the appointment of 
the EUSR received little political attention.605 Moreover, broad responsibilities in a wide 
geographic area did not allow the EUSR to focus on conflict resolution. With an insightful view 
from Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė on cooperation among the two special representatives and the 
monitoring mission, the EUSR for the Crisis, presented an institutional challenge as the EUSR cut 
into responsibilities of the EUSR for the South Caucasus; whereas, the arrival of the EUMM 
assisted the EUSR to South Caucasus with local guidance.606 The breadth of the task and procedural 
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challenges limited the impact of the EUSR. Despite the merger of the EUSR for the South Caucasus 
and that for the Crisis in 2014, the EU has not shown any improvement in conflict resolution policy. 
 
It was in Georgia that the EU deployed the first mission under the ESDP in the post-Soviet area. 
The Rule of Law Mission EUJUST Themis was sent in 2004 for judicial reform.607 As Xymena 
Kurowska notes, the EU was unable to assert itself with the Themis because of complex community 
procedures that often delayed its work.608 Similar to the EUSR, this mission received little 
acknowledgement in the Georgian administration and its mandate was discontinued in 2005. Prior 
to that, in the late 1990s, the EU carried out confidence building measures with its Rapid Response 
Mechanism (RRM) between Georgia and Abkhazia. The EU took an approach similar to its conflict 
rehabilitation role in Northern Ireland discussed in the forthcoming subchapter. Despite the RRM 
measures, the EU was more involved in South Ossetia because this conflict was considered more 
soluble, given its mixed population and its proximity to the capital. More specifically, after its 
termination, the EU took over the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission (BMM) outside the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian territories. Even though the Border Support Team (BST) was dispatched in 
2005, they continued to monitor Georgia’s borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan, but not the 
conflict zones.609 The BST was meant to assist civilian crisis management, yet it did not directly 
relate to conflict resolution. It was only in 2009, when the border team was tasked to establish 
contacts for confidence building, that it moved from conflict management to conflict resolution. 
 
The EU has become by far the largest international donor to Georgia. Since 1997, the EU has 
provided economic rehabilitation and humanitarian assistance for Abkhazia. Between 1992 and 
2006, the EU supported the central government with EUR 505 million in grants, of which EUR 30 
million was allocated for peace purposes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.610 Commission 
programmes were implemented with a common financial tool, the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), that started in 2007 and continued despite the global financial crisis 
and the lack of commitment from 12 EU new member states to the international development 
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policy.611 An additional EUR 181 million was allocated out of the EUR 500 million set aside for 
rehabilitation in 2008-2010.612 After the crisis, the Commission funded conflict prevention with the 
Instrument for Stability (IfS). Despite the range of its political and financial commitments the EU 
stood aside in conflict transformation and has been unable to incentivise conflict resolution. 
 
Prior to the conflict escalation in 2008, the EU had limited itself to declaratory statements only. In 
support of the UN resolutions, the Council reiterated in its declaration “its firm commitment to the 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised 
borders as most recently reaffirmed in UNSC resolution 1808 of 15 April 2008.”613 In a more 
assertive manner, SG/HR Solana, on his trip to Georgia and Abkhazia in June 2008, stated that the 
“stability and prosperity of Georgia and the region was of great concern and interest for the 
European Union,” thereby emphasising the Council’s interest in increasing its engagement in 
Georgia.614 It was only after the crisis that the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) under 
the ESDP/CSCP agreed to expand to conflict resolution in Abkhazia. On the relations of the PSC 
with the EUSR for the Crisis, the EU prescribed that the “Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the 
Council.”615 Although the visits of the EU high-ranking officials and their statements were marginal 
in halting escalation, the EU’s intervention can also be seen in contrast to other international actors. 
As the Tagliavini report noted, “[t]his successful political action stood in contrast to the failure of 
the international community to act swiftly and resolutely enough in order to control the ever-
mounting tensions.”616 The EU remained the most suitable interlocutor for conflict mediation. 
 
In the late 2000s, the EU started to pursue a dual policy towards Georgia. Matching Georgia’s 
strategy, the EU supported the country’s sovereignty and at the same time adopted engagement 
without recognition strategy in view of statebuilding in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This policy, 
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developed in December 2009, is on the whole referred to in the EU’s working documents and the 
policy papers of the EU-based research institutions but not in the official EU documents. The non-
recognition policy was confirmed by the EU in its statements during the de facto presidential 
elections in Abkhazia in 2009: “the European Union continues to support Georgia’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, as recognised by international law.”617 In response to the EU’s position 
on those elections, reelected de facto President Bagapsh stated: “I understand that recognition of 
Abkhazia as an independent state is not an easy process. Whether the US and the EU like it or not, 
we have chosen our way.”618 The de facto president spoke about the EU’s difficulty in resolving the 
conflict because of its inherent bias in favour of Georgia’s sovereignty: “The European Union, the 
European Parliament and the international institutions alike are listening only to Georgia, but 
according to the United Nations Organization there are two sides of the conflict – Georgia and 
Abkhazia.”619 EU language is yet not reflected in the statements of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
leadership.620 In the same way, the EU adhered to non-recognition towards South Ossetia during the 
de facto presidential elections and referendum in 2011. In order not to isolate Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia with non-recognition, the EU has also attempted to engage with the conflict entities. 
 
The EU policy of engagement was inherently limited due to the EU’s respect to Georgia’s 
sovereignty. The EU nevertheless separated the legal dimensions of sovereignty from governance 
practices in view of nation- and statebuilding trends in Abkhazia and South Ossetia discussed in the 
following subchapter. Despite this limitation, combined with the fact that the EU was explicit about 
non-recognition, without a strategy document, its engagement inevitably suffered from lack of 
clarity. Besides visits by the EUSRs and monitoring by the EUMM, the EU was involved in 
Abkhazia through humanitarian aid department of the European Community Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO). Between 1992-2014, Georgia received EUR 130 million for conflict aid of the total 
EUR 187 million funding for the humanitarian response to the South Caucasus from the ECHO.621 
For humanitarian assistance, the EU has also worked with other actors: UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, 
USAID, ICRC, NRC, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Despite its diplomatic and 
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humanitarian engagement, the EU has not incentivised compromise that would allow change in the 
political set-up in conflict regions. Such rewards may include closer relations, development 
resources, and movement of people. With joint inducements for both central government and the 
entities interaction on a shared way to a target would probably alter dynamics in their relations. 
 
The Abkhaz de facto leadership and population, to whom the engagement aspect is meant to apply, 
is exasperated with the limited international engagement and distrusts the EU. As Laurence Broers 
observes, non-recognition forces societies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to subordinate their state-
building project to the goals of outside actors.622 Abkhazis are confused by mixed signals coming 
from the EU. A public opinion survey, carried out in Abkhazia in 2011, on prevailing perceptions 
about the EU in Abkhazia and Europe’s participation in resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, 
showed that the attitude of the Abkhaz society towards European contribution is shaped by the 
political context in which the EU is seen not to be neutral.623 As a leading Abkhaz academic Arda 
Inal-Ipa observes: “news of the European policy of engagement without recognition was met 
initially with hope. However, this policy has been put aside by the EU countries and has become a 
part of the Georgian policy of engagement with the so called ‘occupied territories’.”624 The duality 
of the EU policy seems to cause suspicion among the Abkhazis and so precludes conflict resolution. 
 
Since the EU member states are not in a position to work in conflict entities, they tend to empower 
peacebuilding INGOs to engage in humanitarian aid and gradually in institution building. In its 
Oversees Strategy, Britain has outlined the need for an integrated approach to tackle conflicts with 
several means of intelligence, diplomacy, development, defence engagement and trade, and at the 
same time, has indicated that “the UK’s capacities go beyond Government” when dealing with 
conflicts in neighbouring counties including Central Asia and the Caucasus.625 It follows from this 
that the major INGOs in the South Caucasus have been supported by the Conflict Pool, which is an 
instrument jointly operated by the government departments of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), the Department of International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). The salience of the INGOs’ work lies in their treatment of the sovereignty, particularly the 
legal aspects of people’s travel from the de facto jurisdictions, and at the same time their credibility 
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in those jurisdictions. The Government of Georgia, despite its concern about legitimising the 
practice of international presence, acknowledges the importance of such engagement. Therefore, in 
view of the prohibition of free migration to the de facto entities, Georgia allows humanitarian 
engagement but requests that peacebuilding organisations communicate about their involvement. 
Reporting with a regulatory document of Modalities for Engagement is not always observed by the 
INGOs because they tend to report to their funding agencies, whereas the latter are not necessarily 
directly accountable to the central government.626 At present, against the backdrop of nation- and 
statebuilding in Abkhazia, the presence of the EU and the INGOs is curtailed by the embracement 
policy of Russia towards Eastern Abkhazia, analysed in the next subchapter. 
 
4.6. Present Day Abkhazia627 
 
Most research on protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus has focused on relations between de 
facto entities and their de jure states in terms of non-recognition policy.628 A policy of engagement 
remains insufficiently analysed. Georgia regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of its territory, 
with the status of an Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and SOAR/Tskhinvali Region. In contrast, 
while large numbers of their displaced pre-war population remain unable to return, the remaining 
people in those entities consider themselves to live in the independent republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. The de facto authorities continue to refuse to negotiate with Tbilisi type of federal 
arrangement which they see as necessarily resulting in subordinated status for them within the 
Georgian state. From their part, the Georgian governments and people have opposed any agreement 
that would legitimise the separation of the breakaway entities and create opportunities for them to 
form federal structures with Russia. By maintaining such a stance for over twenty years, both 
entities have become even more removed from Georgia. The EU’s strategy of engagement without 
recognition has not contributed to a political solution. Whilst Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
recognised by Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh has gained no international recognition, not even by 
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Armenia. Nevertheless, it has continued as a self-reliant entity, even with a sharp population decline 
of 30-60% from 1986 to 2005.629 This subchapter yet focuses on the case of Abkhazia, the 
governance practices of which make it distinct from South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
This subchapter argues that although Georgia and the EU have so far adhered to non-recognition 
policies, the existence of governance practices that nurture nation- and statebuilding in Abkhazia, 
coupled with the Russian policy of recognition, provide challenges to conflict resolution. After a 
review of the debate in academic and policy literature over the de facto entities, the first section 
notes that Georgia’s non-recognition strategy, has not mitigated the isolation of its conflict regions. 
Juxtaposing the EU and Georgian non-recognition policies with the Russian policy of recognition, 
the second section argues that Russia’s support of statebuilding in Abkhazia may lead to the 
absorption of Abkhazia with Russia. Drawing on data that is difficult to access, the same section 
explores elements of nascent community-authority relations that aid nation- and statebuilding in 
Abkhazia. The third section examines international actors in their attempt to engender peace, which 
have not respected the modalities of engagement established by the central government. Georgia’s 
engagement policy lacked substance for addressing the alienation of its entities. Neither did the EU 
have a policy with strong prospects of incentivising parties for conflict resolution. 
 
4.6.1. Nation- and Statebuilding in Abkhazia 
 
Academic and policy literature on de facto states in the South Caucasus increasingly discusses 
policies enacted towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia by both state authorities and the international 
community.630 Over the past two decades, parties to the conflicts in the South Caucasus have been 
intransigent about territorial control, yet the situation in conflict entities has not been static. Societal 
and regime consolidation in Abkhazia that creates a complicated constellation for conflict 
resolution deserves more attention. 
 
The notion of “frozen conflicts,” caused by increasing dynamics in the South Caucasus breakaway 
entities, has rarely been used in the specialist conflict literature. Mient Jan Faber observes that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become “self-organized security zones.”631 The strategic 
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significance of the conflict in Georgia lies in the loss of control over Abkhazia that has 
compounded the impression of Georgia’s disintegration. Its significance for the Abkhaz leadership 
is the de facto independence from Georgia.632 In disputing the historical legacies of both 
jurisdictions, a dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia has stalled.633 As a scholar in international 
law explains, for Georgia, peace is a permanent solution based on respect for sovereignty, 
recognised by international law.634 As noted by a conflict resolution adviser at the Directorate-
General for External Relations (DG RELEX) of the European Commission, peace for breakaway 
regions means an unchallenged independence.635 After the wars in the 1990s, the population 
reproduces national narratives with mono-causal explanations.636 With time, de facto Abkhaz 
presidents have made conscious efforts to instill an aura of heroism from the wars waged in the 
early 1990s among the successor generation that is cemented on billboards in the towns of both 
Western and Eastern Abkhazia. Despite frequent changes in a volatile political space, the de facto 
leadership has managed to retain its hold of power and entrench the separation of this entity. 
Dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia has gone even more in stalemate since the 2008 armed 
conflict. The recent conflict became part of the changing dynamics in the region with its 
implications reverberating in the EU’s neighbourhood.637 Although international peacebuilding 
INGOs and local civil society actors, with support of the EU, have facilitated interaction among 
local communities, there has been limited progress in conflict resolution. For more than twenty 
years, Georgia has been intractable over the issue of status, and has underestimated nation- and 
statebuilding in Abkhazia. Against this backdrop, it seems to be tacitly accepted that there is little 
scope to change this reality in the foreseeable future. 
 
The multiethnic character of the current population creates a need for governance practice in 
Abkhazia. At present, the lack of access to justice, public services and information necessitates self-
governance and public institutions.638 The issues of status and Abkhaz-Georgia relations are less 
relevant for people who are facing insecurity in everyday life. As noted by conflict expert Paata 
Zakareishvili, and since 2013 the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality of Georgia 
(SMR): “In Abkhazia and South Ossetia their independence is a declaration and a pose, and in fact, 
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security is much more important for the local population.”639 According to a survey on community 
security conducted by a peacebuilding INGO, Safer World, low levels of community accountability 
and under-investment in community capacity obstruct activities of international organisations.640 
According to this research, there is a need for local self-government institutions that would 
encompass community engagement and partnership working as well as dialogue between NGOs 
and the power structures. Such institutions would allow civil society participation in public debate 
on the socio-economic issues of various ethnic communities. So far, several mechanisms have 
emerged on local and national levels for community participation in decision-making that includes 
both legislative and practical policies. The legislative realm extends to the de facto Law of the 
Republic of Abkhazia on Government in Administrative-Territorial Units, and the de facto Rules of 
the Sukhum Municipal Assembly. In policy practice, community-based approaches subsume 
activities of the Public Chamber of Abkhazia, local councils, village assemblies and community 
consultations. Societal and regime consolidation in Abkhazia complicates conflict resolution. With 
an engagement policy, there is a scope for the EU to focus on self-government institutions, 
community capacity, partnership working and the involvement of civil society.  
 
The de facto Abkhaz political and civic discourse depicts Abkhazia as a pluralistic state, yet the role 
of ethnic minorities in nation- and statebuilding is unclear. The de facto Abkhaz authorities do not 
have a policy for community engagement for ethnic minorities. The ethnic Georgian minority, with 
a contested number ranging from 29,000 to 65,000 of the 118,000 to 220,000 Abkhaz population, is 
particularly challenged. 641 Their return to Eastern Abkhazia only after the wars, has not occurred in 
conditions of safety and dignity. At present, Gali residents commute across the ABL and migrate 
seasonally to tend their fields. They experience the pressing need for employment, housing, 
facilities, infrastructure, healthcare, and education. In situation marked by the lack of rule of law 
and the presence of corruption and crime, ethnic Georgian population and Abkhaz law enforcement 
authorities distrust each other. The conscription of young men used as political tool adds to the 
gender imbalance in Gali. Although the de facto Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia 
guarantees every ethnic group the right of the native language, the Georgian minorities have 
restricted access to school education in the Georgian language and seek higher education in the 
Georgian controlled territories. There is a generally high level of trust towards international 
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organisations but little expectation for change. The EU has not addressed the issue of ethnic 
minorities and this precludes conflict resolution. 
 
4.6.2. Russian Policy of Embracement 
  
Russia has been pursuing a policy of increasing integration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
political, economic, military and administrative terms. Whilst Russia allows the statebuilding, it 
controls Abkhazia in political and economic terms. Even though a strong sentiment of the 
independence prevails among the residents in Abkhazia, in the face of the Russian policy of 
embracement, the Abkhazis are unlikely to preserve their independence. 
 
Restricted access for European companies in Abkhazia leaves Russia practically the only actor for 
economic relations. Beyond the economic blockade, international industries are unwilling to work 
in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the entire North Caucasus, due to the high 
security risk to international investment.642 Major factories and small enterprises in Abkhazia, such 
as a coal plant in Tkvarcheli, have been destroyed, but the demand for raw material increases on a 
needs basis, for example, the construction works in 2014 for Sochi Olympic Games within the 
Krasnodar area of Russia. On the extraction of resources, according to de facto Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba (2010-2011), Abkhazia is determined to be 
involved in investment projects.643 Abkhazia still seems to be deprived of the ownership of 
economic resources that raises the question of the exploitation of enterprises by Russia. 
 
The economic and social isolation of Abkhazia works in favour of integration with Russia. As a 
senior foreign policy maker from the UK FCO observed in an interview, “whether one wishes it or 
not, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are effectively operating now more in a North Caucasus orbit.”644 
For some civil society activists, such a tendency does not necessarily presuppose Russia’s assertive 
policy. Liana Kvarchelia from the NGO Center for Humanitarian Programs Sukhum [sic] says that 
Russia is not able to affect society-building in Abkhazia. A case in point is that of the 2011 
presidential elections, which did not elect the candidate proposed by Russia.645 Instead, as the 
leading practitioner continues, Russia is preserving the status quo while the rest of the world tries to 
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impose a resolution that the Abkhazis regard unfair.646 After the forced resignation of de facto 
President Aleksandr Ankvab (2011-2014), with purportedly Russian assistance, domestic politics in 
Abkhazia seems to be influenced by Russia. On nation- and statebuilding in Abkhazia, the UK’s 
Lord Rea commented that: “Abkhaz people are showing considerable determination and spirit, 
being very loyal to the notion of Abkhaz as a nation.”647 The Russian presence, however, is not 
recognised by Lord Rea: “Abkhazia is run by its own government on certain terms and there is no 
trace of evidence that the Russians are involved in administration of this country.”648 Implying 
Russian involvement in Abkhazia, de facto Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia Irakli Khintba (2012-2014) explained: 
The issues of security and stability in the Caucasus, transport infrastructure development, integration of 
transit potential of the region cannot be resolved without the participation of Abkhazia. … Our relations with 
the EU are influenced by … still negative attitude of the EU towards Abkhazia’s independence. … Abkhazia 
needs direct, specific and non-political rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure.649 
 
Since Russia has concluded the strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in 2014, the two have 
signed over 80 de facto interstate agreements and implemented large-scale programmes related to 
infrastructure, economic development, and the modernisation of social facilities. 
 
With passport politics explained below, Russia has increased its political influence in Abkhazia. 
Moreover, Russia tends to invoke citizenship, as it did in 2008, to protect its citizens on Georgian 
territory. This is a testament to Russia’s involvement in the administration of Abkhazia. In contrast, 
Russia does not seem to support Abkhaz identity and its pluralistic society. Abkhazis are concerned 
to retain their numerical and political superiority vis-à-vis ethnic Georgian and Armenian 
communities. Increased Russification is thus a challenge to Abkhaz identity. It therefore remains 
unclear whether Abkhazia will be able to preserve its identity in an independent state. To reverse 
alienation, Georgia does not explore avenues of cooperation in sectoral areas with Abkhazia. The 
entities have not considered the prospect of European direction either. Political relations and 
development aid from the EU have more sustainable prospects and ought to be a motivation for the 
revisiting of their relations with Georgia.  
 
Citizenship as a political process in Abkhazia has received regular attention as a salient issue. In 
two separate processes of “passport politics:” a) significant numbers of residents in Abkhazia have 
adopted Russian citizenship, and b) residents in Gali, the majority of whom are Georgian citizens, 
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were provided with Abkhaz citizenship. An Abkhaz passport is not valid for international travel but 
entails the political rights to vote and receive a pension and higher education in Abkhazia. Although 
the Abkhaz passport presented itself a dilemma for ethnic Georgians, the demand for basic rights 
prevailed. During de facto presidential elections in 2011, 9,000 Abkhaz passports were issued to 
Georgia, compared to 3,000 in 2009.650 In contrast, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities in 2009 reported that “pressure was exercised on the Georgian population in the Gali 
District through limitation of their education rights, compulsory “passportisation,” forced 
conscription into the Abkhaz military and restrictions on freedom of movement.”651 To deprive the 
ethnic Georgians of political rights, the Abkhaz de facto authorities suspended granting in 2014, 
and have even revoked Abkhaz citizenship to many ethnic Georgians. As Abkhaz citizenship has no 
international importance, the Georgian residents seek dual citizenship, which requires ethnic 
Georgians who rely on welfare and education in Western Georgia to relinquish their Georgian 
identity.652 This is because the de facto Law of the Republic of Abkhazia on Citizenship of 2005 
allows an ethnic Abkhaz to have dual citizenship, but a non-Abkhaz may only hold Russian as a 
second citizenship. Apart from cutting ties with Georgia, it is currently difficult for Gali residents to 
acquire Russian citizenship. Status neutral documents have not yet been embraced. Isolation 
constrains Abkhazia’s development that the EU and Georgian strategies have not addressed. 
 
4.6.3. Engagement Strategy of Georgia 
 
To address the post-conflict situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian Government 
developed two official documents: the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories in 2008, and a State 
Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation in 2010. The Strategy 
document declares the Government’s vision “based on the common principles and values shared by 
all European states, as reflected in the Helsinki Final Act [to build] democratic governance, a 
flourishing economy, … a tolerant and multiethnic society.”653 Despite this wording, European 
values are not reflected in either document. Since there is no clear EU document on how to engage 
the Abkhaz people, it is difficult to identify similarities and differences between the EU and the 
Georgian strategies. The fundamental similarity is their non-engagement that does not contribute to 
Georgia’s cooperation with the entities. The primary difference between the two is that the 
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Georgian strategy by bringing the status issue to the forefront, is not accommodating present day 
Abkhazia, whereas the EU, as a third party, can allow itself more flexibility in its engagement. 
 
Georgia has employed varying approaches towards state- and nationbuilding in Abkhazia. President 
Shevardnadze, in 1992-1995, treated nationbuilding as a reward to Abkhazis; this remained a 
popular position until 2004. President Saakashvili expressed a readiness to recognise political 
differences, but the Strategy on Occupied Territories was framed in a matter of de-occupation, 
aiming: “to reverse the process of annexation of these territories by Russia, and peacefully 
reintegrate these territories into Georgia’s constitutional ambit.”654 The EU has encouraged a 
reframing of such approach. As a Caucasus programme coordinator at a Berlin-based peace 
movement agrees: engagement requires the normalisation of the situation both on the level of 
authorities and on the ground.655 After the change of government in 2013, Georgia has seemed to 
separate nation- from statebuilding. In a statement responding to the strategic partnership between 
Abkhazia and Russia, in 2004, President Margvelashvili called on the international community “to 
prevent assimilation of small nations.”656 The separation of nation- and statebuilding approaches 
has become a cornerstone of the Georgian policy towards the Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
In the late 2000s, the Georgian Government developed status neutral documents as an instrument of 
engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With status neutral identification cards (SNID) and 
status neutral travel documents (SNTD), Georgia has hoped to control freedom of movement and 
extend benefits to people without requiring them to acknowledge the jurisdiction of Georgia. As of 
December 2013, the Service Development Agency of Georgia issued 235 SNIDs and 29 SNTDs.657 
Status neutral documents have remained a sensitive issue among the residents. The Russian and de 
facto Abkhaz authorities have continued to oppose these documents. As a peace and conflict expert 
warns, because the documents issued in Georgia implies sovereignty, those who accept them find 
themselves in inter-communal tension.658 Another reason for the limited use of the Georgian 
documents is that the Abkhazis already had Russian passports by the 2000s. In a way similar to that 
of travel documents, there was little demand for social and education benefits, suggesting that civil 
measures by the Government have not been particularly embraced by people in conflict entities. 
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The EU has taken an ambivalent approach to the status neutral documents. Third states are entitled 
under international law to recognise their validity.659 In a 2012 press release the Commission 
underlined that the EU supported the use of the status neutral documents.660 However, by 2013, 
only a few member states – Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Hungary – accepted them for use, but the EU as a whole has not.661 Those countries 
that recognized the documents, given their historical experience with Russia, were more willing to 
support Georgia’s policy. The decision of the remaining old member states not to accept documents 
can be explained by their hesitation to take a stance against Russia and by the consideration of the 
increased movement of people to the EU countries.  
 
In contrast to the identity documents, there was more need for medical assistance for the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian population. Between 2012 and 2013, the SMR received 837 applications, of 
which 639 were from the residents of Abkhazia and 188 from South Ossetia, and overall state 
funding of medical treatment equalled GEL 2 million.662 Residents of Abkhazia tend to use 
documents issued by Georgia in emergencies. Disease control is one such extraordinary 
circumstance. According to the EU agency European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), Georgia, including Abkhazia, has Europe’s highest rates of diagnoses in human 
immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome – HIV/AIDS.663 As 
the Sukhumi AIDS Centre provides outpatient services only, Krasnodar and Tbilisi are among those 
destinations where residents of Abkhazia seek treatment.664 In its prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS in Georgia, the national hospital of Infectious Diseases, AIDS and Clinical Immunology 
Research Center in Tbilisi diagnosed and treated 198 residents of Abkhazia in 2006-2011, a quarter 
of whom used the Georgian passports to receive treatment free to the Georgian citizens.665 Despite 
this interaction, cooperation between the two in human security is not a common practice. 
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Energy and trade comprise an area in which both Georgia and conflict entities can benefit from 
cooperation, regardless of political dynamics. The Enguri hydroelectric power station 
(gidroelektrostantsiya – HES) has continued to provide electricity on both sides of the Enguri River 
through peace and war. The HES has also been used as a model of coerced but effective 
cooperation for the Abkhaz side to express their discontent.666 To contribute to confidence building 
between both sides, the European Commission supported the reconstruction of the HES by 
allocating EUR 9.4 million in 1999. In South Ossetia, the Ergneti market, which has existed since 
1999 on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, served as a commercial centre for the Ossetian and Georgian 
communities. Ergneti was also a hub of illicit trade with a USD 1 billion turnover from Russia via 
the Kazbegi checkpoint contributing, to 70% of the breakaway region’s budget income derived 
from illegal business.667 For this reason, the EU Customs Control project to check transit cargo 
traffic, initially agreed in 2002, was turned down by de facto Ossetian authorities. USD 120 million 
was inflicted to national revenue, but the total customs revenue doubled after the Government 
decided to close down the market in 2003.668 Whereas Ergneti in South Ossetia was seen to 
institutionalise criminality, Enguri neither consolidated nor challenged the status quo in Abkhazia. 
Both Enguri and Ergneti can be seen as possible opportunities for potential cooperation, which have 
not yet positively been used in the engagement strategies of Georgia and the EU. 
 
The strategies of Georgia and the EU towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not sufficiently take 
into account emerging trends of nation- and statebuilding. The rewards offered in the EU’s strategy 
are insufficient for the de facto entities to change their political arrangements in a way that would 
work for all sides. The EU and Georgia have not managed to develop a substantial policy of 
engagement to prevent the politically, and socially isolated entities from integration with Russia. 
 
4.7. EU’s External Policy with Civil Society in the South Caucasus669 
 
Another aspect of EU external policy meriting attention is that of its cooperation with civil society 
in conflict resolution in the de facto entities of the South Caucasus. This subchapter studies the 
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EU’s work with INGOs, as non-state actors with a focus on Georgia, and thereby contends that EU 
conflict resolution in the South Caucasus has been carried out with limited coherence. The first 
section briefly takes an overview of core European values enshrined in the European normative 
texts underpinning civil society. The next part assesses cooperation between an EU member state of 
the Netherlands and a civil society actor EUROCLIO, promoting education in history and 
citizenship as a means of conflict resolution in the former communist space, achieving only limited 
progress. There are two caveats to this assessment: first, peace initiatives are perceived in mixed 
ways on the ground; and second, the preferences of the states affect their external policy. 
 
4.7.1. Humanitarian INGOs 
  
The EU and civil society hold that common liberal values can facilitate conflict transformation. At 
the core of European values, as Robert Stradling and Christopher Rowe note, are human rights, 
reciprocity, tolerance, freedom, respect for reasoning and truth.670 These fundamental values are 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),671 and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).672 Such a value-based approach underlies, as a guiding principle, the 
policy adopted by the EU and civil society to settle conflicts in the South Caucasus.   Such policy 
can be pursued through history and civic education, pioneered by the INGOs. As the PACE asserts, 
“having a key political role to play in today’s Europe history teaching can be a tool to support peace 
and reconciliation in conflict and post-conflict areas.”673 In 2009 the Prague Summit endorsed the 
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF) in promoting contacts between civil society in the 
EU and the EaP region for the capacity building of the local NGOs, with common projects related 
to political transformation, economic integration and multiethnic cohesion. 
 
The work of the EU and the INGOs in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus has encompassed 
three tracks of diplomacy. Track I has involved governmental diplomacy, track II – multiple levels 
of contact, and track III – the people’s level. A peacebuilding practitioner comments that the INGOs 
were often inclined to adopt a top-down approach instead of engaging with communities on the 
ground and this accounts for the limited progress in confidence building.674 Another practitioner 
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adds that movements at all levels are important for shaping peace dynamics, and, although the 
bottom-up approach is more sustainable, it needs to rely on the readiness for political solution.675 
On political will from the top, the practitioner notes that the EU is unlikely to facilitate civil society 
engagement without a normalisation process between the Georgian-Abkhaz and the Georgian-South 
Ossetian authorities.676 A director of community foundation for Northern Ireland, drawing on the 
Northern Irish peace process as a major accomplishment of recent peacebuilding, says that it is 
essential to combine both approaches for intercommunity reconciliation.677 A university academic 
at a state university in Tbilisi observes that, from the onset, the Western individuals and groups 
volunteered to facilitate peace among the local communities in Georgia.678 Since 1997, the work of 
the INGOs on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, known as the Schlaining process, has involved both 
political elites and civil society.679 The EU’s role as a peace facilitator increased by including civil 
society actors in its external policy. However, there is a general sentiment that the EU has not 
sufficiently availed itself of the resources of the INGOs to deal with conflicts. A Eurasia projects 
director at a peacebuilding INGO believes that the EU policies aimed at responding to the needs on 
the ground and at encouraging governments to be more flexible on their positions have reached 
their limits without any particular effect.680 Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, in its recommendations 
for conflict settlement, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that the EU promoted 
confidence building with the ENP and that the EUSR observed the Minsk process.681 It was only in 
2011 that the EU combined efforts with the INGOs by bringing five predominantly UK-based 
INGOs (International Alert (IA), Conciliation Resources (CR), LINKS, Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), and the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation) into an international consortium to work 
on Nagorno-Karabakh.682 Joint activities with civil society actors, similar to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, did not yield policy coherence to EU conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU, in 
cooperation with international INGOs, has not achieved coherence in conflict resolution as a result 
of not drawing on their full potential. 
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4.7.2. History Education for Conflict Transformation 
 
It is worth examining the way in which EU member states perceive their neighbourhood as they 
deal with issues on an EU level. One major member state of the Netherlands stands out with its 
distinct policy mechanism towards EU’s eastern neighbourhood. This is demonstrated by its 
bilateral cooperation with the Matra Social Transformation Programme for Central and Eastern 
Europe (Maatschappelijke Transformatie), redeveloped in 2004 and originally pursued in response 
to the post-communist changes in the CEE. The policy document, “Matra Modernised,” categorises 
the EU neighbourhood in terms of three groups: EU candidates (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), eastern partners without accession 
prospects (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and Russia.683 The 
document underlines the incentive to stabilise the EU neighbourhood by supporting democracy, the 
market economy and the post-conflict situation with an explicit understanding that “[a] stable 
region is in the interests of the Netherlands.”684 To help the CEE countries overcome transition, the 
Dutch government has drawn on the resources of civil society and is supportive of a similar 
approach on the EU level.685 Besides cooperation at the governmental level, member states reach 
out to the grassroots level together with civil society actors. 
 
In its performance of its conflict resolution, the EU has worked with a Hague-based European 
Association of History Educators – EUROCLIO. Since its founding in 1992, at the request of the 
CoE, this professional association, which unites predominantly Western countries, has encouraged 
innovative and responsible history education in those regions affected by conflict. A founding 
president of EUROCLIO stresses that “sharing knowledge by teaching and learning history 
promotes cultural diversity, tolerance, and peace.”686 A senior project manager at EUROCLIO adds, 
“civil society organizations in the EU inspire committed individuals in the SC countries to reinforce 
the open society culture in their local contexts.”687 In order to revisit the causes of ethnic tensions 
after the 2008 conflict, the Matra Programme supported a project called “Tolerance Building 
through History Education,” managed by EUROCLIO and its regional member association 
Georgian Association of History Educators (GAHE/IMSA). This project produced supplementary 
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resource material for secondary education.688 The Georgian state had its own policy for human 
rights education, pursued by the Civic Integration and Tolerance Council within the Administration 
of the President of Georgia, guided by the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration 
and implemented by the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia.689 Although both the 
national policy and the EUROCLIO/Matra promoted inclusive history, the work of the latter was 
initially met with mixed feelings in Georgia.690 Despite understanding that Georgia, as a part of 
Europe, shares European culture and values, those values are perceived differently from those 
which are regarded as intrinsically Georgian. 
 
Conservative circles in Georgia identify a Western hypocrisy existing alongside the Western values 
of democracy. The difficulty of acknowledging civil society initiatives at the national level has 
restricted the work of this INGO and the EU related to conflict resolution. The EU’s engagement 
with civil society is primarily limited by the competing priorities of the member states. A recurring 
argument among peacebuilding practitioners over the shortfall of the INGO engagement is that the 
member states have different interests in relation to EU foreign policy. The director of EUROCLIO 
shares concerns over the willingness of people in Europe to contribute to peace in their 
neighbouring countries and, in her words, “it increasingly turns out that people are unwilling to do 
so.”691 As the history educator notes with regret, “the Netherlands has lately become inward-
looking because the populist government is less supportive of engagement of the EU and civil 
society in Europe’s neighbourhood.”692 On the various preferences of the member states, the senior 
project manager points out that the Netherlands has refocused its geographical attention on the Arab 
region and the Matra programme has recently been put on hold.693 The project manager concludes, 
“[S]outh Caucasus is probably not on top of the agenda in the EU, but the neighbourhood policy 
instruments of the ENP and EaP facilitate social cooperation to change this dynamic.”694 Mixed 
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perceptions about the INGOs work and different preferences among the member states limit the 
conflict resolution work of the EU and civil society in the South Caucasus. 
 
To sum up, this subchapter has found that the outreach for conflict resolution through history 
education in Georgia, supported by the Dutch government, has been limited. As the Government 
shifted its focus to a different geographic area, policy support towards the South Caucasus also 
changed. Observation of initiatives conducted by individual member states shows that EU external 
policy in cooperation with civil society in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus remains 
incoherent. Conversely, in the Northern Ireland community, initiatives facilitated by the EU 
contributed to conflict resolution, as discussed in the next subchapter. 
 
4.8. EU Role in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland 
 
This subchapter explores the implications of the EU’s role in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland for 
the third party assistance to the South Caucasus, drawing on similar patterns between these two 
conflicts. It argues that the EU can identify similarities in its engagement in the Northern Irish 
conflict with religious causes, for conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, that distinguish with 
territorial reasons, despite the differing natures of the conflicts inside and outside its borders. 
 
Situated in the northeast part of the island of Ireland and partitioned from Southern Ireland in 1921, 
Northern Ireland is a constituting self-governing part of the UK with devolved institutions and a 
unique constitution. The division of Protestants and Catholics turned into political separation when 
those living in Northern Ireland who identified themselves as unionists wished to remain with the 
UK, whereas that part of the population calling themselves nationalists sought unification with the 
Republic of Ireland.695 The conflict, known as the Troubles, lasted from 1969 to 1994 and ended 
comparatively quickly with a substantial outcome after the signing in 1998 of the Belfast 
Agreement, otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement.696 It has been argued that the 
Agreement is inherently illiberal because a consociational settlement dismisses a common 
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citizenship.697 Despite its achievement in conflict resolution, the transition from conflict to peace 
has been problematic, as observed by an advisor to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the 
1990s.698 The peace process in Northern Ireland cannot be understood without examining the role 
of the external actors who mediated between local political groups and provided assistance. 
 
The EU’s involvement in Northern Ireland was key in providing resources for community relations 
and building civic infrastructure. The nature of the consociational institutions and the policy 
acceptance are central features of the political accommodation in Northern Ireland.699 Another 
relevance for the EU’s conflict resolution policy in the context of the South Caucasus is that peace 
needs to occur at the grassroots level to achieve conflict transformation.700 According to a peace 
practitioner who leads a conflict research institute in the Northern Irish city of Derry, well known 
for sectarian violence, the building of empathy and reconciliation between the opposing sides 
changed the dynamics of this intercommunal conflict and this can be adapted to the Caucasus 
context.701 This holds true for the EU non-recognition policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Funding from the European Union Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation has influenced 
the perception of reconciliation among people as a concept associated with the EU programme.702 
As Neil Jarman states, community-based policing and security has been a good example of track II 
diplomacy over the past decade.703 Normalisation initiatives in a divided society, with partnerships 
and accountability, resonate with the South Caucasus context. According to a scholar of legislative 
studies at a university in Belfast, the conflict cannot be solved but can be managed by maintaining a 
peace process with assistance of the EU as an external actor.704 With assistance, the EU is likely to 
save protracted conflicts from escalation in the South Caucasus. The EU experience in conflict 
management within its member state has relevance for its policy in its eastern neighbourhood. 
 
On a different note, the increase in economic performance in the Irish Republic since 1993 has 
prompted the Northern Irish population to support the unification of Northern Ireland with Southern 
Ireland. By the same token, it is suggested that Georgia should strive to make itself attractive to the 
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entities by becoming a functional state with a good democracy and economy.705 This idea that the 
central government should be an exemplar of a growing economy for the breakaway regions has 
gained traction within Georgian political thinking since 2004. Once it was clear that coercive 
measures had not yielded any significant results, favourable policies were extended through an 
engagement strategy towards the entities, the choice of which now resides with those entities. 
 
This chapter has identified that international actors have been unable to influence a political 
solution to the protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus. For the purposes of this argument, this 
chapter has first explained the reasons for the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which stem 
from the Soviet constitutions, the estrangement of ethnic minorities from the Georgian political 
elite, and nationalism. Since gaining independence, over three phases of its foreign policy, 
Georgia’s confused dealings with Russia are apparent in its view of Russia as an interlocutor, while 
requesting its assistance in brokering a peace. In an attempt to reassert its regional influence, Russia 
has overtly supported separatist minorities politically, militarily and economically. This chapter has 
also presented the debate over Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration and the outcome 
of the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, which was perceived as unfavorable to the nation’s 
security. Georgian foreign policy after 2013 shows a shift towards duality in political and economic 
relations with Russia, coupled with the European and Euro-Atlantic policy direction. 
 
Finally, the chapter has analysed the intersecting aspects of the EU’s limitations in conflict 
resolution in the South Caucasus. In the 1990s, the European nations had a limited awareness of the 
conflict situation in their former Soviet neighbourhood. The international presence of the UN and 
OSCE did not reinforce the EU’s representation. Despite financial assistance, the EU has been 
unable to incentivise the conflicting parties. Whilst not recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
state- and nation-building, particularly in Abkhazia gathers pace, that Georgia’s engagement 
through cooperation and the EU’s engagement without recognition strategies have not addressed. 
The chapter’s conclusion was that the EU can draw on from the third party peacebuilding assistance 
in Northern Ireland for conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, in cooperation with civil society. 
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Chapter 5. EU Mediation in the Russia-Georgia Conflict in 2008 
 
 
EU mediation in the South Caucasus was prompted by the outbreak of the armed conflict between 
Georgia and Russia in August 2008. During the crisis, the EU increased its political level of 
engagement by appointing the EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia, sending in the EUMM, and 
establishing the Geneva Process. Whilst the EU views its mediation in Georgia as a major example 
in common policy coherence, this chapter posits that EU member states had divergent opinions 
regarding their involvement and the EU has not been coherent in conflict resolution. 
 
This chapter investigates whether the differing preferences of the member states, consequent upon 
their historical experience with Russia, accounted for their divergence. This idea is developed in 
four steps: the first subchapter analyses EU mediation, marked by two ceasefire agreements: a Six-
Point Peace Agreement on Ceasefire, and a Declaration of the European Commission and European 
Council. During negotiations led by Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the Council of the EU, the 
key principles sought by the Georgian Government were overridden. The second subchapter reveals 
the differing positions and limited security capabilities of EU member states. The third subchapter 
argues that differences among the member states over deployment of the monitoring mission 
challenge the existing view of the effectiveness of EUMM. By examining the GID rounds, the 
fourth subchapter demonstrates that the EU has not been assertive in its negotiations. 
 
5.1. EU Diplomacy and the Peace Accord 
 
During the Russia-Georgia conflict, the EU emerged as a mediator due to the inability of the other 
external actors to prevent and mediate conflict. The extent of the EU’s influence over the peace 
process remains yet unclear. The mediation was a difficult stage in the diplomatic process, 
consisting of two phases, one in which the ceasefire was reached and the subsequent political 
settlement. The interests of the conflicting party were excluded in the agreements and these 
agreements since then have not been observed. Therefore, this subchapter argues that the EU’s 
diplomacy was limited. 
 
Mediation of the EU as a peace actor requires academic examination. Grevi defines success of EU 
mediation as occurring when a common effective action is accomplished.706 In this line, successful 
mediation would imply an assertive common action of the EU to ensure that the interests of 
conflicting parties are taken into account and adhered to in a peace agreement. The thesis, however, 
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does not intend to measure success of mediation. This is because success cannot be confined to the 
extent to which EU mediation produced agreements, which excluded the objectives of the parties, 
or whether the provisions of the agreement were met. The thesis views the EU mediation in terms 
of literature contrasting functional and political cooperation explained earlier in chapter 2. 
 
This subchapter does not evaluate mediation against the terms of the peace agreement and the 
extent these terms have been upheld. The EU’s mediation, in fact, is mixed in what is deemed to be 
a robust intervention.707 MacFarlane observes that, although the EU helped to stop hostilities, it had 
difficulty in adopting a united stance in relation to external crisis resolution in its eastern 
neighbourhood.708 Cornell and Starr add that the EU’s diplomacy has shown limitations in its ad 
hoc engagement and in its encouragement of the meeting of the provisions during institutional 
mediation.709 As the authors note, prior to that, EU’s profile in the region had focused on its own 
needs in energy and governance, ignoring the region’s security requirements for conflict 
resolution.710 Likewise, Dennis Sammut points out that, despite mediation and financial assistance, 
there is “a gap between the stated objectives of the European Union and their implementation.”711 
During the first phase of its diplomacy, the EU’s priority was the conformity of the parties with the 
ceasefire. The accord, however, did not include provisions of vital importance for the Georgian 
Government about the return of displaced people and the use of existing international mechanisms 
for negotiation. Although under the second point of the agreement, the ceasefire marked results in 
mediation, part of contention of this subchapter is that hostilities apparently stopped when the 
situation on the ground had reached a stalemate, prior to the EU’s common decision to intervene. 
Other than that, the thesis analyses the impact of mediation over the second phase by comparing the 
objectives of the agreement against their outcomes during the Geneva Process. An analysis of the 
mediation suggests that, because the terms requested by the Georgian side were excluded and even 
those agreed were not adhered to by Russia, the EU’s mediation was limited in both phases. 
 
Following the outbreak of the conflict, the three largest EU members – France, Britain and 
Germany – started to mediate with Moscow and Tbilisi. After five days of fighting, before a 
common policy was formulated, individuals from the member states began to act. The decision to 
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engage was made by the so-called troika – the President of the Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, SG/HR 
Solana, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. In addition, the 
decision was delegated to Bernard Kouchner, the French Foreign Minister, and the European 
Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The mediation was largely 
facilitated by the French presidency, strengthened by the personal credentials of the President of the 
French Republic, Sarkozy, who took a leading role as well as an intermediary position between 
Moscow and Tbilisi. The leaders of Germany and the UK negotiated separately between the two 
capitals. On 12 August 2008, during the visit of President Sarkozy together with Foreign Minister 
Kouchner to Moscow, after meeting President Dmitriy Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, and 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Russian President announced that agreement had been 
achieved.712 The agreement did not include those provisions critical for the Georgian side, notably, 
repatriation of displaced people and availing international frameworks for negotiations. Eventually 
it was accepted as fait accompli, especially due to its fifth and sixth points, by the Georgian side 
during the visit of Foreign Minister Kouchner to Tbilisi on the same day.713 After these 
negotiations, two documents were concluded: Protocole d’accord – the Six-Point Peace Agreement 
on Ceasefire on 12 August 2008,714 followed by an implementation document – the Declaration of 
the European Commission and European Council on 9 September 2008, signed by President 
Sarkozy and President Barroso after the Extraordinary European Council met on 1 September.715 
Officials both at the Commission and the Council state that the EU supported Georgia because 
stability in the South Caucasus was important for stability in the EU.716 In the assessment of the 
MEP, the EU intervention eventually appeased tensions.717 An examination of the peace document 
presents a somewhat different picture of the EU’s mediation. 
 
The extent the conflicting parties’ adherence to the peace agreement is disputed. First, it is difficult 
to identify an official version of the Protocole d’accord agreed by all parties since two documents 
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were signed separately.718 The first document, available in French, only bears the signature of 
President Sarkozy and President Saakashvili, and the second, in Russian, is signed by President 
Medvedev on behalf of the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides.719 In addition to that, President Sarkozy, 
together with SG/HR Solana, President Barroso, and President Medvedev, agreed on implementing 
measures for the ceasefire agreement of 12 August in Moscow, but no relevant document followed 
from this. The documents reflect President Sarkozy’s particular diplomatic style, which deviated 
from standard procedures during the escalated crisis.720 The Protocole, in its final form now listed 
the following points: one (non-use of force), two (cessation of hostilities), three (humanitarian aid), 
four and five (the Russian and Georgian withdrawals), and six (international discussions). 
 
The Georgian Government denounced Russian compliance with the immediate terms because 
points one, three, four, and six had not been upheld. The first point was violated as the parties had 
resorted to the occasional use of force.721 In line with point two, the formal halt to military actions 
marked the ad hoc achievement of the EU. In fact, the fighting did not stop until 12 August, when 
the Russian forces had achieved their objectives by going forward in Georgia and reaching what 
became the official ceasefire line in the agreement.722 The other side of the ABL line in South 
Ossetia has been closed to humanitarian aid providers, such as the International Committee of Red 
Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) and the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).723 The third point continued 
to be neglected despite the Security Council’s call for an immediate access for humanitarian 
provision and an unimpeded access for the displaced in conflict-affected areas.724 Point four, on the 
withdrawal of the Russian forces, is arguably the most critical. After the Georgian side declared the 
ceasefire on 10 August and returned to its quarters, the Russian troops followed the army and 
entered deeper into Georgia. Russian forces withdrew from Poti and Gori, as well as from 
uncontested territories in October 2010, but they had strengthened their positions in the Akhalgori 
region, villages Perevi, Didi Liakhvi, Patara Liakhvi and Prone Gorge, located within the 
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jurisdiction of the Provisional Administration of South Ossetia and never pulled back to the 
positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. As Colonel Christopher Langton observed, the 
Russian presence amounted to 3,000 soldiers in Abkhazia and to 2,000 soldiers of the 58th Army in 
South Ossetia.725 Illustrating the European Parliament’s position towards Russia’s use of force, the 
Resolution from 2008 underlined that there was “no legitimate reason for Russia to invade Georgia, 
[and] to occupy parts of it.”726 The Resolution from 2011 reiterated that: 
[A]lmost three years after the conflict with Georgia, Russia still does not respect the agreements of 12 August 
and 8 September 2008 on the withdrawal of troops to the pre-conflict positions from the Georgian occupied 
provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia and does not guarantee the European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) access to these territories.727 
 
The fifth point, asserting that “[p]ending an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces 
will implement additional security measures,”728 was initially not acceptable to the Georgian side. 
President Sarkozy reassured President Saakashvili, in a later communication from 14 August, that 
the provisional patrol measures were implemented inside the ABL while the mandate of 
international mechanism was the subject of discussion by the OSCE, the EU and the UN.729 The 
sixth point initially included defining the political status of the entities.730 According to a Council 
official, President Saakashvili opposed the terms on status that were later replaced by initiating 
“international discussions on modalities for security and stability in [sic] Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.”731 This is the baseline of GID in terms of security and stability for conflict settlement. 
 
At present, 20% of Georgian territory remains occupied, being under the control of the Russian 
armed forces without the consent of the domestic government. Occupation is determined following 
the law on military occupation prescribed by the Hague Regulations of 1907 that “[t]erritory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”732 As an 
occupying power, Russia must adhere to its obligations under international humanitarian and 
human rights law in respect to the occupied territories. Under international humanitarian law, 
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Russia is required to comply with the law of occupation as principally governed by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 and the First Additional Protocol of 1977, which includes the 
fundamental protection of human rights.733 As Georgia and Russia are both party to international 
human rights treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Russia is also bound to comply with 
international human rights law.734 Again, as both Georgia and Russia are party to the ECHR, the 
occupied Georgian territories fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Human rights violations and ethnic cleansing directed to ethnic Georgians in the areas 
under the effective control of Russian forces has been continuously deplored by PACE, ICG and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW).735 To that end, the Georgian Government instituted proceedings 
against Russia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2008 on the grounds that Russia 
violated the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 
Georgia contended that in 1990-2008 during its intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia: 
The Russian Federation, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising 
governmental authority, and through the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist forces and other agents acting 
on the instructions of, and under the direction and control of the Russian Federation, is responsible for 
serious violations of its fundamental obligations under [the] CERD.736 
 
However, in 2011, the Court determined that it did not possess the jurisdiction to hear the merits of 
the case and it was summarily dismissed.737 In 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in its preliminary examinations concluded that: 
South Ossetian forces carried out a widespread and systematic attack against the ethnic Georgian civilian 
population in South Ossetia and adjacent areas in the context of the armed conflict in the period from August 
2008 through October 2008 that amounted to the crime against humanity of forcible transfer of ethnic 
Georgians under article 7(1)(d) [of Rome Statute738].739 
Despite this conclusion, due to the on-going national proceedings in both Georgia and Russia, the 
OTP postponed its decision to open an investigation of the situation in Georgia. In such matters 
related to the ICJ and ICC, the EU has no direct influence on judicial stages. The outcomes of these 
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proceedings, however, may well impact EU policy – particularly its capacity as a mediator, as a 
consequence of the altered situation between Georgia and Russia. 
 
As the international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia is regulated by international law, at 
all such interventions, the EU preferred to act as a mediator instead of engaging with Russia on the 
grounds of its violation of international law violations. Although the EU was able to facilitate a 
ceasefire agreement, the EU did not yet have the requisite political authority to ensure that the 
parties observed the agreement. The terms of the agreement were not respected by Russia and, 
therefore, the second phase of mediation conducted by the EU ultimately showed limited progress. 
The concurrent attempt by Georgia to bring proceedings before the ICJ to order Russia to comply 
with its obligation under international law was also unsuccessful. 
 
Although the EU’s involvement in the 2008 conflict is considered to be the most rapid of any such 
involvements in an external crisis, it was still quite a while before the EU engaged with the parties. 
The EU’s inability to react more promptly was, in large part, a consequence of the absence of a EU 
contingency plan for crisis escalation, despite a deteriorating security situation in its 
neighbourhood. Its regional presence did probably allow the EU to assess the volatility of the 
situation, but a senior officer in the Council hinted that the EU did not have an operational plan in 
place because it had not been anticipated that the crisis would escalate to such a magnitude.740 In 
contrast, the Commission official advances that there was a need to work to de-escalate the crisis 
and stabilise the situation, prior to August 2008 that implies that the EU was aware of tensions 
between the conflicting parties.741 As the official specified a year after the crisis, the EU has a 
strong political dialogue with Russia when it faces important issues in their common 
neighbourhood. In the run-up to the fighting during their discussion with Russia about recurring 
incidents, the Russian response was that the main interlocutor was the Georgian Government.742 
Despite acknowledging the need to address the issue, the Commission official emphasises the 
brevity of the war and the absence of any specific warning of escalation from Tbilisi or Moscow.743 
As the official said: “Contingency plans existed in general terms how one can react using crisis 
management measures,” but the EU did not foresee that the situation would escalate in such a short 
space of time.744 When the crisis escalated, it took the EU considerable time to put a mission in 
place and to earmark specific forces from the member states. After the war, the Commission, 
together with the World Bank, organised a Donors’ Conference for Georgia and pledged USD 4.5 
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billion for 2008-2010 in assistance for social and infrastructural rehabilitation and economic 
recovery.745 As the Commission official concludes, the EU can use various instruments to influence 
the behaviour of the parties but, ultimately, in the absence of any leverage, Russia is not challenged 
in the region.746 Following the military cooperation treaties concluded by Russia with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the contingents are likely to stay in the entities for the foreseeable future. 
 
During the conflict, other regional and international actors were in a far weaker position to defuse 
military tension. In answer to a question on relations between Russia, the EU and the US, Professor 
Burns says that, since the collapse of the Soviet Union with a “triangular dialogue” underway 
between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington, many steps have been taken to move away from 
armed confrontation.747 Following the decade of the Cold War in international politics from 1945 to 
1991, the level of nuclear weapons in the US and Russia has decreased and the US needs to 
continue to cooperate with Russia to eliminate the risk of war between Russia, Europe, and the 
US.748 Although Russia is a potential partner with the US in building nuclear confidence and 
counterterrorism, Burns emphasises the need to have a balanced policy towards Russia: “The 
Russians are designing a greater sphere of influence that is not in the interest of the peoples of 
Central Europe or Western Europe or North America. … I would hope that the United State and 
Europe will continue to be strong enough that Russia would not try to re-impose its will on Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.”749 The US as well as NATO did not 
mediate between Russia and Georgia as their engagement would cause an even more hostile 
response from Russia. The US limited its support to the arrival of the Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, on 15 August, and statements made by both the Democratic and Republican 
presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain. Yet, as Vladimir Orlov indicated, the 
conflict damaged a strategic dialogue between the US and Russia.750 After 2008, under the 
administration of President Obama, the US pursued a “reset” policy with Russia, revising the US 
missile defence plans in Central Europe. Russia’s reciprocal willingness to alter their relations was 
reflected in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.751 On the consequences of the 
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US retreat from the South Caucasus, James Nixey notes that, the South Caucasus has become an 
essential concern for US foreign policy, and its withdrawal from the region would not be 
advantageous for its interests.752 The Council and Commission officials note that, in the light of the 
need for the US to cooperate with Russia on global issues, the US was not in a position to support 
Georgia.753 As Adam Hug suggested, the 2008 crisis had shaken Western support as a whole for 
President Saakashvili.754 Like the US, NATO limited its position with a declaratory statement by 
the Parliamentary Assembly, which “deplored the occupation of the Georgian territory by Russian 
forces.”755 By 2009 Russia, NATO and EU appeared to be at a “strategic crossroads.”756 
 
Shortly after the conflict, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.757 
As the President of Georgia stated in 2009, Russia’s assertive policy had already presupposed 
recognition of independence of both territories.758 That, of course, added to the limitations for the 
EU and complicated any sustainable settlement. In doing so, by ostensibly protecting their 
residents, Russia impeded the peace process by clearly not abiding to the agreement.759 Recognition 
was not followed by the major powers other than the reciprocal recognition from Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria, and Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, Tuvalu. Since then Georgian officials have 
tried to persuade the EU to urge Russia to respect Georgia’s sovereignty. The EU reflected its non-
recognition in its Conclusions demonstrating its decideveness: “The European Council strongly 
condemns Russia’s unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.760 PACE, similarly, deplored the Russian non-mandated military presence and its refusal to 
allow monitors.761 Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a monumental change. The EU 
continues to face disagreement among its member states over common approaches to the South 
Caucasus and this makes the achievement of a solution even more complicated. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2009_Morales_Russia_New_National_Security_Strategy_Medvedev.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=0558db804fb
4cfd6a6f7ff8bf7fc5c91. 
752 James Nixey, “The South Caucasus: Drama on Three Stages,” in America and a Changed World: A Question of 
Leadership, ed. Robin Niblett (London: Blackwell/Chatham House, 2010), 139. 
753 Interview 15; Interview 11. 
754 Adam Hug, “Georgia in Flux,” in Spotlight on Georgia, ed. Adam Hug (London: The FPC, 2009), 11. 
755 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Declaration 373, The Conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation, 18 
November 2008, Spain: NATO PA, Accessed 2-11-14, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1654, Para. 1. 
756 Rem Korteweg, “Russia and NATO at Strategic Crossroads,” Column, The Hague: HCSS, 2009, Accessed 3-11-09, 
http://www.hcss.nl/en/column/1212/Russia-and-NATO-at-strategic-crossroads.html. 
757 Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ukaz prezidenta rossiiskoi federatsii o priznanii Respubliki Abkhaziya, 26 Avgusta 
2008 goda №1260, Moskva: Kreml, Accessed 16-01-14, http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=047559, (in Russian); 
Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ukaz prezidenta rossiiskoi federatsii o priznanii Respubliki Iuzhnaya Osetiya, 26 
Avgusta 2008 goda №1261, Moskva: Kreml, Accessed 16-01-14, http://document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1114437, (in 
Russian). 
758 Interview 2. 
759 Interview 6. 
760 Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1 September 2008, 2. 
761 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1647 (2009), The Implementation of Resolution 1633 
(2008) on the Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia, Strasbourg: PACE, Accessed 09-01-14, 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=17708&Language=EN. 
144 
5.2. Divergence among EU Member States 
 
Differing interests among the EU member states raises the question of whether the EU, as a 
supranational institution, is divided internally. This subchapter tests the relevance of common 
positions within EU member states by examining the EU’s deliberations over involvement in the 
conflict between Georgia and Russia. After a brief overview about the literature on the EU’s 
common policy of engagement in the conflict, the next part observes the negotiation process around 
involvement and identifies general contours of divergences between some old and new member 
states, and among some old member states of the EU. 
 
An analysis of parliamentary debates of the EU member states who took the leading role in 
mediation demonstrates this disunity. The EU member states progressively created institutional 
means to foster consensus on their foreign policy directions for the common goals.762 Yet there are 
counterarguments against the viability of the EU’s common actions. As Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė 
argue, even if the institutional means of the EU converge into a common position, EU foreign 
policy is shaped by the most powerful member states.763 The decisions of the member states, acting 
unilaterally or in cooperation with one another, then move on to collective deliberations among all 
member states.764 Similarly, Joachim Bitterlich notes that national dissimilarities of the member 
states still outweigh commonalities among them and, in the absence of consensus among all 
member states, the EU finds it hard to formulate common foreign policy.765 In this context, a broad 
spectrum of opinions exists about a common foreign policy among the 27 member states regarding 
engagement in Georgia. Towards one end of the spectrum, the new member states hold that the EU 
should engage more resolutely in its eastern neighbourhood, and at the other end, some old 
members have different ideas about their engagement. During the conflict, two levels of divergence 
arose – predominantly between some old and new member states of the EU and among several old 
members. The EU appears to be coherent in approximation with conditionality to its neighbours, 
but it is not as consistent about pursuing common political agendas. 
 
During the conflict, the EU struggled to formulate a common policy for engagement. The Report on 
Implementation of the ESS noted that involvement in Georgia demonstrated the achievement of EU 
collective action and accentuated the need for a more coherent contribution. As the ESS reported, 
although the EU has made a difference in dealing with crises since 2003, there is a need to expand 
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its mediation capacities: “[w]e need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.”766 At 
the Extraordinary Meeting on 13 August 2008, the Council of the EU requested “to coordinate 
European assistance and to encourage pooling arrangements designed to enhance its 
effectiveness.”767 During the 2008 crisis, common assistance with joint resources implied the EU’s 
decision to deploy a civilian peacekeeping mission under the CFSP that was to be “conducted in the 
context of a situation which may deteriorate.”768 In its Communication to the Council, the 
Commission accentuated the importance of intergovernmental and institutional unity: 
[I]t is in the EU’s interest to engage with Russia in renewed efforts for the resolution of conflicts in our 
common neighbourhood. This requires the will and the capacity of the EU to act as one, combining both 
Community instruments as well as those of CFSP/ESDP.769 
 
The EU’s communication should be read as an encouragement for a common assertive engagement 
for halting hostilities and setting the pace for negotiations. Despite the declared common position, 
the EU has difficulty in adopting a shared perspective on Russia. In Grevi’s judgment, in the face of 
the differing stances towards Russia, the Union has struggled to speak with a single voice – the new 
member states, the Baltic countries and Eastern and Central European states took a proactive stance 
towards EU intervention, whereas France and Germany favoured a discreet approach.770 When 
confronted by the crisis, they chose to preserve functional relations with Russia rather than make 
their policy with Russia subject to disagreements over Georgia. A representative from the 
government office in Georgia also referred to limited political unity among the old and new 
members in relation to the EU’s involvement.771 Eventually, the EU supranational bodies agreed on 
the need for Europe’s diplomacy but, owing to the clear difference in national positions regarding 
intervention, the member states remained cautious to intervene in the conflict. 
 
Motivated by economic geographically and historically defined security concerns and wary about 
political repercussions, the leaders of the Eastern European and the Baltic states explicitly 
supported Georgia. During their visit to Tbilisi on 12 August 2008, the presidents of Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Poland, the Prime Minister of Latvia, and the President of Ukraine “reaffirm[ed] their 
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commitment to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia.”772 Most importantly, 
ten post-communist countries advocated a tangible approach to Russia even though their energy 
dependency on Russia was higher than that of the old members. As MacFarlane notes, Western 
leaders evoked the Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe and warned of the implications of 
Russia’s behaviour in their external relations.773 The old member states, France, Germany, Italy, 
and the UK were divided over how to deal with Russia.774 The author continues that the EU was 
unable to achieve consensus on a strong response because of the dependence of major member 
states of the EU on Russian energy exports.775 The EU decision to get involved in the crisis was not 
a result of a collective opinion of the member states on the urgency of the problem. Instead, it was 
largely determined by the initiative of the French presidency. In addition to the commitment from 
France, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel, conducted separate 
negotiations about a ceasefire with Moscow and Tbilisi. On 15 August 2008, Chancellor Merkel 
and President Medvedev met in Sochi and Chancellor Merkel thereafter visited Tbilisi. 
 
The study for this dissertation of the records from the parliamentary hearings on 12 August, 
regarding the situation and its consequences for Germany and the EU, reveals that the Bundestag of 
the Federal Republic of Germany refrained, at least for the time being, from participating in the 
EUMM. The German position was that the parties needed to meet the terms of the agreement under 
the Security Council mandate and that the OSCE mission could observe the agreement later, 
suggesting that Germany’s participation in an EU peacekeeping was premature.776 Some states from 
the group of the old members of the EU took a strong position about their engagement. The firmer 
stance of the UK distinguished it from the other old members of the EU. 
 
The UK’s political support of Georgia was fairly decisive in the common European action. As the 
Georgian ambassador to the UK said in 2009, the UK’s position was characterised by strong 
bilateral relations with Georgia.777 Similarly, as a UK FCO foreign policymaker comments, “the 
UK has kept a close bilateral relationship over two decades with Georgia and has maintained a 
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consistent approach towards the conflict.”778 On 9 August the UK Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, David Miliband, strongly supported a swift resolution to the conflict 
with the mediation of the EU, the UN, and the OSCE,779 and, during his visit to Tbilisi on 19 
August, the Secretary adopted a clearer stance by demanding Russia’s “immediate withdrawal” 
from Georgia.780 The visit of the Secretary Miliband was preceded by the visit at that time the 
leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, who called for the UK and the Western powers to 
take an assertive position in support of Georgia. To reaffirm its support, the visits of the UK 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, and Brian Fall, the UK’s Special Representative for 
South Caucasus, also followed at the end of 2008.781 The record of the British parliamentary 
debates shows that the House of Commons agreed with the Cabinet Office. As the European Union 
Committee at the House of Commons concluded: 
We agree with the overall policy of the Government and the European Union that it is important to remain 
engaged with Russia but, … engagement must be hard-headed, pragmatic and unsentimental.782 
 
The Defence Committee of the UK Parliament expressed a similar stance: “The Government should 
adopt a hard-headed approach to engagement with Russia, based on the reality of Russia’s foreign 
policy.”783 The EU Committee similarly assessed the EU’s negotiated agreements as “substantial 
but incomplete.”784 As a member of the UK Parliament observed, Britain and other European allies 
have an important role in resolving the conflict in Georgia.785 Denis MacShane argued in a 
newspaper article that, although David Cameron had defied traditional diplomacy and shown 
support of the country by going to Georgia during the war, the UK should make it even clearer   
that the annexation of Georgia is not acceptable.786 In policy circles, the UK’s position has not been 
seen as an immediate sign for the genuine engineering of a policy to back the South Caucasus.787 
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The positions of Germany and the UK were important because of their capacity for quick 
contributions to the ESDP missions. Whilst the German Bundestag exercises a strong oversight 
over military ESDP/CSDP deployments abroad, no parliamentary consent is required for the 
deployment of the unarmed missions.788 Similarly, the UK Parliament does not exert power of 
approval of the UK’s contribution and has a minor legislative scrutiny over the CFSP missions. The 
Senate of the Republic at Parliament of Italy showed its support by approving a Decree Law from 
22 September 2008 on the participation of Italy in the EUMM, contributing 40 observers to the 
mission.789 Italy was the second largest contributor of observers and resources after France.790 
Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Italian Republic, in 2010 took credit for playing a fundamental 
role in ending the crisis in Georgia.791 After 20 member states pledged their contribution to the 
EUMM, Germany made an input of 40 to the total number of 200 observers.792 The stance of 
Germany and the UK shows the divergences between the member states. Although the member 
states agreed on common values, their degree of support clearly differed. 
 
Despite these observable differences, officials from the Commission, the Council, and the 
Parliament unanimously confirm that, although policy towards Russia is an area where the EU is 
very often divided, in this particular case, there was unanimity for the EU’s action – first to bring 
the armed conflict to end and then to send a mission.793 As a Commission official said: “There was 
a surprising degree of unity in fact and there was unanimous backing from the presidency for the 
missions.”794 The European Parliament has supported stronger involvement in Georgia and 
encouraged the Council to take more assertive action. The Parliament generally advances the need 
to define common security interests, which would take the member states beyond national security 
interests and make the EU’s common policy more consistent.795 As the MEP comments on the 
Parliament’s stance to reform the EUFP, in order for the EU to react to external crises more 
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effectively: “If we maintain intergovernmental division, it would be difficult to maintain action.”796 
Referring to inter-parliamentary division, the South Caucasus Delegation of the European 
Parliament commissioned to join negotiations in Tbilisi stated: “EU is now a major partner in the 
Georgian peace process and will have to follow up to make it work. This needs the European 
Member States to stand together.”797 MEPs advocated employing economic and social sanctions, 
such as opposing Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). More specifically, 
during the Parliamentary debate on 1 September 2008, MEP Graham Watson (ALDE UK) 
suggested that one tangible response to Russia might be a boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in 
Sochi.798 Ruprecht Polenz (CDU), who chaired a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting at the 
Bundestag on 14 August, stated that proposals for a soft approach were not communicated by the 
Eastern members.799 At that point, as a foreign policy practitioner in Brussels recalls, in an effort   
to influence the behaviour of Russia, negotiations on renewing the partnership agreement with 
Russia, that had begun at the June 2008 Summit between EU and Russia, were suspended.800 In 
addition, on 27 August, the G7 countries issued a joint statement condemning the recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.801 Despite the original stance, talks with Russia resumed at the 22nd 
EU-Russia Summit in Nice in November 2008. After the crisis, the Parliament announced that the 
EU took concerted action with regard to both mediating the agreement and deploying the mission, 
which showed the EU’s capacity for a common European approach.802 Ultimately, the EU did reach 
a common position that brought the conflict to an end. 
 
The significance of the negotiation during the conflict was that it showcased disagreement among 
the member states over their engagement and deployment of the EUMM. This topic is evaluated in 
the next subchapter. The transposition of realist and liberal intergovernmentalist arguments onto EU 
foreign policy makes it evident that, although supranational values are important for common 
policy, it is the preferences and interests, that define the behaviour of the EU member states. 
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5.3. European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia 
 
The EUMM is regarded as the fastest deployed peacekeeping mission in the history of European 
foreign and security policy. Although the EU member states managed to pool resources in a joint 
policymaking action, an unarmed civilian mission reached Georgia a month after hostilities 
stopped. The search for consensus prolonged the deployment of the EUMM. In contrast to the 
prevalent view,803 this subchapter identifies the disunited positions of the states in relation to their 
presence in Georgia. During the debate over deployment, divergence in opinions among the states 
influenced the decision about their engagement. The absence of criteria by which the mission’s 
success can be measured, other than the terms of operation defined in the EUMM mandate, makes it 
arbitrary to evaluate the mission’s achievements. The study shows that insufficient security 
capabilities and the weak mandate have limited the EU’s conflict resolution. 
 
The EUMM required a strong crisis management system entailing economic, military and human 
capabilities. Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff indicate three types of capabilities necessary for a 
third party conflict involvement: policy tools and their timely deployment, funding and 
coordination.804 The EU has a limited budget to send new missions and this budget is complicated 
by the system of contributions from the member states.805 Between two streams of security 
capabilities, the CSDP proper entails civilian missions (police, civilian administration), whereas 
military operations are predominantly supported by individual states. The deployment of the 
EUMM provided a test for the EU’s security capabilities as member states had differing 
priorities.806 As noted by a Commission official, the EU avoided confrontation with Russia by any 
conceivable means and, in order to halt escalation, it mostly resorted to negotiations.807 The policy 
maker at the Council confirmed that the EU did not want to engage in military controversy with 
Russia and a civilian mission was better suited for the tasks of normalization and stabilisation.808 
Deployment of a military mission was excluded as it would not receive access to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, although, at the present time, the civilian mission does not have such access either, at 
some point, access for the civilian mission is not excluded, but the military mission would be very 
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unlikely to access the secessionist entities.809 In contrast to the EUMM, the EUSR does currently 
have access to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
After intense deliberations, the EU member states decided to deploy an EU civilian monitoring 
mission in Georgia. Following an exploratory mission, 200 monitors were sent from 22 states, 
starting on 15 September 2008.810 The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) envisaged a smaller 
deployment but the number of the contributing states increased to 26 in 2009 and remained 24 in 
2015.811 In addition, seven Crisis Response Team (CRT) personnel were dispatched to Georgia. The 
EUMM reached the ground two months after the conflict broke out and started to operate in 
October 2008.812 The EUSR for the Crisis stressed that EU involvement was not a “snapshot 
operation,” instead, it exemplified the EU’s capacity to mobilise in an uncharacteristically quick 
manner, whereas the involvement of the UN in the overall conflict, in comparison, would imply a 
gradual political exercise which would take time to put in place.813 In this case, the EU reached an 
essential outcome: the deployment of 220 mission observers in three weeks’ time, convening an 
International Donors Conference in Brussels, the establishment of Geneva discussions in a month, 
and, as a first result in Geneva, the formation of incident prevention and response mechanism 
groups.814 The Commission sums this up as a “unique commitment” made by the EU during the 
crisis.815 At present, with the UNOMIG and the OSCE missions suspended, the EUMM is the only 
international monitoring mission in Georgia. 
 
Two constraints to the EUMM, namely the narrow mandate and the limit of action, have 
conditioned the EU post-agreement implementation. The EUMM mandate entails four components: 
stabilisation, normalisation, confidence building, and informing the European policy.816 From the 
outset, the EUMM has not had the executive power to monitor and report on stabilisation and 
normalisation. Second, the EUMM has been denied access to the territories held ante bellum, as the 
patrolling capacity of the EUMM in South Ossetia stretches only 130 km along the ABL between 
Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT) and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whereas the UNOMIG and 
                                                          
809 Ibid. 
810 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP; European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Mission Facts and Figures, 
2015, Accessed 05-01-15, http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures. 
811 Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, “EU Peacebuilding in Georgia,” 287. 
812 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2009/572/CFSP on Amending and Extending Joint Action 
2008/736/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 197 2009, Accessed 4-01-13, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:197:0110:0110:EN:PDF. 
813 Interview 14. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Interview 11. 
816 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP, 27. 
152 
the CSCE/OSCE were meant to work on both sides.817 Thus, the mandate and the lack of access 
precludes the EUMM from carrying out its full tasks.818 On this restriction, the Russian and South 
Ossetian authorities require that the EU negotiates entry with the South Ossetian authorities. An 
observer deployed with the EUMM found that the language barrier and security considerations 
obstructed contact between observers and the people on the ground.819 Beyond these limitations, 
compared to the UNOMIG and the CSCE/OSCE, the EUMM has a more complex task in front of 
it. Given its size, the EUMM is expected to dismiss the Russian allegations about the Georgian 
forces concentrating at the boundaries of two autonomies. The Georgian side therefore keeps 
underlining with the European partners the need to sustain the mission.820 Together with its raison 
d’etre for the mission, the EU prolonged the mission’s mandates, doubling the budgetary support 
from EUR 31,000,000 to EUR 53,600,000 between 2008 and 2009.821 Although this growth mirrors 
support from the Council, the official from the SG/HR office in 2009 stressed that conflict 
resolution depends largely on the domestic situation in the country rather than on the EU’s 
support.822 The importance of the EUMM presence is regularly underscored at the Geneva talks, 
which are elaborated in the next subchapter. 
 
The EU is united around its common values and its member states pool national resources for joint 
policymaking, but they often do not share similar views about engagement in their neighbourhood. 
The case of the EUMM reveals the member states’ difficulty in finding consensus, but it also 
vividly illustrates the paradox of EU foreign policy that the EU can be both an agent with divergent 
national interests and a unitary actor in external relations. The hesitation over confronting Russia 
outweighs EU’s incentives to practice a more functional policy. Given the nature of its security 
capabilities and the mandate, the EUMM has been unable to build confidence along devided lines. 
 
5.4. The Geneva Process 
 
While EU mediation facilitated conflict stabilisation in 2008, it has subsequently been unable to 
resolve the conflict in the course of the Geneva International Discussions (GID). 31 rounds of 
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Geneva talks, in which the EU continued to be engaged as a mediator, found little tangible progress. 
Having examined the deployment and limitations of the EUMM in the previous subchapter, this 
part takes stock of the GID and evaluates the second phase of EU’s mediation following the sixth 
point of the peace agreement on security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
The Geneva Process, as a peace mechanism to negotiate security and stability in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, represents the new international format. The GID was established as a consequence 
of the peace agreement of 12 August 2008 and the implementing measures of 8 September 2008. 
Building on the sixth point of the August agreement, referring international negotiations on security 
and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the talks started in October 2008. This is 
the first format in which the common features of both the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South 
Ossetian conflicts are addressed. A month after hostilities, the Council appointed the EUSR for the 
Crisis to take the lead in the GID that brings all parties to conflicts with the participation of 
Georgia, Russia and the US, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and under the co-chairmanship 
of the EU, the UN, and the OSCE.823 All three intergovernmental actors are meant to reinforce each 
other to help the conflicting parties reach a compromise through discussions at the working groups, 
plenary meetings and consultations. 
 
Although the EU showed a readiness to create a dialogue, the GID revealed three major limitations. 
First, following the EU non-recognition policy, the EUSR inevitably had a predetermined position 
about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that inherently limited its neutrality when 
representing the Council.824 Second, the divergent preferences of the conflicting parties exceeded 
the EU’s already constrained leverage, limiting the outcome of negotiations. The third reason that 
diminished the EU’s impact was the lack of commitment from the EU to address the political aspect 
of the conflict. The first round of GID reflected differences in political interests among the parties, 
which were predicated on status issue rather than on reconciliation. At the GID the Georgian 
Government tried to internationalise the conflict, and conversely, the two breakaway entities sought 
to legitimise their sovereign status. The second round established two working groups (WGs): WG 
1 responsible for modalities of security and stability, and WG 2 on IDPs and refugees. The PACE 
assessed that the WG 1 made modest progress.825 The fourth round of the talks carried out in 
                                                          
823 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/760/CFSP on Appointing the EU Special Representative 
for the Crisis in Georgia, Official Journal of the European Communities L 259 2008, Accessed 5-01-14, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:259:0016:0018:EN:PDF. 
824 Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, “EU Peacebuilding in Georgia,” 289. 
825 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1683 (2009), Resolution on the War between Georgia 
and Russia: One Year After, Strasbourg: PACE, Accessed 5-09-12, 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=17774&Language=EN. 
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February 2009 introduced two parallel mechanisms of joint Incident Prevention and Response 
(IPRM) between Georgia and Abkhazia, with the participation of the EUMM. In the fifth round, it 
was agreed to form an OSCE-led joint assessment team to address disruptions in the infrastructure, 
but forming such group was inhibited by the closure of the OSCE. The Geneva talks were 
underway, but still the member states could not reach consensus with Russia over prolonging the 
mandate for the OSCE mission, which monitored South Ossetia for 17 years and was suspended in 
December 2008.826 Similarly, in June 2009, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution to renew 
the mandate of the UNOMIG that had operated in Abkhazia for 15 years.827 The conflict entities 
therefore lost their international presence. The UN remained engaged only in development-related 
activities through the UNDP and the election observation through the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).828 The sixth meeting, in July 2009, exchanged proposals 
on the non-use of force and the two consecutive meetings in the same year addressed humanitarian 
issues. The ninth and tenth rounds, in January and April 2010, reiterated the gradual approach. 
After the eleventh round, in June 2010, the Abkhaz delegation temporarily sabotaged the talks. 
 
During the rounds held between 2010 and 2013, the limited political dimension of the EU’s 
engagement has re-established the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are now 
recognised as independent states by Russia. As the President of Georgia explained in his 
conversation with the author in 2010, the Geneva discussions went into a stalemate.829 The EUSR 
for the Crisis was convinced in 2009 that, despite the recognition, the dialogue on Georgia’s 
conflict regions was instrumental and had to continue.830 In his assessment, the GID has been an 
“ongoing political process.”831 During the 24th round, in June 2013, the construction of fences 
along the ABL lines began in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.832 The EU’s Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) expressed “deep concern about the putting up … physical obstacles to the 
freedom of movement.”833 As an expert on the EU-Russia relations said, the EU needs to be more 
                                                          
826 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “OSCE Chairman Regrets Disagreement on OSCE Future in 
Georgia,” Press Release, 2009, Accessed 2-01-12, http://www.osce.org/cio/50525. 
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International Studies, 2009, Accessed 27-10-09, http://csis.org/files/publication/090619_Hamilton_Georgia.pdf, 1. 
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832 European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of Geneva Discussions, 
26.06.2013, Press and Public Information Section, Tbilisi, 2013, Accessed 18-10-13, 
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3896/. 
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self-confident about its neighbourhood policy and to be able to conduct a decisive policy with 
strategic patience.834 By 2014, the pre-conflict status quo ante in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had 
not been restored.  
 
Analysis of the Georgian President’s speeches between 2007-2013 reveal the expectations of 
solving conflicts through the EU. As the President Saakashvili stated: “[W]e will never forget the 
role the European Union played in obtaining the ceasefire, but we also hope that the European 
Union will never forget that the Ceasefire Agreement has never been implemented.”835 In the EU’s 
statements, besides the reiteration of support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, 
prevailed the importance of values, reforms, legislative alignment, and relations in the scope of the 
EaP. President Van Rompuy’s response to President Saakashvili carries such normative emphasis: 
“Our expectation is that the process of consolidating democratic institutions should continue.”836 In 
this period, Russia signed strategic partnerships and integration agreements with Abkhazia and 
South Ossettia, the conclusion of the latter coinciding with the 30th round of Geneva talks. By 
March 2015, the recurrent talks reached their 31st round without any tangible outcome towards a 
negotiated settlement. Despite profound obstacles and the limitations of the EU’s ability to become 
more influential in conflict mediation, keeping the format of negotiations is an achievement in itself 
and retains scope for progress. 
 
This chapter has offered an empirical analysis of the EU’s involvement after the Georgia-Russia 
conflict in 2008. The EU exhibited an uneven attitude to prevent the conflict and a hesitant 
approach to security conditions in Georgia. Some old member states felt that the EU was not the 
best-positioned actor to intervene. The new members, in contrast perceived that this crisis posed a 
challenge to their security. Ultimately, the difference that the EU made in addressing conflicts in 
Georgia since 2003 was that the EU acted as a mediator by seeking a peace agreement, appointing 
the EUSR, sending the EU peacekeeping mission, and initiating the GID. This subchapter has 
adopted reasonable criteria and examined the overall consequences following on from the EU’s 
exertion of its mediation influence. This analysis supports the chapter’s central contention that the 
widespread idea of the EU’s achievements, even if ultimately the member states agreed and 
contributed to deployment, is not justified by the existing empirical evidence. Although those 
                                                          
834 Interview 19. 
835 Administration of the President of Georgia, “Mikheil Saakashvili Met with European Council President in Brussels,” 
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actions illustrate a common foreign policy, the EU conflict resolution policy as a whole has not 
been coherent. The EU was unable to influence the peace process, given the prevalent interests of 
the member states, which can be explained by the realist and liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspectives.837 The new political realities have important implications for stability of EU’s 
neighbourhood.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has examined the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. By studying 
two aspects of EU policy in Georgia – conflict resolution and transport policy – the author’s own 
view is that the EU is incoherent in its conflict resolution but coherent in transport cooperation. The 
thesis has argued that the EU achieved coherence in transport cooperation with legislative 
alignment, creating common area, technical assistance for transit development, and coercive 
measures. The causal factors for incoherence in conflict resolution was different preferences of the 
old and new member states following their historical experience with Russia, and their inability to 
share foreign policy competencies that rests in institutional framework of the CFSP. The 
contribution that the thesis has offered is the study of EU foreign policy in transport as applied to 
the South Caucasus. 
 
The EU has pursued an approximation policy in transport towards the South Caucasus that has been 
largely absent from the literature on the EU external governance in sectoral areas, such as transport. 
Although, as chapter 2 reviewed, several articles mention EU external rule transfer,838 the literature, 
as a whole, is divided into three topics: a) CTP policy within the EU,839 b) EU foreign policy 
towards its eastern neighbourhood,840 and c) security in the South Caucasus.841 The study of EU 
foreign policy regarding transport in the South Caucasus has attempted to bridge these three topics.  
 
EU’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus can be divided into three periods: 1) 1992-2004, 
when the EU opened its delegations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, initiated TRACECA and 
concluded PCAs; 2) 2004-2008, when the EU included the region in the ENP; 3) 2008-2014, when 
the EU devised the EaP, mediated in 2008 and signed the AA with Georgia. Despite its aim for 
“improving coherence”842 across these three phases, the post-Lisbon CFSP implementation has 
been characterised by limitations of the EU member states to share competencies in foreign policy 
regarding key security developments in their neighbourhood. This thesis, therefore, has suggested 
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that the EU, despite the importance of the South Caucasus as a transit region for cargo and energy 
from Central Asia to the European markets, tends not to commit to conflict resolution. Instead, the 
EU is coherent in its approximation in the sectoral area of transport and solidifies its presence in its 
eastern neighbourhood in institutional terms. 
 
Most IR theories are unable to explain the nature of an entity that is not a state. Drawing on the 
definition of Ginsberg, the EU foreign policy is a strategy entailing the positions, relations and 
actions of the EU in world politics.843 EU foreign policy is based on the four approaches of 
normative, soft, civilian, and military power but, taken separately, these approaches cannot explain 
exactly Europe’s form of power. Therefore, this thesis has combined these approaches.844 As 
Manners and Smith proposed, as a normative power, Europe bridges civilian and military power.845 
The thesis has explained EU policy conduct through the application of the realist and liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework. Through this framework, Moravcsik, referred to earlier, identified 
different state preferences as a factor affecting major interstate negotiations within the EU.846 Hyde-
Price emphasised that the national preferences of the major states determine the outcome of 
negotiations.847 The EU’s incoherence in conflict resolution affirms the neoclassical realist and 
liberal intergovernmentalist orthodoxy that, despite shared values, EU policy is shaped by the 
divergent interests of major member states, motivated by their own preferences and experience with 
Russia. The combination of perspectives from these two theoretical layers is a way to build a bridge 
between the theory and practice of international relations. 
  
The single-case approach was chosen to examine EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus in 
its entity. Marked by a multiplicity of conflicts, this region is more prone to crisis than the rest of 
the EaP is and, therefore, the South Caucasus is the most representative case within the EU’s 
neighbourhood, notwithstanding the recent Ukraine crises. This thesis has positioned the research 
question in the context of EU common foreign policy and contested the view that the EU acts with a 
common policy. Discourse analysis of EU declaratory statements has found that normative 
convergence and socialisation are also pursued on a discursive level. Drawing on the study of 
academic and policy literature, documents, expert interviews, and direct observation, this thesis has 
developed a new source of secondary literature. After presenting concluding remarks, this chapter 
indicates areas for further research into the EU’s foreign policy. 
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6.1. Concluding Thoughts 
 
Since the 1990s the EU has refrained from engaging in conflict resolution in the presence of the 
international actors of the UN and OSCE. As MacFarlane pointed out, given the European powers’ 
lack of interest in the South Caucasus, there is no coherent EU policy strategy towards the region.848 
In terms of Fawn, the EU’s role in its eastern neighbourhood is also constrained.849 After 
determining the causes of the protracted conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the thesis has 
examined Russian involvement in the region. Mediator bias is implied by the fact that Russia was a 
signatory of peace agreements. In the three phases of its foreign policy, Georgia had fluctuating 
relations with Russia (1991-1995), re-orientated its policy towards the West (1996-2003), and 
continued an intense European and Euro-Atlantic policy (2004-2013) that caused its political 
disconnection from Russia. The EU’s external policy towards civil society in the South Caucasus 
leads to the same conclusion of incoherence regarding conflict resolution. On engagement without a 
recognition policies of both Georgia and the EU towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, chapter 4 
determined that, they have not focused on a substantial policy of engagement. 
 
Having examined the terms of the peace agreement mediated by the EU in 2008, the mandate of the 
EUMM and the Geneva Process, this thesis contend that the EU was not influential in mediation. 
The key question of the EU’s output in mediation has been assessed against the provisions of the 
agreement and the outcome of the GID.850 In the first phase of its mediation, albeit with divergent 
approaches among some old and new member states, the EU did play the distinct role of a principal 
mediator. However, the EU did not take an assertive position when clauses important for all parties 
were overridden. In addition, the EU has been unable to facilitate a compromise in the subsequent 
phase of mediation over the GID. The thesis thus argues that, irrespective the EU’s role in the 
ceasefire, the EU has not been influential in mediation. The EU could not conduct a coherent 
conflict resolution policy due to dissenting voices on engagement within the EU member states. 
 
By contrast, an analysis of EU policy in transport towards Georgia delivers a strong argument in 
favour of the EU’s coherent policy towards the South Caucasus. As chapter 3 argues, the EU has 
been coherent in its transport with legislative alignment, creating common area, technical 
assistance, and coercive measures. In order to bring institutional reforms to domestic maritime 
transport policy in Georgia, the EU has used sanctions, notably the withdrawal of recognition of 
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seafarers’ certificates and their re-recognition as a reward for reforms. The existence of TRACECA 
shows a high level of coherence in transit cooperation between the EU and the South Caucasus. 
 
6.1.1. Areas for Further Research 
 
 
The EU conducts a coherent policy in the sectoral area of transport, that has not been the case in 
relation to its conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The EU policy in transport and conflict 
resolution provides evidence that the nature of its common foreign policy towards the region has 
been inconsistent. There is both scholarly and social relevance for this research. With regard to 
social relevance, the thesis does not set out policy proposals for the EU and the South Caucasus 
countries, but it does advance knowledge into the identification of those areas in which EU policy 
solutions can be found. The recognition of the coherence of the EU’s transport policy makes it 
possible to suggest that, by conducting a coherent policy regarding conflict resolution, the EU can 
build on its established position in the South Caucasus. 
 
The examination of the particular conditions of the South Caucasus conflicts makes it clear that, 
although the EU helped formalise hostilities in Georgia, its engagement was ad hoc instead of being 
informed by a crisis preparedness. Looking beyond the South Caucasus, developments in Ukraine 
show that the EU has not engaged in other EaP countries with protracted conflicts using those 
foreign policy instruments at its disposal with greater determination. This thesis has come to the 
conclusion that whilst the EU transport cooperation has been coherent and conflict resolution 
incoherent, the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus has been inconsistent. 
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Notes  
 
1. In the Balkans the EU deployed the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(EUPM BiH) (2002), the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) 
(2004), the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (2008), the European Union Force 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia) (2003), the European Union 
Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) (2003), and the 
European Union Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) 
(2005). In the EaP countries, the EU sent the Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis) 
(2004), the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) (2005), 
and the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) (2008). The EU was militarily 
involved in Southeast Asia through the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (EU AMM) 
(2005). The EU engaged in the Middle East through the European Union Rule of Law Mission for 
Iraq (EUJUST LEX) (2005), the European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing 
Point (EUBAM RAFAH) (2005), the European Union Police Mission Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) (2006), and the European Union Police Mission to 
Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) (2007). In Africa the EU sent the European Union Military 
Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EU Artemis) (2003), the European Union Police 
Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa) (2004), the European Union Security Sector 
Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DR Congo) (2005), the European 
Union Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) (2006), European Union 
Congo Police Mission (EUPOL RD Congo) (2007), the European Union support to African Union 
Mission in Sudan (EU AMIS) (2007), the European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) 
in South Sudan (2012), the European Union Military Bridging Operation in Chad and the Central 
African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) (2008), the European Union Mission in support of Security 
Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) (2008), the European Union Naval Force 
Somalia (EU NAVFOR Atalanta) (2008), European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM 
Somalia) (2010), the European Union in Libya (EUFOR Libya) (2011), the European Union Border 
Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) (2013), the European Union Regional Maritime 
Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor) (2012), 
European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) (2013), and the European Union Capacity 
Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (2012). Cf: European External Action, Completed 
Missions and Operations, Ongoing Missions and Operations, Brussels: EEAS, 2014, Accessed 23-
04-14, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm. 
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